A Neo-Aristotelian Account of Predication
Auteur(e) : Luc Schneider
Adopting the so-called Ontological Square, a conceptual scheme that combines the distinction between universals and particulars with that between characters and their bearers, leads to a revision of atomic logical form resulting in a formal calculus called the Logic of the Ontological Square (LoOS). LoOS provides four forms of predication (i.e. instantiation, subsumption, attribution and inherence) instead of only one (i.e. exemplification) as in classical predicate logic. Furthermore, predication in LoOS consists in copulae binding individual terms, whether instance terms or type-terms. Despite this differences, however, LoOS can be given a semantics that is akin to a first-order semantics for standard second-order logic.
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1. Commentaire de Luc Schneider - le 31 août 2009 à 11:27
CHANGE: Actually I will discuss a simpler and more perspicuous system which is closer to predication in ordinary language, based on two ties: subsumption (which includes instantiation) and attribution (which includes inherence).
It is also interesting to note that the underlying ontology is a bicategorial substance-attribute ontology, since particulars can be conceived of as their own infimae species and hence only differ from universals in terms of generality. This makes dealing with Ramsey’s problem a bit easier.