Sopha 2009

According to Broome the requirement of instrumental rationality reads: You ought (If you intend to E and believe that your M-ing is a necessary means to E, form the intention to M).
One problem of Broome’s account of instrumental rationality is that the relationship between requirements of rationality and reasons remains obscure. I will therefore suggest a modification of Broome’s account. The principle of instrumental rationality can be fulfilled by either giving up the end or forming the intention to take the means. The normative requirement at stake is exactly that a rational agent should make that decision (which intention to form) in a considered way, i.e. by weighing the reasons for or against one of the two possible alternatives of fulfilling the normative requirement. This way a connection between the normativity of rationality and the normativity of reasons is established. I then defend my account of instrumental rationality against possible objections (drawing on the work of N. Kolodny and K. Setiya).

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