What is a
Musical Genre
and What is its Use?

An Ontological and Æsthetic Analysis
of a Socially Dependent
Art Category

Mémoire de Maîtrise universitaire,

présenté au

Département de philosophie à l'Université de Genève,

sous la direction de

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Année académique 2013-2014.

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PART 0. INTRODUCTION

0.1. Abstract

This essay is dedicated to the study of the nature of musical genres. I will ask and try to answer such questions as: What sort of object are they? What do all musical genres have in common and how do they differ from each other? Why do we classify music into genres? How do we distinguish between musical genres and what are our distinctions based on? What is their importance from an æsthetic point of view?

My methodology will be to first draw desiderata from common uses of the phrase, philosophical theories on the subject, and discussions of examples[1] and then to give a final analysis trying to fulfill those desiderata in a satisfying way[2]. The four main conclusions found in the final analysis will be that (i) whether a musical output (a general term embracing e.g. a musical work, performance, improvisation, composition, recording, draft, …) is considered to belong to such or such genre is an important matter for æsthetic evaluation. (ii) Musical genres are social objects (the sort of entity that John Searle calls *status functions*) owing their existence to a collective recognition of their status, which serves a specific function, in paradigmatic cases: to give the genre's musical outputs a set of æsthetic constraints that the audience can expect to be respected. Furthermore, the fact, if it is one, that a musical output belongs to a specific musical genre and that it thus acquires a specific status function (iii) depends strongly on the ontological nature of the musical output which can consist not only in its musical structure, but also in its musical medium, its historical context of creation, its process of transmission, and other features. Finally, (iv) musical genres depend strongly on the artist's intentions that his or her musical output be considered as belonging to a certain art category.

0.2. Structure of the essay

Apart from the introduction, this work is divided into five parts.

In the first part (pp. 5-14), I will study the common use of the phrase "musical genre" and draw a first set of desiderata from this preliminary investigation. To do so, I will distinguish between musical genres, musical forms, and musical styles as well as examine the relation that we normally consider musical outputs (works, performances, recordings, etc.) to bear with their genres.

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[1] A vast majority of my musical examples are taken from the realm of either Western 20th century popular music or Western classical music (both new and old). This is due to the fact that these are the two traditions about which I know the most and I hope that this bias will not affect what I have to say about musical genres in general. If it does, then one should consider that my study is only centered on those two traditions.

[2] Notice already that if the first desiderata are drawn from common uses of the phrase "musical genre", the last ones are drawn from argumentations and analysis and work like intermediary conclusions. I still decided to call them desiderata, although this term is often reserved only for pre-requisites to the analysis, because even the last ones still are, in the end, propositions that should be desired to be part of the final conclusions.

In the second part (pp. 14-32), I will study philosophical theories about musical genres and different ontological kinds of musical objects. Ideas found in the work of Nelson Goodman, Philip Alperson, Stephen Davies, Theodor Gracyk, Andrew Kania, and Roger Pouivet will be discussed in relation to several musical examples. Positive and negative points of these theories will lead us to a second set of desiderata, not directly drawn from common sense this time but rather serving as intermediary conclusions.

In the third part (pp. 32-47), I will study the important relation that art categories (of which musical genres is a kind) bear with artists' intentions. To do so, Jerrold Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism and Kendall Walton's paper on art categories will be presented and discussed in relation with further musical examples. Another set of desiderata will be drawn.

In the fourth part (pp. 47-68), I will present John Searle's theory of social ontology and argue that it can serve as a basis for the analysis of the nature of musical genres. I will adapt Searle's concept of status function to some of the findings acquired in the preceding parts and argue that both the positive and negative points found above can be dealt with using the idea that musical genres are a kind of status function. Further musical examples will be analyzed. A last set of desiderata will be drawn.

In the conclusion (pp. 68-80), I will give a one-paragraph summary of what I consider musical genres to be and use it to show how it can fulfill the desiderata accumulated during the essay. I will then give a last and, I hope, helpful example of an application og my analysis.

Let us now go on with the rest of the introduction where I will present some of the reasons that led me to choose this subject.

0.3. Why study musical genres?

In order to introduce the reasons behind a study on musical genres, I propose to briefly explain how I came to research this subject as I consider this to be a telling story of some of its important aspects. What really led me to it, more than philosophy, was my experience as a musicology student in Geneva. When I first started my Bachelor's degree, I was expecting to study all different kinds of music but looking forward to deepen my strongest musical interests, which were mostly centered around 60s garage-rock and German *komische Muzik*, 70s African-American dance music, and 80s post-punk. To my surprise, I soon found out that none of these musical genres were taught or even vaguely approached. The only 20th century musical genre taught in any musicology course in Geneva was what they called contemporary music. There were seminars on Karlheinz Stockhausen, but no one talked about the students of his who formed CAN. Professors talked for hours about Pierre Henry, but forgot to mention his collaboration with the Spooky Tooth. We were reading texts from Luciano Berio, but not his book on rock. Steve Reich, La Monte Young, and Terry Riley's innovations were examined, but not their musical exchanges with Irmin

Schmidt or Brian Eno. Pierre Boulez was praised as both a composer and a conductor, but not for his work with Frank Zappa. Perhaps more surprisingly, jazz also was entirely absent from the Genevan program[3]. For the final examinations validating a Bachelor's degree, students were told they could be tested on everything contained in the 1988 edition of the *Norton History of Western Music*, but could ignore the five more recent editions as they started to included chapters on jazz and popular music.

I found this situation strange and I tried to find explanations. Of course, a strong underlying reason seemed to be that classical music, both contemporary and old, was considered more valuable and thus more worthy of study. I thus tried to figure out what values exactly are at stake in this tacit but firmly established evaluation. I asked professors about it but everybody declined to judge the whole Western classical tradition as necessarily better than any other, although it was the only tradition they talked about. A common response I got from them was that it was unfortunate, but the teaching members' domains of specialization did not include any kind of popular music, or any kind of non-Western music. The closest it got to popular music was when we discussed Belá Bartók and the Trecento, but even then, the limit separating the classical composers from their popular influences seemed clear to the teachers.

It was not for me. Why were frottola or troubadour music considered worth studying, but not blues and griots' music? Why did we have to learn the (not so impressive) musical innovations of Christian Cannabich, whilst writing a paper on any of the many musical genres Miles Davis had contributed to was not possible? Why did we have to spend a whole year studying rhythm notations in the late French Middle-Age (although not one student cared about it), but did not spend half a minute on the development of studio techniques (which are so important to understand most of today's music)? It seemed to me, as Alessandro Baricco had put it, that the border of classical music was similar to the Roman Empire's: no one could tell where it stopped but many were ready to protect it (Baricco, 2006: 19).

Anyhow, although I couldn't give a reasonable explanation of how the program had been determined, these enquiries helped me to figure out a certain number of criteria that certainly did *not* explain it: the program was not based on musical complexity or musical superiority of any kind (otherwise early Mozart would be replaced by Meshuggah), it was not based on the instruments used or the technique of composition (since *musique concrète* and rap use the same medium), it was not based on musical influence or on a certain musical filiation from master to student, musical references, or inspirational sources (otherwise CAN, Kraftwerk, or Emerson, Lake and Palmer should have been included). The diversity found in what is labeled classical music, from Francesco Landini to John Cage, as well as strong musical similarities to some popular music, such as Klaus Schulze's or Florian Schneider's, made it

[3] To do complete justice to the Department, let us note the exception: during one semester, it would have been possible for me to validate 1.6% of my degree by taking a course on pre-WWII jazz (be-bop not included) given in an engineer school situated 60 kilometers East of the University of Geneva. The only thing is that I would have had to pay for the (rather expensive) train tickets.

impossible to differentiate them on musical grounds[4]. So what was it? This is where my study of musical genres began.

The most fitting answer that I found seemed at that time to be unsatisfactory. It was derived from the descriptions that Arthur Danto and George Dickie gave of art (Danto, 1964 & Dickie, 1969). The best way to differentiate between classical and popular music, I thought, was to look at the way music was classified by a mysterious net of institutions: the artworld. The latter is composed of museums, professional critiques, art historians, but also music conservatories, radio presenters, or musicologists. According to Dickie, art is determined by a certain status, that he calls the status for appreciation, attributed to some artifacts by this net of institutions. This is roughly how his notion of status for appreciation works: To know what kinds of paint-jobs are considered art, you should look at what museums expose. Are comics art? Well, it depends if they are hung in galleries or not. Etc., etc. Dickie's definition of art might be too restrictive for everything we would like to label as art[5] but restrictiveness seems to be the order of the day when considering the distinction between popular and classical music. I thought, then, that in order to tell whether something is considered classical music or not, maybe we should look at what kind of music is taught in conservatories or played in classical music institutions. Irmin Schmidt? No. Rhys Chatham? Not in Switzerland. Steve Reich? Yes, since a couple of decades. La Monte Young? It depends on the work.

This institutional answer was unsatisfactory to me because it seemed to be circular: if classical music was what art institutions thus classified, how did art institutions choose it? Furthermore, if this answer seemed to work for classical music, it did not explain how jazz, or rock, or techno, or rap, or hi-life music could be grouped together, since those genres don't have a body of institutions clearly established, as classical music does. I began to wonder: how is the classification into musical genres similar from one genre to the other? Are there other musical genres than classical music that seem to be explainable only on such an uncertain basis? If what is considered classical music seems not to depend on a value-basis, why is it considered more respectable than other genres for so many people?

That is also when I began to realize that a vast majority (something that must approach 90%) of the money Switzerland spends on music is dedicated to classical music. Jazz might be around 5% to 8% since there are two Swiss schools that allow you to do a Bachelor's degree in jazz, since 2006. Furthermore, anyone wishing to teach music in primary schools, secondary schools, or in higher education, can only do so if they possess a degree in jazz or classical music. All of this is even more surprising when one thinks about the fact that jazz and classical music are among the least popular musical genres –as of 2013, classical music represented 2.8% of the music industry and jazz 2.3% (Vanhoenacker, 2014). How is it possible that in Switzerland, a country that never even had a strong jazz or classical music tradition (the

[4] For other arguments in favor of thinking that it is impossible to differentiate between popular and art music on musical grounds, I can transmit upon request a non-published article on the subject called *La musique populaire savante.*
[5] See for instance the critique by Jerrold Levinson in "Defining Art Historically".

most famous Swiss composer being Arthur Honegger), such genres are so well established in state institutions?

