Fantasy: its nature, norms and value (University of Geneva).
Date: 10 - 11 October 2024
Location: Rue Jean-Daniel Colladon, 2.
Speakers:
• Julia Langkau (Geneva)
• Bence Nanay (Antwerp)
• Arina Pismenny (Florida)
• Gregory Currie (York)
• Steve Humbert-Droz (Umea)
• Miriam Schleifer McCormick (Richmond)
• Eden Lin (Ohio)
• Mathilde Cappelli (Geneva)
10th October 2024
9.15 - 10.45 - Julia Langkau (Geneva) (Chair: Mathilde Cappelli)
Towards a Taxonomy of Experiential Thinking
Building upon Katalin Balog’s (2020) notion of contemplation, this paper works towards a taxonomy of experiential thinking by distinguishing between fantasy, creative imagination and contemplation on the basis of subjective value (in the sense of experiential value) as well as in terms of directedness. I will make plausible that all three ways of thinking are guided by attention to subjective value and then argue that fantasy is best understood as being directed towards the self, while both creative imagination and contemplation are outward-directed in different ways, sometimes involving an aspirational goal. Further, subjective value involved in fantasy is of one particular kind, while creative imagination and contemplation both encompass a much broader range of values.
11.00 - 12.30 - Bence Nanay (Antwerp) (Chair: Kael McCormack)
The Innocence of Imagination?
According to a widely held view both within and outside philosophy, imagination is innocent in the sense that it does not influence what we think and do. Hence, we can let our imagination wander anywhere. There are two ways of pushing back against this ‘innocence of imagination’ claim. The less controversial one is to argue that imagination does in fact influence some of our other mental states. The defenders of the ‘innocence of imagination’ claim could accept this line of argument and still maintain that this does not mean the loss of innocence as imagination may still never be in a position to have any kind of (harmful) influence on our actions. I argue that imagination is not innocent even in this narrower sense as imagination can and does influence many of our actions.
14.15 - 15.45 - Arina Pismenny (Florida) (Chair: Anaïs Giannuzzo)
Sexual Fantasy and the Politics of Desire
In this paper, I explore the ethical and political dimensions of sexual fantasy. As Amia Srinivasan has compellingly argued, even our most private desires may be influenced by social power dynamics. Feminist critiques of sexual desire have highlighted the ways in which fantasies can be shaped by systems of inequality and often reinforce patriarchal norms. However, neuroscientific research has established that there is a potential disconnect between desire and pleasure; I argue, partly on that basis, that despite this influence, sexual fantasy’s unique relationship to desire on the one hand and to pleasure on the other allows it to serve as a safe imaginative space where desires can be explored without conforming to societal expectations or moral norms. Some fantasies are amoral, if not apolitical, when they remain purely imaginative and do not motivate real-world action. This is because the teleology of certain fantasies aims solely at the enjoyment of the fantasy as such—engaging in a form of imagining that just happens to provide pleasure, without making any claim to being in itself desirable. This, in turn, allows us to appreciate the epistemic and aesthetic dimensions of fantasies. They can provide insights into personal psychology and serve as a medium for exploring and understanding complex emotions, desires, and even social power dynamics in a space that is free from moral judgment, which may in turn lead to sexual liberation.
16.15 - 17.45 - Gregory Currie (York) (Chair: Radu Bumbăcea)
TBA
11th October 2024
9.15 - 10.45 - Steve Humbert-Droz (Umea) (Chair: Irene Lonigro)
On distinguishing hoping from fantasizing.
Both lay people and philosophers assume that hoping for something implies imagining it (Bovens 1999, 2021). According to a popular account, hoping is typically constituted by fantasizing about a possible outcome (Martin 2011, 2013). This idea, while promising, doesn’t align with two widespread views on hope. First, contrary to wishes, we cannot hope appropriately about anything - e.g., outcomes we believe impossible (Milona & Stockdale 2018; Wheatley 1958). Second, contrary to mere fantasizing, hopeful imagining is supposed to possess an epistemic power (Martin 2013: 88).
In this talk, I argue with Martin that hope paradigmatically involves an instance of cognitive imagination. However, rather than framing hope as involving "free-play" fantasy, I contend that hopeful imagination operatesunder constraints (Kind 2016, 2018). The cognitive base of hope (i.e., the states on which the hopeful feeling is based) provides the type of constraint that allows hopeful imaginings to have epistemic value. Finally, I contrast hope and wishes, providing arguments to distinguish them (contra Martin 2011 and Kind 2016). While hopeful imagining relies on both a conative and cognitive base, wishful imagining mainly relies on conative states.
11.00 - 12.30 - Miriam Schleifer Mccormick (Richmond) (Chair: Francesca d’Alessandris)
Wondering With Impunity: Why it is (almost) Never Wrong to Wonder”
I argue that a kind of wondering, which I call pure wondering is never epistemically wrong. Further, this kind of wondering has great value; given its value, it should rarely be discouraged but, instead fostered and cultivated. I begin with a brief discussion of some different ways of thinking about wondering that one finds in recent discussions, and clarify the nature and value of pure wondering. The kind of radical openness of unrestricted wondering is linked to creativity, humility and perhaps a kind of peacefulness. I then turn to some candidate epistemic norms for when and why wondering should be restricted. I argue that none of these restrictions are warranted for pure wondering. But, even if epistemic norms do not apply, what about practical, moral or fittingness norms? I go on to consider some of the risks of wondering, focusing on moral concerns about unrestricted wondering. Is not firm closed-mindedness sometimes what is needed in matters of moral importance? I argue that belief and commitment are compatible with pure wondering; that this is so tells us something about the nature of belief. The final section will discuss whether certain kinds of objects are not worthy of wonder which would make pure wondering unfitting if directed at those objects. I concede that there may be cases where fittingness norms apply but, as has been made clear in discussions of fittingness of attitudes, whether it is fitting to hold a particular attitude does not settle whether it is wrong to hold it. One of the worries about wondering includes its content. Are there not some things we should not wonder about? This is closely connected to a common concern about fantasy; are there not some things we should not fantasize about?
14.15 - 15.45 - Eden Lin (Ohio) (Chair: Agnes Baehni)
Fantasy, Pleasure, Desire, and Morality.
It seems clear that to fantasize about something requires imagining it while feeling pleasure, but it is less clear what the nature and object of this pleasure must be. In this paper, I distinguish two views about the nature and object of the pleasure that is required by fantasy, and I argue that one of these views makes it easier than the other to justify the claims that one cannot fantasize about something without desiring it and that some fantasies are morally objectionable.
16.00 - 17.30 - Mathilde Cappelli (Geneva) (Chair: Céline Schöpfer)
The enigmatic pleasure of fantasy
This talk aims to elucidate the nature of fantasy and sexual fantasy in particular, which has not been explored much in the philosophical literature and mostly in relation to imagination. In order to do so, I shall first distinguish fantasy from imagination by specifying the sort of pleasure centrally involved in fantasy. I shall then argue that the attitudes of desiring and fantasizing strongly interact with each other and that the nature of this interaction should be clarified, because if not one may be tempted to misleadingly assume that fantasizing necessarily involves desiring. This assumption is exposed to the following objection: in a nutshell, if (i) the pleasurable activity of fantasizing x necessarily involves desiring x, if (ii) desiring x is a source of displeasure when this desire is unsatisfied and if (iii) fantasizing x does not satisfy one's desire for x, then (iv) it seems difficult to account for the pleasure we take in fantasizing.