These questions brought me to realize that one possible answer is that classical music, and jazz to a lesser degree, can be studied from notated works. On the contrary, the most popular musical genres of today (pop, rap, R'n'B, rock, electronic music, etc.) are not based on written music at all but rather on studio technologies. Soon after, I discovered Theodor Gracyk's book on the æsthetics of rock who defended and deepened this idea with a philosophical rigor and clarity that made me realize that the questions to which my musicology studies brought me could very well be treated from a philosophical point of view. I thus continued to research these topics and that is what brought me to write this *mémoire.*

PART 1. COMMON USE OF THE PHRASE "MUSICAL GENRE"

1.1. Meno's paradox

The question "What is a musical genre?", just as any of the form "What is an X?", can be considered subject to Meno's paradox:

> *Meno* – And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know? (Plato, 2008, 80d-e)

If we do not know what musical genres are, then how will we ever find out what the object of our enquiry is? But if we do know what they are, then there is nothing to enquire about; the question is purely rhetorical and pretending not to know the answer is hypocritical. Or so it can seem.

Fortunately, there is a way to bootstrap ourselves out of this paradox: we can figure out the way we normally use this concept in every day discourse in order to single out the object of the enquiry and use this data as the *explanandum* of our analysis. The different uses of the term might not always be coherent and sometimes one needs to modify the *explanandum* to give a satisfactory *explanans*. As it is sometimes said, common sense might not have the last word but it should have the first one. I will thus begin by presenting a certain number of characteristics pertaining to what seems to be the common use of the phrase "musical genre" and extract desiderata that should be met in the final analysis.

A first thing that we can note about "musical genre" is that we use this term to group musical outputs into categories, but that it is not the only way to do so. We also group musical outputs into other types of categories, two of the most common ones apart from genres being *styles* and *forms.* Even if we sometimes use those three expressions interchangeably, they are not synonymous and it is instructive to see how the

latter categorizations differ from musical genres. Let us then examine the distinction between style and genre.

1.2. Genre vs. style

In everyday discourse, we sometimes distinguish "genre" and "style" neatly, as when we say that Eminem's style has evolved a lot between his first and second album even though he was still making music in the same genre, but it is also quite common to use these terms to mean the same thing. For instance, one could ask "What are your favorite styles of music?" interchangeably with "What are your favorite genres of music?". In music literature, it is also common to find authors who do not draw a clear line between the two concepts. In any case, one can also find attempts to clearly distinguish styles and genres and some of them seem to reflect our everyday usage of the terms.

Even if there are a lot of diverging ways of trying to settle this distinction, the general tendency in musicological studies is to consider genres, unlike styles, to depend strongly on historical, social, or geographical parameters as well as on the composer's, or other relevant observers', assertions (e.g. declarations, manifestos, newspapers' reviews, concerts' programs, etc.). On the contrary, styles are considered as categorizations fundamentally based on strictly musical features, or *formal* features (e.g. types of harmony, counterpoint techniques, rhythm patterns, instrumentations, instruments' techniques, modulations, composition techniques, etc.).

The importance of formal features pertaining to styles is obvious in musicologist Johan Fornås' conception of the term, which reflects quite well on what basis the distinction between styles and genres is generally drawn:

> A style is a particular formation of formal relations in one single work, in the total work of an artist, or in a group of works across many genres. (quoted in Moore, 2001: 440).

David Cope has a similar definition, although it is limited to the styles of individual composers. For him, the style of the individual S in the musical instances X (for instance, Mozart's style in his early piano sonatas, Jimi Hendrix's style in his guitar solos, or Brahms' style in his entire œuvre) is defined as all the musical elements that are common to all S's X. At first glance, this might seem much too simple to be true. Anyhow David Cope's definition has an empirical plausibility to it, as it is the working definition used for his computer program EMI, whose function is to create new musical pieces in the style of a given composer. EMI analyses the pitches and durations of the notes in a certain number of pieces, makes some kind of statistical synthesis of the information and then recreates a new piece on the basis of this synthesis (Cope, 1992). The style of the output is surprisingly similar to the style of the original pieces.

Indeed, it seems to me that, for instance, some of Mozart's piano emulations would be attributed to the Viennese composer even by connoisseurs[6].

If Cope's definition is close to being accurate (and one would think it is when listening to EMI's emulations)[7], in order to decide whether a certain piece belongs to a certain style, instead of having to look at the historical background of the piece, or at what the composer said about it, or at the way people used to classify the piece at the time, etc., we would only need to find out how much strictly musical (or formal) similitudes there are between the piece and a statistical synthesis of the works that are part of the style[8]. Cope's work does not offer such a method, but it takes for granted that parameters such as historical periods, geographical origin, composer's background, directed audience, and other contextual features of musical works are not relevant in defining musical styles. This is not true of musical genres. Cantante, German rap, and acid-house are deeply anchored in socio-historical features and this seems to generally be a distinctive feature separating styles and genres.

A clue leading to the same conclusion is that, if I became skillful enough, I would be able to create a piece in whoever's style (Mendelssohn's, Pink Floyd's, Machaut's, etc.), but there are genres in which I will never be able to write pieces, as for instance in Ars Nova, Grand Opera, or romantic Lieder. The reason is that those genres belong to historical periods that are over. If I nevertheless try to imitate them, we would probably classify my creations as *neo*-Ars Nova, *new* Grand Opera or *post*-romantic Lieder, just like we categorize Stravinsky's *Pulcinella* as belonging to the *neo*-classical genre. Similarly, if I have lived in Switzerland all my life, I will not be able to make West-Coast rap or Delta blues, even if I can mimic Snoop Dogg or Robert Johnson very well. Furthermore, since favelas and gangsters designate social entities, favela funk and gangsta rap depend on socio-economical origins[9]. All of this seems to point to the fact that styles depend on formal musical features only while genres, or at least some of them, can depend on the work's origin and its context of creation. Thus, we can spell out the first desideratum of our analysis.

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[6] Musical examples of EMI's emulations are available on David Cope's website: http://artsites.ucsc.edu/faculty/cope/mp3page.htm

[7] It is true though that Cope's working hypothesis does not always represent the use we make of the expression "musical style". For instance, I might compose a little piece strongly inspired by Bach's inventions, but very different to his cantatas. We would probably say that my composition is in Bach's style *tout court* and need not restrict the classification to Bach's *inventions'* style. Anyway Cope's definition makes Bach's style *tout court* dependent on his cantatas just as much as on his inventions and the EMI's synthesis of Bach's style *tout court* would thus have a good chance to be quite dissimilar to the little piece I created (which would be, according to Cope's definition, in Bach's *inventions'* style and not exactly in Bach's style *tout court*). There thus are cases where Cope's definition does not reflect the way we normally use the term but, in any case, I think that if it is somehow possible to emulate the style of a composer S in his or her works X by analyzing what is common in all S's X, then a composer's musical style is something that is strongly dependent on purely formal (or strictly musical) features.

[8] Of course, this implies that we already know that a certain number of pieces belong to a certain style, but that is also the case when we ask: "Does x belong to this style or not?".

[9] It is worth noting however that gangsta rap is nowadays sometimes used to label lyrical contents only, whether or not the rapper has been, or still is, a gangster. Before the mid-90s, when artists such as Snoop Dogg, Tupac, or Dr.Dre started to become extremely popular, gangsta rap was a term which only designated to rappers who legitimately claimed to be gangsters and would not have been given to a cheat. This has changed over the 21st century and this rather new tendency, exemplified by Lil' Wayne for instance, will probably increase during the coming years. This illustrates the fact that denotations of some names of musical genres change over time.

(1) Musical genres, unlike styles, are not always strictly based on the formal features of the music but can possess a strong contextual anchorage, such as a determined historical period, a geographical provenance, or a specific sociological origin.

This difference between styles and genres can be linked with another distinctive feature that some genres possess but that styles don't: conventions. Musicologist Allan F. Moore, when distinguishing styles and genres, highlights it this way:

> … we can describe the symphonies of Beethoven and Brahms as belonging to the same *genre*, while inhabiting different styles. Comparing the symphonies of Beethoven and Lutoslawski, conventions of genre are still vaguely present, while the distinction between styles is greater, because of the intervening weakening of tonality. On the other hand, Beethoven's sonatas for piano and his symphonies use different conventions of genre, but are written within the same style. This seems to represent the terms' everyday usages. (Moore, 1998:1)

The phrase "conventions of genres" does indeed apply well to symphonies, operas, madrigals, masses, etc. but we would not use it to describe what is distinctive to Schubert's Lieder style or to the Yarubas' drumming style. Styles seem to be categories that apply to the character of certain music that already exists, however this character has been obtained. On the contrary, genres can sometimes be compared to musical recipes, consisting in some conventional constraints to respect in order to create something that would belong to the genre in question. For instance, a string quartet piece is written conventionally for two violins, a viola, and a cello and contains several movements. These conventions can be challenged (for instance, Shostakovich's 13th string quartet has only one movement), but remain paradigmatic to a genre. Thus, if I write a piece of music for two violins, a viola, and a cello with several movements, I would have created a string quartet. To make music in a certain style, you normally don't follow steps. It is true that we might be able to formulate a certain number of rules to follow in order to create a piece in some composer's style, but those rules won't be conventions. They would rather be descriptive rules found *a posteriori,* such as the rules that Joseph Fux spelled out in *Gradus Ad Parnamus* to allow readers to compose in Palestrina's style. A genre's conventions (for instance, the convention according to which a classical symphony begins with an *adagio* movement) seem not to be *a posteriori* rules but rather constraints to respect (or to challenge) when creating in this genre. Thus our second desideratum is that:

(2) Musical genres, unlike styles, can be conventionally constituted in some respects[10].

[10] Note that the point here is only to say that some genres have conventions when styles seem not to have any and I am thus not denying that there can be some genres without any convention. For instance, in order to make punk music, one seems not to have to follow any particular conventions, musical or otherwise (there is punk music that sounds like rap, other that sounds like metal, etc. and the musicians' attitudes, statements, origins, etc. also vary a lot in this genre).

1.3. Genre vs. form

There is another type of musical categorization that comes with conventions: musical forms. Forms though, like styles, but unlike genres, are not contextually anchored. There are strict criteria to determine whether a piece is in sonata form, if a *Lied* is in the *durchkomponiert* form or in the simple strophic form, or if a medieval *chanson* is a *virelai*, a *ballade,* or a *rondeau,* and, as might be obvious, they depend on formal features only, and thus not on socio-historical criteria. If I create a piece that starts in the tonality of *C,* exposes a first theme, modulates to G, exposes a second theme, modulates to a few different tonalities without new thematic material, makes a cadence in *G,* modulates back to *C* to expose the two themes again before a final cadence, I will have created a piece in sonata form, no matter when I created it, in what context, or what people think of it.

Likewise, I could make up a form with an ABACDEFEFCABA structure (where each letter represents, say, a distinct melody) and call this form "Ramdam". Furthermore, if you make a piece with the ABACDEFEFCABA melody structure, even if there is no link between my made-up form and your composition, I would be allowed to say that your piece has the Ramdam form without further ado. I don't need anyone's point of view to be entitled to describe whosever piece as having the Ramdam form.

This is not true of musical genres. I cannot make up the genre "made-on-Mondays" and say that such piece by Vivaldi and such song by Syd Barrett belong to it because they were made on Monday without further ado. Even though I could rightly say that they are part of the set made-on-Mondays, for this set to become a genuine genre, it seems that I would have to convince at least some other people that it is worth grouping together works that were made on Mondays and ascribing them this peculiar genre classification. In other words, you cannot just make up a genuine genre as you can make up a genuine musical form. Ascribing correctly a form to a piece only requires that the form ascription correctly represent the musical structure of the piece. Ascribing a genre to a piece demands more than just the accurate representation of its structure or of the fact that a piece was made on a Monday.

But then, what else than a correct representation of a certain fact is needed for an accurate genre categorization? Why is it acceptable to classify such song as part of the rockabilly genre but not as part of the 124-BPM genre? A first guess would be that genre classifications should correspond to the way people usually classify music. That seems right but it cannot explain how musical genres can emerge. For instance, why did rockabilly become a genuine genre and not 124-BPM? It seems that, for a new genre classification to arise, it should somehow be able to convince others that this genre is worth using as a musical classification. Once more, this is not the case for form classifications. Thus, our third desideratum is that:

(3) Musical genres, unlike forms, are not simply accurate representations of a certain feature of the piece it applies to (such as its structure, its tempo, or the day on which it was created) but further needs to somehow correspond to the way people usually classify music or be a convincing or interesting way of grouping musical outputs together.

1.4. Æsthetic relatedness

Further desiderata can be found when considering relations between æsthetics issues and musical genres. A first thing to note on this subject is the similarity in æsthetic properties that musical outputs belonging to the same musical genre often share. For instance, compositions belonging to dodecaphonism are normally demanding. Performances belonging to thrash-metal are generally powerful. Works belonging to classicism mostly are harmonious. Reggae music is mellow. Etc., etc. Furthermore, there are musical genres that are aesthetically very dissimilar. For instance, hardcore punk and Gregorian chants don't share much æsthetically[11].

Relatedly, it is often much easier to judge whether a work is better than another if they belong to the same genre rather than works belonging to æsthetically foreign genres. For instance, it is obvious to me that IAM's album *L'École du micro d'argent* is much better than F.F.'s *Si Dieu veut…* and this obviousness is definitely related to the fact that they both are late 90s Marseilles rap. Conversely, it would be really hard for me to tell whether *L'École du micro d'argent* is better or not than Jacques Dutronc's first album, a 1966 garage-rock work. With this in mind, we can formulate the following desiderata:

(4) Musical outputs belonging to the same genre are æsthetically more similar to one another, on a general basis, than to musical outputs belonging to different musical genres and this allows to judge more easily the comparative worth of musical outputs belonging to the same musical genre.

Now, musical genres are often associated not only with similarities in æsthetic qualities but also, comparably, to musical tastes. Accordingly, preferences in musical genres sometimes serve as a way to learn about people. It is indeed quite common, at least in certain social milieux, to ask a person we just met what kind of music he or she likes to listen to.

Furthermore, the answer to such a question can serve as a sort of social distinction and is relevant to the way we consider people, at least when we don't know them well. In other words, tastes in musical genres can influence the way we consider strangers. For instance, if I meet someone who tells me that he

[11] These generalities about æsthetic similarities and dissimilarities are not always true. For instance, in thrash-metal, there is a tradition of creating at least one ballad per album (e.g. "Cemetary Gates" by Pantera or "Nothing Else Matters" by Metallica). Most people consider that these songs belong to thrash-metal although they share more similarities æsthetically to pop-rock than to regular thrash-metal songs.

or she only listens to Renaissance choral music, it would probably occur to me that this person might belong to a higher-class and conservative family (and perhaps, a bias of mine might lead me to think he or she is a little boring). Furthermore, a cliché that has not been wholly falsified in my experience is that, among the older generations, at least in Switzerland, punk or rap fans are often considered to be sorts of rebels without a cause or even uncivilized youngsters.

Moreover, musical tastes are often associated with related tastes in clothing, movies, books, cars, jewelry, and other socially relevant æsthetic preferences. Typically, rap, reggae, and punk fans each have their own paradigmatic clothing styles across the whole planet, which have barely changed for decades. Hippies mostly listen to psychedelia and folk, most metal fans like wearing black t-shirts and long hair, ska fans often imitate the fashion style of Jamaican rudeboys and rudegirls, etc., etc. Let us summarize this in another desideratum:

> (5) Musical genres can serve not only to differentiate between musical outputs but are also related to social distinctions among their audience; the core audience of a musical genre is often associated with a specific social group.

1.5. Works, subgenres, and genres

Further precisions on the subject and the goal of our enquiry can be spelled out by considering the relation between music and musical genres. Here is a first thing to note: musical genres are sorts of sets which contain musical works, improvisations, unfinished works, public performances, perhaps scores (which can be considered to be instructions for performances), or festivals (which can be equated with multiple performances), for instance. Can a person, such as a reggae musician, belong to the reggae musical genre? I would say that he or she is not, only his or her music. In any case I will here say that musical genres have *members* and that those are musical *outputs* (to use a general term embracing musical works, pieces, improvisations, compositions, performances, musical drafts, etc.) that *belong* to a genre.[12]

A question would then be: what is the relation between musical outputs and their musical genres? A first intuition can lead to think that it would be similar to the species-genus relation of biological classification: Haydn's *Clock* symphony is equivalent to the individual to which the genre classical symphony is a species, to which the genre classical music is a genus, to which the genre Western music is the family, etc. Looking more closely to other possible kinds of relations between genres, subgenres, and individual works by comparing them to literary genres will help us formulate another desideratum.

[12] Note that most of the musical outputs considered here as examples are musical works, but I don't think that anything I say excludes other forms of musical outputs.

In *Qu'est-ce qu'un genre littéraire?,* Jean-Marie Schaeffer points to the fact that the model of biological classification (into species, genus, families, orders, etc.) doesn't apply straightforwardly to literary genres, contrary to what Ferdinand Brunetière thought (Schaeffer, 1989: 71). He illustrates this by the different ways in which a work can be said to belong to several categories. In some cases, an equivalent to the biological classification seems to work fine. For instance, a work can be considered both a fiction and a short story because the genre short story is a sub-class of the genre fiction in a similar way to the fact that dogs form a sub-class of mammals. Something similar can be said of William Gibson's *Neuromancer*: it belongs to both cyberpunk and science-fiction, because these genres stand in something like the species-genus relation.

Anyway, as Schaeffer points out, the parallel with biological classification cannot always be drawn. His first example is the fact that we classify *Don Quixote* as both a parody and a story: this is not a species-genus relation. The two different classifications rather are about what Schaeffer calls two different levels of the text: it is a parody because of its semantic and syntactic features and it is a story because of its mode of enunciation, which is narrative as opposed to imitative (as in tragedies). The second example is the fact that we classify *Orlando Furioso* as an epic as well as a fantastic narration: these classifications don't stand in the species-genus relation either. Even if both are about the semantic level of the text, we classify this work as epic because of certain passages and as fantastic because of others (Schaeffer, 1989: 69-70). As we can see, the main difference seems to be that, in the biological classification, when an individual belongs to two categories, one is subsumed by the other.

In music, the same point can be made. When a piece of music is classified into two different genres, it is sometimes because one is subsumed under the other. For instance, *Laffy Taffy* belongs both to snap music and to hip hop because the former is a sub-species of the latter. Sometimes though, the species-genus relation does not apply. For instance, Burzum's album *Filosofem* is both considered to belong to the lo-fi (from *lo*w-*fi*delity) genre and to be part of heavy metal, but one genre is not the sub-class of the other. Actually, just like the fact that *Don Quixote* is both a parody and a story, the two genres pertaining to *Filosofem* don't predicate the same "levels" of the work: it is a heavy metal album mostly because of the way the music is composed and played while it is a lo-fi album mostly because of the way it was amplified and recorded. I shall make my point clearer by detailing why *Filosofem* is considered lo-fi.

Lo-fi is a categorization that appeared in the 80's to describe the way some rock bands were intentionally avoiding the standard studio recording practice of reproducing music without detectable harmonic distortions, hum, unwanted frequencies, or background noises, but rather preferred their recordings to contain such flaws and sound "dirty". Lo-fi bands would typically use bad quality recording material such as old 4-band tape-recorders, set the microphones entry volumes too high in order to create distortion on all instruments, or avoid the usual studio sound-smoothing treatments such as dynamic compression and limitation.

When Varg Vikernes –the unique Burzum member– recorded *Filosofem* in 1993, he decided to show his lack of interest in a big career, as well as his disdain for the money-making attitude that he found too common amongst rock musicians, by intentionally avoiding what was then considered as standard commercial sound quality. For instance, when asked by the sound engineer what microphones he wanted to use for the vocals, he replied "the worst one" and ended up using the microphone of a headset, thus making the entirety of his voice's recording to be distorted. Moreover, in order to show his despisal for the then growing interest in powerful and sophisticated guitar amplifiers in the heavy metal scene, he refused to follow his colleagues' advice to use a Marshall and instead diverted the function of his brother's home stereo speakers, resulting in a stringent and aggressive high-pitched timbre (which, ironically, many later black metal bands imitated with fancy guitar amps). As drums, he used a set abandoned in the studio and his bass-guitar was the cheapest he could find. Finally, the whole recording process took no more than 17 hours, from the moment he entered the studio until the end of the mastering[13], although the normal length for this process in professional metal bands varies between weeks and months.

Now, the features that have made *Filosofem* be considered lo-fi –intentional use of bad quality recording material, avoidance of fancy instruments, neglect for studio sound treatment– have no link to the fact that it is a heavy metal album. If one were to record a funk, a rap, or a synth-pop album (which are genres predicating the songs' structures, melodies, harmonies, rhythms, instrumentations, etc.) with the same recording and amplification techniques, it would be lo-fi but not heavy metal. Conversely, if Varg Vikernes had played the same compositions (that is to say songs with the same structures, melodies, harmonies, rhythms, instrumentations, etc.), but had recorded them with normal professional studio standards, it would still have belonged to the heavy metal genre, but not to the lo-fi genre. Another way to put it is to say that if one were to study a scoring of *Filosofem's* songs, one could tell that it is a heavy-metal album, but not that it is lo-fi.

Note that if heavy-metal, funk, rap, or synth-pop works can also be lo-fi, this is not the case for classical music or traditional folk music. Indeed, when it comes to the classification of those two broad genres into sub-classes (e.g. for classical music into quartets, chaconne, or variations and for traditional folk music into Afro-Cuban, polka, or Cajun music), it seems that studio techniques don't play an important role at all for genre classifications. Even though in electronic classical music, studio techniques play a very important role, there is, to my knowledge at least, no genre distinction based on studio-related criteria. For instance, there is no lo-fi *musique concrète* or glitch *Elektronische Muzik.* We shall see in the conclusion how this could be explained.

[13] All information about the recording process comes from Varg Vikernes's own website (Virkenes, 2005).

The point here is that the classification into genres –even when based on strictly musical criteria– first, does not conform to a genus-species relation and, secondly, can be based on aspects of the works that are irrelevant to other genres. Our sixth desideratum is thus:

> (6) Musical genres can be based on many different "levels" of a musical output such as its musical structure (e.g. rondo), its geographic origin (e.g. Malaysian music), its instrumentation (e.g. symphony), or the way it was recorded (e.g. lo-fi music), but not all musical genres are based on the same "levels" (e.g. there is no lo-fi classical music).

What do "levels" exactly mean here? Well, it seems that a musical output can possess features that might be worth differentiating into layers, such as its score, its studio work, its origin, its instrumentations, etc. These different layers seem to sometimes play different classificatory roles as we have seen with lo-fi and heavy-metal. A further question would then be: how do you tell what layers are important for the existence and differentiation of musical genres? A possible answer is that: one should consider the essential features of a work, its ontological nature. This brings us to the next section of this essay, which is dedicated to philosophical discussions of musical genres' ontologies.

PART 2. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ON MUSICAL GENRES

It is only recently that analytic philosophers have turned their attention to this subject and a good deal of the literature about musical genres has focused exclusively on the distinctions between rock, classical, and jazz music. The restriction of the main discussion to these three types of music can perhaps be explained by the fact that the subject of musical categorizations in philosophy takes its roots in the ontological question of what musical works really are. And it is only fairly recently that philosophers, at least in the analytic tradition, have began to discuss different ontological types of musical works.

On the face of it, only after the publication of Theodore Gracyk's *Rhythm and Noise* in 1996 did philosophers turn their attention to the ontological differences between rock and other types of music[14]. Before that, most of the ontological discussions focused on Western classical music only, and the main distinctions made among musical types were based on Nelson Goodman's opposition of autographic and

[14] I surmise that the main reason for the absence of a philosophical classification of different types of music is that the default genre of music that philosophers listened to is that of the Western classical tradition. This does not mean that philosophers ignored other types of music, but it is understandable that the most urgent ontological problem was to find an accurate description of the music they interacted with the most. Let us note that only after the Second World War did jazz begin to be listened to by (white) higher classes and that rock music was fundamentally a teenager-only phenomenon until, at least, the mid 60's.

allographic (=non-autographic) arts[15]. Without going into the details, I will briefly present Goodman's distinction as it will be useful to refer to later and serves as a good introduction to the ontology of music.

2.1. Autographic vs. allographic

A first way to present this categories is that it makes sense to distinguish between art practices where we talk of forgery, such as painting and sculpting, and other art practices, such as music or literature, where copies of the artworks are normally not considered forgeries but genuine instances of the artworks, for example the copy of *The Aleph* I have in my room. In the chapter 3 of *Languages of Art*, Goodman writes:

> Let us speak of a work of art as *autographic* if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it is significant; or better, *if and only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine.* (Goodman, 1968: 113)

This distinction is not as simple as it can seem at first glance. For instance, some artworks, such as engravings, allow for copies but can also be forged. Goodman approaches this problem in a convincing way. One of his answers is that engravings, like paintings and sculptures, but unlike music or poetry, don't have notations (1968: chapter 4). In fact, Goodman thinks that what makes the difference between the arts that are usually not regarded as admitting forgery and the others is grounded in the fact that they can be notated. A copy of a book, of a score, or of a notated choreography cannot be considered a forgery, Goodman thinks, because these are artworks that can be reduced to notations and a copy of a notation is not a forgery but is just another notation token. The copy of *The Aleph* I possess is a token of the artwork just as much as Borges's manuscript is. I can make a forgery of the manuscript but, supposedly, I cannot make a forgery of *The Aleph*. Thus, Goodman considers that the distinction between forgeable arts and non-forgeable arts is coreferential with the distinction between non-notational and notational arts.

As Levinson notes in "Autographic and Allographic Arts Revised", this is not quite right. If I make a copy of one of Haydn's quartet and present it as one of my own, it will be a forgery. If I write a poem and publish it as a lost work of Verlaine, it will be one too. In both these cases, we have notational arts but cases of forgery. The reason underlying this seems to be that a musical work (or a poem) is not a musical structure (or a word structure) *simpliciter*. Something like the context of creation –who wrote it, when it was written, against what background, etc.– is also part of the ontology of artworks. This is so in a way that is similar to the fact that an utterance is not identical to a sequence of words, as Grice famously

[15] A noticeable exception is two paragraphs in Roman Ingarden's book on music where he mentions the then new possibility for composers to base the notation of their music on recordings rather than on scores, thus modifying the mode of existence of the work, making them "real" instead of "purely intentional" (1989: 148). Unfortunately, he didn't consider this mode of existence as one which applied to musical works, strictly understood, and thus didn't pursue the study of this sort of music which, ironically, was beginning to be very important when he published the book in 1966.

pointed out, but is also constituted by such things as the person who uttered it and in what context. We will come back to this point below, in the section dedicated to intentions and art categories. For now, let us only note that the notation of a poem or of a musical piece is not the only constituent of such works, *pace* Goodman.

Now, this is not a reason to completely abandon Goodman's distinction between autographic and allographic arts. The separation between, on one side, paintings, engravings and sculptures and, on the other, poems, novels, and written music remains intuitively accurate to the way we interact with artworks. Indeed, the forgeries of notated works seem to be special cases of forgery. Levinson thus proposes that, instead of following Goodman entirely in his notion of autographic arts and erroneously assimilating arts allowing for forgery with arts that cannot be notated, we should use the following definition:

> A work of art (and the art form it belongs to) is autographic *iff* the identity of genuine instances of the work is *not at all* determined by identity of character in a notation or compliance with a character in a notation. (Levinson, 2011: 101).

This nicely separates the categories that we intuitively think of as admitting for forgery in the ordinary sense (painting, engraving, sculpting, …) and the ones where forgeries are a sort of special case (literature, poetry, music, …), as in the Haydn and Verlaine examples above. With this definition in mind, we can now come back to the subject of musical genres and its treatment by analytic philosophers.

2.2. Nature of improvisation

As mentioned above, some philosophical discussions of different musical types were based on Goodman's distinction, even though I haven't found any before Gracyk's that tried to describe musical genres as different ontological objects. For instance, discussions on the specific status of jazz can be found in articles by Philip Alperson (1984) and James Valone (1985) but they don't consider jazz productions to be another kind of ontological object compared to classical music works. Alperson, though, comes close to it and it is worth considering his article before we move on to Gracyk.

Alperson's article "On Musical Improvisation" starts by discussing Goodman's distinction between allographic and autographic arts and goes on with musical examples that cannot be considered neatly as either one of those, despite Goodman's seemingly categorical definitions of this terms. Alperson begins his article by noting that, for Goodman, when composers write a piece, they create an allographic artwork, but when one performs the artwork, the performance itself should be considered as autographical. On the face of it, this application of the distinction seems quite accurate, whether we take it to be based on Goodman's forgery criterion or on Levinson's notation criterion: if I am not allowed to record the premiere of Philip Glass's *Sixth Quartet* by the Kronos Quartet, it would not be because of the

risk that I would fraudulently copy Glass's music, but rather because of the risk that I would record the performance (and perhaps diminish the number of potential buyers of Kronos' next CD by putting it on the Internet). Furthermore, this specific performance does not have a notation even though Glass's *Sixth Quartet* does. There thus seem to be good reasons to consider the *Sixth Quartet* as being allographic and its performance as being autographic. Accordingly, Alperson further notes that we can hear any classical music performance as either the rendition of a musical structure created by the composer –i.e. as a type identical in all correct performances of the work– or we can hear the performance as acts of skills by performers –i.e. as a unique token[16]. Consequently, we could hear Philip Glass's *Sixth Quartet* as either an allographic work by the composer or an autographic performance by Kronos Quartet.

However, Alperson argues, the distinction proposed by Goodman doesn't apply that clearly to all kinds of music. A jazz concert, for instance, should not be heard as the instantiation of a type, or as the autographic rendition of an allographic artwork, because there is no pre-existing allographic work involved. Indeed, even when jazz musicians play standards (as opposed to their own pieces or free improvisations) such as *Summertime* and *Autumn Leaves,* the original songs by Gershwin and Kosma cannot be considered to be works instantiated in the concert (as is a rendition of Mozart's *Cosi Fan Tutte*) since what the jazz musicians display are rather their own improvised versions of the songs, which are rather thinly based on the written standards. That is, in a normal jazz performance of *Autumn Leaves*, there are perhaps only 10 or 20% of the totality of the notes played that correspond to what is written in Kosma's score, and the rest is improvisation. This is the reason why saying that jazz performances will never achieve the structural richness of Beethoven's late quartets –as Alperson reports someone stated during an æsthetic congress– is just a wrong-headed way to consider jazz æsthetically (Alperson, 1984: 22).

At that point of his paper, Alperson comes close to differentiating improvised music and written music as two distinct ontological objects. He even writes that philosophers like Eduard Hanslick or Nelson Goodman make a *categorical* mistake by thinking of improvisation as a "pale imitation of conventional music-making" (Alperson, 1984: 24). Anyhow, he then argues that the reason of their mistake is not that written music and improvised music are different ontological categories, but that these philosophers' view on the ontology of musical works is too narrow, failing to consider improvising as central to all kinds of music. Indeed, Alperson argues, any improvisation possesses musical elements that pre-exists it, such as the palette of musical phrases that jazz players learn to manipulate, and any classical work possesses elements of improvisation, both in its rendition as a performance and in the acts of composing. He thus

[16] Of course, we could also hear the music in different ways according to ontologies that don't allow for the relation between a work and one of its performances to be a type/token relation. For instance, some perdurantists think that a musical work is the logical sum of all the temporal occurrences of a work (like a performance or someone imagining the performance), past, present, and future and that when we hear a performance, we only hear a part, however relevant, of the work, which we can never perceive entirely. With such a theory, the distinction between allographic works and autographic performances does not make sense. Anyhow, I don't think this is very relevant for us here, I just wanted to point it out.

concludes that jazz does not belong to a distinct ontological category to written music, but only differs in its proportion of pre-existing and improvised musical elements.

Alperson's views are very interesting and certainly contain elements of truth, but there are strong reasons to believe that he is mistaken in thinking that we should not distinguish between different ontological types of musical works. Even if we agree to consider jazz and classical music performances and compositions as both involving elements of improvisation as well as containing pre-existing musical structures and further agree that Goodman's distinction does not apply quite neatly to what distinguishes improvised performances from written music performed, there still are important differences between standard jazz and standard classical music on an ontological level.

Firstly, even if it is undeniable that classical composers often improvise when they compose, when we talk about Palestrina's *Missa Papae Marcelli*, we are not talking about the improvisation that led Palestrina to write this mass, but about the mass itself. Secondly, it is also true that classical performers might improvise in a weak sense when they perform *Missa Papae Marcelli,* but, in standard cases, when we talk about their rendition of Palestrina's work, we can ignore the improvised aspects and discuss their performance as if it was completely planned and that no creation or addition was being made during the performance. In other words, even if the scheme type/token doesn't apply to the relation between a classical work and its performances as neatly as it would to the type "A" and the tokens *A*, **A**, **A** and A, it can, and actually is, applied in standard critical practice. In the classical music tradition, composers, musicians, and amateurs consider the set of instructions given in scores to be some kind of model to which performances must be compared and this comparison can be done regardless of the performances' improvised aspects.

These two points are just not true for standard jazz practice. Firstly, when we talk of John Coltrane's *A Love Supreme,* we *do* refer to the improvisations that led him and his band to the creation of this classic jazz album. Secondly, the normal critical practice would never ignore the improvised aspect of the performances recorded in *A Love Supreme*. Ignoring that *A Love Supreme* is largely improvised and considering it instead as if it was a classical music performance is to come close to committing the same mistake as the person who deplored that jazz music would never be as structurally rich as Beethoven's late quartets, whose mistake Alperson rightly pointed out. However right Alperson is to draw our attention to pre-existing musical structures in jazz performances and improvisational aspects in classical music, there is a strong sense in which we say that standard jazz performances are improvisations and standard classical works are not.

Now, there is an even stronger reason to consider that Alperson is wrong in thinking that all musical pieces should be put in the same ontological basket and that is because some musical works are even more foreign to standard classical works than jazz performances: works that are recordings.

2.3. Recorded works

Musical works, like engravings and novels, but unlike paintings and carved sculptures, can allow for multiplicity[17]. Anyhow, there are at least three different kinds of multiplicity displayed by art works and different types of musical works seem to display them all. Stephen Davies thus distinguishes among multiple artworks that are created and transmitted through what he calls *exemplars*, *encodings,* and *sets of instructions*.

In the first case, when one creates an *exemplar* (e.g. a novel, a folk tale, or a traditional folk song), one creates a multiple artwork that is both an instance of the work as well as a "model with the normative function of setting the standard that other instances of the [work] must emulate." (Davies, 2003: 159) Note that not all features of an exemplar always are exemplary: a traditional folk song can have different variants depending on who sings it while remaining the same, it thus has some features that must be taken as exemplar and some others that can vary.

In the second case, when one creates an *encoding* (e.g. a photographic negative, the cast of a sculpture, or the tape of a purely electronic music), one creates an object that can generate instances of the artwork when submitted to the *decoding* of an appropriate device or process. For instance, the decoding of electronic music piece's tape is done through a certain sound system in good working conditions.

In the third case, when one creates a *set of instructions* (e.g. a musical work specified by score, the script for a play, or a notated choreography), one produces directives that executants or performers must follow in order to create an instance of the work. Note that what the artists create in such cases are objects that are much thinner than the instances of the work: however thorough the explanations of a score, its performance will always possess properties that were not spelled out in the set of instructions (for instance, the timbre of such Stradivarius used in the performance of Beethoven's first violin concerto is a property of the performance but not of the score).

Most works of the classical music tradition belong to this third category of multiple works of art. Jazz standards (but not free-jazz improvisations) should probably be classified in this category too: even if the freedom given to the interpreter is much greater than in the standard classical music tradition, one must still follow some of the instructions displayed in the score in order to perform such or such a piece. A jazz musician might not follow *Summertime*'s melody exactly but should still make it recognizably based on the instructions displayed in the score at the risk of not producing an instance of *Summertime*.[18]

[17] Note that if one accepts to consider performances to sometimes be instances of musical works (for instance, accepting that a jazz performance is a musical work), that performances are kinds of events, and that events always are individual entities that can never be reproduced, then one must admit that not all musical works allow for multiplicity, as jazz works would not.

[18] As said in the preceding footnote, jazz performances might be considered as examples of non-multiple musical works and one could further argue that jazz standards can only be considered as works when they are performed since, unlike classical music, jazz standards' scores would not be representative of the work itself (because, for instance, too broad a proportion of the music is left at the discretion of the performer). One could thus argue that jazz standards might be works but are not what

Now, however close or foreign jazz standards are to standard classical music works, both of these differ greatly from musical works that are recordings, which belongs to the type which Davies names encodings, such as tapes of purely electronic music (e.g. *Terminus II* by Gottfried Michael Koenig), *musique concrète* works (e.g. *Études aux chemins de fer* by Pierre Schaeffer), or other kinds of recording-based music (e.g. the 1944 electro-acoustic piece *The Expression of the Zaar* by Halim El-Dabh (which predates, despite its obscurity, all other electro-acoustic music pieces by four years)). If Goodman's distinction does not apply as neatly as he thought to all kinds of music, as we saw for jazz, we do talk of standard classical works as being strongly based on notations, in a way comparable to poems and novels, and we do talk of *musique concrète, Elektronische Muzik,* and other musical genres as consisting of works that can be described as encodings, just like casts, engravings, or photographic negatives. These latter examples are not based on any notation at all and seem to be the most genuine examples we have of autographic works of art.

As mentioned above, the first in-depth description of recordings as a different kind of ontological object to standard classical music works was done in Theodor Gracyk's book on rock, *Rhythm and Noise* (1996), which can be considered as a cornerstone in the ontology of musical genres. According to Gracyk, rock works are paradigmatically instances of creative recordings –just as *Terminus II, Études aux chemins de fer,* and *The Expression of the Zaar*– and thus are to be differentiated from works for performances, such as standard classical music works. Furthermore, Gracyk argues, the whole rock genre's æsthetic criteria should be based on the fact that its standard works are recordings. Andrew Kania, Stephen Davies, and Roger Pouivet, for instance, followed his conception of standard rock works and took it further in order to make more precise distinctions with other musical traditions.[19]

Davies calls sets of instructions since the instances of the work (its performances) would never be identical. Jazz standards would thus not be multiple works of art. Anyhow, this view need not concern us here.

[19] Stephen Davies did not follow Gracyk as closely as Pouivet and Kania since he only agreed with him about the primacy of the recording practice in rock works. However, he disagreed with Gracyk about whether rock works are for playback (being replete recordings) rather than for performances. Davies' idea is that rock works, unlike purely electronic music works which he considers to be replete recordings (such as *musique concrète* works), are performances of a specific kind: performances for studio. He writes: "They are of a kind in which the 'performance' concerns the electronic sculpting of sound and aims at effects relying on the paraphernalia of the studio. A given piece can be performed again (or 'covered'), but to be faithful to the original it must also set out to create an electronic soundscape unlike that of the live environment." (Davies, 2003: 167-168). Anyhow, I think that the disagreement comes from Davies's mistaken view about the way rock musicians usually record nowadays. It is true that in the early days of rock, during the 50's, bands performed together in the studio and there would be several sound engineers moving the mixing table's switches, faders, and knobs while the band was playing, making the recording practice a sort of performance (just as Alexander Sokurov's *Russian Ark,* a 96-minute unique sequence shot, can be considered as a performance for a video camera). But as early as the late 50's, and overwhelmingly since the late 60's, rock recordings are made in a fashion much closer to purely electronic music or to most movies, as opposed to performances: they are made of separate small bits recorded at different times and sometimes in different places that are then put together only in the mix, which is a process that involves many sessions, many different non-real time treatments (adding effects, changing the equalization, panning, taking an effect out, trying a new panning, etc.), coming back and forth in the advancement of the work, and which is much closer to composing than to performing. Thus, considering these works to be performances for studio is nearly as strange as considering classical music works to be performances for music paper. Anyhow, Davies' concept of performance for studio might be a good way to describe early 1950's rock recordings, as well as some more recent rare examples, such as the bluegrass band Doyle Lawson & Quicksilver, the folk singer Steve Earle and some recordings by the lo-fi rock band Beat Happening, because these are examples of bands who record all together at the same time with only one or a

To be more precise, Gracyk's main claim is that the ontology of standard rock works is different from standard classical music works because the former are notated works for performances but the latters are to be understood as recordings; rock works are not for performances but for playback. As noted above, a common account considers that works of classical music are abstract types whose tokens are particular performances following the scores' instructions. Even if they differ slightly, performances that follow correctly what Beethoven wrote on the *Grosse Fuge's* score are tokens of a type, namely the work called *Grosse Fuge*. For rock music, (just as for purely electronic works or *musique concrète*) this scheme doesn't apply. Most rock songs are never written down; unlike classical composers, who create scores, what rock musicians make are not instructions for performances. Rather, as Gracyk argues, in most cases the focus of critical attention in rock music is the recordings that bands produce.

With the support of a generous number of musical examples, interviews, and descriptions of critical practice and creative process in rock, Gracyk's book is very convincing in showing how rock's æsthetics would gain much in considering that standard rock works are recordings rather than abstract types whose tokens are performances. An important implication of this thesis is that rock works should thus not be assimilated to classical songs (or Lieder, madrigals, motets, etc.) with which they often are misleadingly compared and underestimated. As Gracyk argues, the difference between a rock recording and a classical work is close to what distinguishes a movie from a play. Stephen Davies puts it in a nice formulation:

> In some respects, making a movie is like performing a play: acting is involved in both. For the movie, though, acting contributes to its creation, but not, as in the case of play, to the delivery of an already completed piece. (Davies, 2003 : 167)

Comparing the making of a movie or the performance of a play to the opposition between the activities of classical musicians in a concert hall and of rock musicians in a studio is enlightening: in both cases there is, on the one hand, the rendition of a pre-existing work via a performance, and, on the other hand, the creation of a work whose final product is a tape, an electronic audio file, or another recording support.

2.4. Rock, jazz, and classical music

In his 2005 dissertation, *Pieces of Music: The Ontology of Classical, Rock, and Jazz Music*, Andrew Kania adds to Gracyk's theory an ontological description of jazz and classical music. To summarize his thesis, Kania considers that where rock works are "replete recordings that manifest songs, which can be performed live" (Kania, 2005: 201), Western classical works are "an abstract object –a type or kind of performance, created by an act of composition" (2005: 86) and jazz music is an art that has no works, because the primary focus of critical attention in jazz music is performances, which are ephemeral

few microphones and whose recordings thus don't involve an important post-production input and can quite accurately be considered as works for studio performances.

entities, unlike works, which are of necessity persisting objects (2005: 201). Indeed, two essential features of artworks, according to Kania, are (i) that they persist through time, there aren't any ephemeral works, and, being the end-product that is aimed at in a given art tradition, (ii) they are the objects toward which most of the critical attention concentrates; in other words, they are the primary focus of critical attention.[20]

At this point in the presentation of Kania's theories, one might wonder: what is so special about rock recordings that allows them to be works? What about classical music recordings? And jazz recordings? And what about rock gigs? Why would the latter be so different from jazz performances?

The main difference between, on the one hand, standard jazz and classical music recordings and, on the other hand, standard rock recordings, Kania argues, is that the goal of the former is to reproduce or reconstitute in the most realistic way possible the live performance it recorded but not for the latter. Standard classical and jazz recordings would be a sort of documentation of the performance recorded but standard rock recordings wouldn't. Overdubs, vocal doubletracking, loops, cuts, post-production effects, strong artificial reverbs, non-natural echoes, unrealistic panning, drastic volume modifications, and the like are part of normal studio practice in standard rock recordings and are valued as such; it is not the case in standard jazz or classical music. In standard rock recordings, the studio work is to be heard as an important æsthetic aspect, whether successful or not, and it plays an important creative role[21]. In standard classical or jazz music, the overdubbing of an instrument or the cut of a take are considered cheating, the role of the studio is to be *transparent*, that is to say to not modify the aspect of what is recorded. Thus, in jazz and classical music recordings, the focus of the critical attention is the performance (transparently) recorded but in rock music (just as in *musique concrète*) it is the recording itself.

This point makes sense to one acquainted with the history of rock and the revolutions first operated in the Sun Studio –for instance, with 1951's hit *Rocket 88* (which is often cited as the first rock-and-roll single) as well as with their work with Elvis Presley from 1954 on– and then in Abbey Road Studios – whose explorations led to Pink Floyd's *The Piper at the Gate of Dawn* and the Beatles' *Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Heart Club Band,* both from 1967. Interestingly, the point can also be made with such albums as Bob Dylan's *The Basement Tapes,* which avoided explicitly the use of the then new and fancy recording

[20] These two features are not indisputably essential to works of art. For instance, one could say that there are no arts without works but there are arts with only performances (such as happenings). For the second point, some could argue that the primary focus of critical attention is not always directed at the works in a given tradition. For instance, Johan Sebastian Bach's fame was due to his improvisational skills as a keyboardist although his works are rather considered to be what he wrote down, not what he improvised. Furthermore, in the tradition of contemporary pop music, the primary focus of critical attention arguably is the private life of the singers even though their art, if they have any, rather is their music. I am not going to discuss these points here but just wanted to mention the fact that one could disagree with this account of artworks.

[21] Accordingly, even if Gracyk's thesis is not taken for granted by most people discussing rock music, some famous studio producers are sometimes referred to as members of the bands produced although they don't perform in them. For instance, Martin Hannett is called the fifth Joy Division member, George Martin the Fifth Beatle, Butch Vig the man behind Nirvana's *Nevermind* and Quincy Jones/Michael Jackson as well as Timbaland/Justin Timberlake were often referred to as duos. Moreover, most rock band members participate in the studio process. The Doors' keyboardist, Ray Manzarek, once said "Rock bands who don't mix their albums are not serious about their music" (quoted by Gracyk, 1996: 57).

production techniques, which were then used by all musicians who could afford them (in a manner similar to, but much less extreme than, Burzum's *Filosofem*). Indeed, the intentional refusal of fancy recording equipment somewhat makes the takes and the studio work part of the creative process and definitely is a non-negligible æsthetic feature of the album, both for its form –the sound quality reminding of some of Bob Dylan's influences, such as Hank Williams and John Lee Hooker, some of whose songs where covered in *The Basement Tapes*– and for its content –the message being something like: you don't need fancy gear to make good rock, a basement and a few mics will do. Thus, here too, and unlike recordings of *The Well-Tempered Clavier* by Gustav Leonhardt or of Coltrane's *A Love Supreme*, the work would consist *in* the recording, rather than the recording being *of* a performance.

Now, both Kania and Gracyk admit that their classifications are not entirely strict. That is why I repeatedly used the word "standard" with respect to rock, jazz, and classical music works or recordings. Gracyk writes that his attempt is only to point to some non-negligible æsthetic features of rock and not to define or even give an accurate description of the whole rock music. Kania writes that his classifications of jazz, rock, and classical music works are not meant as definitions of those genres but rather as ontological descriptions of paradigmatic productions in those three traditions and that there is room for counterexamples (2005: 33). As such, he mentions the species of Western classical music known as electronic classical music, which produces works that are not for performance, but are rather ontologically replete recordings, like rock music works (2005: 33-4). Arguably, there also are rock bands whose shows, rather than their recordings, are the primary focus of critical attention. I am thinking, for instance, of the early Swans, whose extremely powerful sound, produced by numerous guitar amps, was part of their æsthetic uniqueness but which could not be reproduced on a normal record player. One would thus need to go to the show to get acquainted with the band's æsthetically most valuable contribution. This does not mean that their concerts were their works, but one could argue so (although many would agree with Kania that works have to be lasting entities and thus that performances can't be works). We could also mention jazz examples in which the recordings are the final artistic products and the primary focus of critical attention, as displayed, for instance, by Miles Davies' *Bitches Brew,* where the studio producer Teo Macero, through intensive tape editing, such as tape loops and tape delays, restructured the original recording[22] in such a way that the final result is inseparable from what happened in the studio (so much so that the studio restructuration of the pieces were later imitated by the musicians in live concerts). But, as said, those counterexamples can be accepted as exceptions by Gracyk and Kania's theories.

[22] Paul Tingen, a specialist of Miles Davis, writes : « "Pharaoh's Dance" [*Bitches Brew*'s first track] contains 19 edits - its famous stop-start opening is entirely constructed in the studio, using repeat loops of certain sections. Later on in the track there are several micro-edits: for example, a one-second-long fragment that first appears at 8:39 is repeated five times between 8:54 and 8:59. The title track contains 15 edits, again with several short tape loops of, in this case, five seconds (at 3:01, 3:07 and 3:12). » (Tingen, 1999)

Roger Pouivet, in *Philosophie du rock*, is less cautious and gives a necessary and sufficient criterion for a work of music to be a rock piece. To summarize his thesis, he agrees with Gracyk and Kania in saying that rock works are recordings, but he adds that what distinguishes rock from other genres whose works are recordings as well is that rock works are examples of mass art. Let us briefly explain his thesis in more detail.

Pouivet's distinction between classical art, mass art, and folk art[23] derives from Noël Carroll's notion of mass art (Carroll, 1997). It relies, for the most part, on the differences in cognitive accessibility and diffusion processes of these different traditions. Pouivet's notion of mass art is very similar to Carroll's but differs in some ways[24], so I will present Pouivet's here since it is his definition of rock that interests us. For him, a mass artwork is (i) an artifact whose function is æsthetic (ii) which is produced to be economically accessible to most people as well as (iii) cognitively accessible to mass audiences, and (iv) whose ontology allows for multiple instances, and thus mass diffusion, thanks to mechanical reproduction processes (Pouivet, 2010: 48). Some examples he gives, apart from rock albums, are books such as *The Da Vinci Code* and *Harry Potter,* and movies such as *Titanic* and *The Matrix*.

For Pouivet, (i) is supposed to bring a necessary condition for mass artworks to be considered as art and to exclude newspapers, T.V. documentaries, radio talk-shows, and other artifacts which he doesn't want to consider as art but which match the other criteria. Whether or not his criterion does the job is a difficult question that cannot be treated here.

By (ii), Pouivet perhaps wants to exclude some photography or engraving that could match the other criteria but whose exuberant prices make them impossible to be acquired by a wide audience. Anyhow, it doesn't really concern music as far as I can see.

By (iv), Pouivet means, (like Noël Carroll (1997) and Walter Benjamin (2003) before him), that the ontological status of mass art works is one that allows automatized reproductions. Recordings, printings, or engravings –unlike paintings, statues, or live performances– can be art objects that are meant to be massively reproduced. Like engravings (and unlike paintings), they are autographic arts that allow for non-forged copies. According to Pouivet (as well as Benjamin and Carroll), classical and folk artworks are typically not meant to be so diffused, unlike mass art which is necessarily so.

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[23] He uses the expression "art populaire*"* and notices that *populaire* here doesn't mean famous or liked by many (as in the contemporary English "popular art") but rather something like the mainstream culture of a specific social group, which other social groups might not share. For instance, *Le ranz des vaches* is "populaire" (with respect to the Swiss culture) but it is not popular. I hesitated to translate "art populaire" by "traditional art" but decided against it because of the conservative and old-fashioned connotation that the word "traditional" carries.

[24] Carroll's definition goes as follows: « x is a mass artwork if and only if 1) x is a multiple instance or type artwork 2) produced and distributed by a mass technology, 3) which artwork is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (e.g., its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for the largest number of relatively untutored audiences. » (Carroll, 1997 : 190) Pouivet's definition is thus very similar, as he himself acknowledges. Anyhow his description specifies the cognitive requirement differently: it puts more weight on the culture of the audience rather than on the easy-to-grasp structure of the artifacts. Furthermore it adds an economical requirement.

By (iii), Pouivet means that in order to understand a mass artwork, there is no need for any specific kind of education or culture. On the contrary, for Pouivet, in order to properly understand classical art, it is required to be acquainted with what he calls *humanist culture* (2010: 36). Thus, he explains that one of the reasons why the last recording of the *Goldberg Variations* sells less than the last Céline Dion recording is that, in order to appreciate the difference between the previous *Goldberg Variations* recordings and the new one –which is where most of its value lies– one needs to have learnt about the previous *Goldberg Variations* recordings and being able to discern subtle differences of musical interpretation.

For Pouivet, something similar can be said of contemporary classical music's electronic works, such as Pierre Schaeffer's *musique concrète,* Karlheinz Stockhausen's electronic works, or Iannis Xenakis's computer music. Although their ontological status allows for automatized reproduction (since they are replete recordings, just like rock albums) and so differ from the interpretation of written classical music (such as the *Goldberg Variations*), they too would ask for so-called humanist culture to be understood. We might illustrate what Pouivet says by considering that one would need to know about the history of music in order to understand Xenaki's experimental piece *Mycenae Alpha,* because an important part of its value lies in the fact that it is the first piece to be produced by a computer program (UPIC) that could translate graphical images into musical results and one should know that in order to appreciate *Mycenae Alpha* for its true worth. This is indeed similar to the cognitive requirement that asks one to know a little about the history of the *Goldberg Variations'* interpretation in order to get the real value of its last recording.

Now, for Pouivet, appreciating Céline Dion's last album doesn't require any specific cultural knowledge; basically, everyone gets it (2010: 38). Thus, for Pouivet, even though electronic classical musical works such as Pierre Schaeffer's *Variations pour une porte et un soupir* or Karlheinz Stockhausen's *Gesang der Jünglinge* match three of the four mass artworks' criteria (being æsthetic artifacts that are economically accessible and allow for mass distribution thanks to the fact that they are studio works) they differ from Céline Dion's album with respect to their cognitive status. Rock recordings are supposed to be understandable without any musical education and by all cultures, but electronic classical music would require a specific and restricted education to be understood. Thus, for Pouivet, electronic classical music doesn't belong to mass art and so is not rock music.

According to Pouivet, there exists the same kind of difference between mass art and folk art. In order to understand Yiddish music properly, one needs to be acquainted with a Central European tradition of the mid-19th and early 20th century and this is not available to everyone on the planet (2010: 42). Just the same applies for traditional Indian puppet theatre, which requires to be acquainted with specific fictional characters and their representation, or even to movies like *Les Gendarmes*, which require to be acquainted with some of the French culture in order to appreciate their humor. A reason for this matter of fact is that

folk art, like classical art, is not meant to be massively diffused even when its medium would allow for an automatized reproduction (as with *Les Gendarmes*).

A problem that I find in Pouivet's thesis, according to which rock is necessarily part of mass art, is that it seems to take for granted that all rock works are readily accessible when it is not obviously so. For instance, being able to properly understand Refused's *The Shape of Punk to Come* requires grasping some of the many references to music history contained in the album, such as the allusion to Ornette Coleman's *The Shape of Jazz to Come.* Refused's album was an attempt to state that punk music couldn't continue to be anti-establishment in the late 1990's if it encapsulated revolutionary lyrics in sounds that had then become mainstream. They wanted to show, in a fashion similar to Ornette Coleman, how anti-authoritarian ideologies could not be transmitted coherently using the same "shape" as 70's and 80's punk, because those had become too conventional and economically established. Thus, in order to fully understand Refused's album, one would need to know quite a lot about the history of rock music and its social implications, just as one needs to know quite a lot about the history of classical music and its technological development in order to understand Xenakis' *Mycenae Alpha.*

Another example is Sunn O)))'s *Monoliths and Dimensions*, the understanding of which seems to require some knowledge about the history of doom-metal and the fact that musicians of this genre normally don't collaborate with contemporary classical music ensembles and composers. Not being able to tell that Sunn O))) have made something new with this album is similar to not being able to tell the difference between the last *Goldberg Variations* recording and its predecessors. Certainly, it is also a reason why *Monoliths and Dimensions* sells less than the last Céline Dion recording, but, *pace* Pouivet, it is definitely not something that excludes it from the category of rock. We have not yet approached the problem of what would make this album (or Refused's for that matter) belong to this category, but considering them to be excluded from rock and instead to belong to the classical music tradition goes strongly against normal genre classification practice, as it is for instance displayed in their official biography (Stannard, 2014), in books on the history of rock, in music magazines, in music shops, or on Sunn O)))'s Wikipedia page. A theory that would make Sunn O))) and Refused *de facto* electronic classical music must be misled.

The examples of musical works that are considered to be rock but that are not readily accessible to someone who doesn't have some musical education are easy to multiply. It seems, then, that what Roger Pouivet has defined with his necessary and sufficient criteria is not the set of rock works but rather a subset of it –which contains Céline Dion but not Sunn O))). Similarly, Andrew Kania seems to have described a subset of the Western classical works –which doesn't include electronic classical works– and a subset of jazz music –which doesn't include the part of jazz music that produces recordings as works.

Before I go on with the positive aspects that Gracyk, Kania, and Pouivet's theories will bring to the present study, there are two more points that I want to stress which somehow distinguish my study from those by Gracyk, Kania, and Pouviet.

The first one is that their distinction between musical genres are based on the differences found in the *works* produced in these different traditions[25] and their discussions of musical genres start from this work-based ontology. For instance, Gracyk writes:

> Rock's most distinctive characteristic within popular music may lie in the realm of ontology, in *what a musical work is* in rock music as opposed to what it is, for instance, in jazz or country or folk. (Gracyk, 1996: 1; my emphasis).

Let me illustrate how this approach can be problematic for us: as we have seen, Kania and Pouivet follow Gracyk in considering rock works to be recordings. But then, what about rock bands that have no recordings? An answer given by Pouivet is: these bands have not yet produced works. But the problem is that, if one agrees with Kania that what distinguishes jazz from both rock and classical music is that it is a musical genre whose main focus of critical attention is performances but that these are not works, then how are we to differentiate between jazz and rock-with-no-work? Certainly, Kania, Pouivet, and Gracyk's discussions have something to say on this problem; for instance, Kania points out that jazz is an improvisation-based musical genre, unlike most rock and classical music. But there are a great number of rock bands that have not produced any recordings and that use improvisation just as much as jazz bands. Furthermore, there were in the Renaissance and early Baroque organ or lute traditions a strong component of improvised performances (which later came to be more or less codified with the emergence of such genres as toccata, prelude, ricercar, recherche, etc.). There probably were an important number of church organists who did not compose anything but who were recognized as skillful improvisers. If we take the work-based ontological perspectives found in Kania, Gracyk, and Pouivet too strictly, we would find that the output of such musicians, just as rockers without recordings, is indistinguishable from jazz musicians' output. According to me, this problem comes from the fact that we distinguish between musical genres on another basis than on the different ontological features of their musical *works*.

The second point that distinguishes their study from mine is that these three philosophers chose to focus on very broad musical genres (jazz, rock, and classical music), a method that yields very interesting results but which might be problematic for the following reason. Even though the distinctions between

[25] Kania's case is a little different as his analysis of jazz emphasizes the fact that this musical genre has no works and the most important art object that jazz produces is performances. He also notes that works are not more important or valuable than other art objects (such as performances) and points to the fact that most philosophers tend to focus their musical ontology on works and do not discuss other art objects as he himself does. Anyhow, he distinguishes jazz from rock and classical music on the basis of his analysis of works in these two latter genres: according to Kania, jazz's primary focus of critical attention is not studio works, contrary to rock, but performances and, contrary to classical music, these performances are not based on notations and thus are ephemeral, which gives jazz its specific status of musical art with no works. Thus, although his ontology of jazz music is not strictly speaking work-oriented, the way he distinguishes this genre from rock and classical music is.

these broad genres seem to be good ones to start with – and philosophers must certainly start somewhere, as Kania notes about this specific subject– they are categories that don't encompass the practice and conceptions about musical categories of most contemporary musicians, composers, or music specialists, which I consider primordial in the categorization of music into genres (for reasons that should become clearer later on in the section about artists' intentions).

Indeed, musicologists and music historians normally sort musical genres in smaller sets (e.g. fourth Franco-Flemish generation, *Neue Deutsche Welle*, trecento madrigal, spectral music, …) and rarely oppose classical music –broadly construed– to rock –from Abba to Zappa– or to jazz. Only in trying to write the history of very broad musical traditions (as it is done in Richard Taruskin's *Oxford History of Western Music,* in Piero Scaruffi's *The History of Rock Music* or in Donald Grout's *The History of Western Music*) would we find such oppositions, and in most cases, the distinctions between rock, jazz, or classical music are then proposed as working hypothesis rather than as scientific distinctions[26].

This avoidance of such broad genre distinctions seems even truer when one considers musicians' practice and testimonies. Indeed, when musicians describe the genre of music they make, so far as I can see, it is normally done in a more precise manner. Renaissance choruses wouldn't normally say they perform classical music (or art music for that matter) and hip-hop beat-makers would never say they play rock. For reasons that will appear clearer later on and which are linked with the intentions of the artists as well as with the social conventions about musical classifications, I think that one should pay close attention to the way people –and especially artists– normally classify the music they play or listen to. Although the three philosophers haven't argued that we should be dividing contemporary Western music into only three categories, the fact that they focus their interests on such broad distinctions differs from my approach, whose goal is to apply to smaller sets as well as broader ones.

2.5. Three distinctions

Although Gracyk, Pouivet, and Kania's characterizations of rock, classical, or jazz music might not match exactly the way we normally use these terms, they certainly are close to it. They may lead to counterintuitive results if one takes them to apply strictly, but let us not make it a reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Some of the distinctions they propose are very insightful and relevant to our problem so let us now see how we can use their work.

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[26] For instance, Donald Grout writes in the second edition of *The History of Western Music:* « … this book is concerned only with art music; and it emphasizes certain composers, works, and historical relationships. Fashions in history change with the generations, like fashions in musical taste. Of course a historian tries to be objective; but any general history of music is bound to reflect its writer's judgment as to which of the music of the past that he happens to know, and which aspects of the historical development of that music, are most worth attending to in the present. ». In the introduction of his book on the history of rock music, Scaruffi explains that there is not one history of rock but several (he mentions the history of rock hits, the Italian history of rock, the history of the writer's favorite bands) and that his history of rock is subjectively delimited by his interests for alternative music (Scaruffi, 2009: 2).

Firstly, I attribute great importance to Gracyk's distinction between (i) *transparent recordings and studio works*, i.e. recordings that are mere reproductions of live performances, where the goal of the recording process is to achieve transparency, and recordings that *are* the musical works, where the recording process is essential to the creative and æsthetic aspects of the work. This distinction is important not only on an ontological level –these works being arguably the first ones in music history that are autographic yet allow for multiple instances[27]– and on a social level –being well suited to mass diffusion– this distinction is also important on an æsthetic level: perceiving some musical works as belonging to the recording category rather than to the live performance category affects the æsthetic properties that are attributed to them, as we will see in more detail below. Gracyk's distinction is also very important for us because it forces us to consider *music as being an art whose media can be of different ontological kinds* and points to the fact that this ontological multiplicity pertaining to music might be what distinguishes broad genres such as classical music and rock music.

Secondly, I find that Kania's distinction between (ii) *performing a pre-existing work or not*, and the way he uses it to differentiate standard rock (whose recordings are not identical to pre-existing works), jazz (whose performances fall between performing a pre-existing work and creating something new[28]), and classical music (whose works pre-exist the performances) show how important *the origin of performances and recordings in the creative process* is with respect to musical categorization. This distinction further points to an interesting fact about musical genres: that a work requires performers to improvise, to follow a score, or to play what they have been orally transmitted seems to be at the center of the distinctions between jazz music (significantly improvised), classical music (almost entirely written down), and traditional folk music (considered by most to only be orally transmitted and "composed" through this transmission).

Thirdly, I think that the epistemological aspect of Carroll's distinction between mass art and high (or avant-garde) art, or, more broadly, between (iii) *cognitively accessible and demanding art traditions*, and the way Pouivet uses it to try differentiating rock music from electronic classical music also points to a very important factor of musical categorization into genres, namely *what the audience is supposed to know when listening to a piece.* Even if the way Pouivet uses this distinction does not correspond entirely to our categorization practices (as we can easily find examples of rock music that are demanding just as there are many classical pieces that are easily accessible) it is true that, in general, rock music is made to be readily accessible and that classical music, especially in the 20th century, often asks for a more substantial cultural background to be fully appreciated. In fact I find that Carroll and Pouivet's distinction applies very well to the main difference between pop music and experimental (or avant-garde) music. On

[27] This might not be the case if one considers music boxes (or other automatic mechanisms making music) and their replicas to be musical works.

[28] Note that the question whether jazz performances, because they are ephemeral, can or cannot be considered to be works is a different problem which cannot be addressed here.

the face of it, an important feature of pop music is that most of the population should be able to appreciate it, whatever their cognitive background, and an important feature of experimental (or avant-garde) music is that it consists in pieces that are meant to be strongly innovative and thus cognitively challenging.

Gracyk's distinction (i) is about the musical medium. As might be obvious, media play an important role in musical classification. Whether the work's medium is a performance or a record is important but it is not the only important distinction concerning the medium with respect to musical genres. Below is a scheme whose purpose is to illustrate how broad genre distinctions can be based on paradigmatic musical media (e.g. most electronica works correspond in my tree to 2.1.2.1.2.1. of 2.2.2.2.2. since they are creatively modified recordings (2.1.2.1.2.1.) of human performances using amplified digital instruments (2.2.2.2.2.); *musique concrète* works correspond to 2.1.2.1.2.2 since they are creatively modified recording of noises).



From this distinction we can draw another desideratum for an analysis of musical genres:

(7) The differences in the musical media used by the musicians or the composer can strongly determine the musical genre of the musical output produced (e.g. *musique concrète* works are creatively modified recording of noises).

Kania's distinction (ii) is about the origin of the musical work; the way and the context in which it was created. This distinction is tightly linked to Gracyk's, as the medium used for the creation and the diffusion of a musical work is an important part of its origin or creational process. Anyhow, the question of the origin and the question of the medium should be differentiated, for two works can have the same musical medium and differ in their origins in relevant ways. For instance, Wendy Carlos' recording of Bach's *Brandenburg Concerto* and his recording of his own compositions in *Sonic Seasonings* have exactly the same medium (several layers of single-track recording of an analog Moog synthesizer mixed in the post-production) but the creational origin of the *Concerto* makes its recording by Carlos part of the classical music tradition unlike *Sonic Seasonings*, which is considered to be a New Age or experimental ambient electronic music album[29].

From this distinction we can formulate a further desideratum:

(8) Basic musical genre distinctions (e.g. between jazz, folk, rock, or classical music) can be based on the creative origin of the musical output (e.g. whether a musical object is composed by an individual or a group of people, if it comes from an unknown source, if it is improvised, created through oral transmission, written down, etc.).

Carroll and Pouivet's distinction (iii) is about the audience's influence on musical genres and more specifically on how an intended audience (one that, for instance, should know that punk music from the 70's was absorbed by mainstream commercial music in the 90's, or an audience that should know about the development of technology in electronic music) can determine the genre of music.

From this distinction we can formulate another desideratum:

(9) Some musical genre distinctions can be based on the type or capacity of audience intended by the musicians or composers (e.g. pop music as a genre seems to be based on the accessibility of its members and experimental music on the ability of its members to surprise the audience with new ways of making music).

[29] See for instance http://rateyourmusic.com/release/album/walter_carlos/sonic_seasonings/ or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonic_Seasonings

These three distinctions are going to be useful in what follows, but I will now put the first two aside and concentrate on a problem to which the third one leads, namely, the importance of the artist' intentions for musical genres. Gracyk, Kania, Pouivet, as well as Davies do not fail to consider intentions as an important subject to discuss in the ontology of musical genres, but only Pouivet's distinction between classical electronic music and rock makes it explicit that the artist's intentions are an important factor in determining genres. I will now explain why I think some of the intentions that musicians or composers have in the making of their music play a very important role in determining the category we should consider their music to be in.

PART 3. INTENTIONS AND MUSICAL GENRES

3.1. Intentions and literary categories

To weigh the importance of intentions in the ontology and understanding of musical genres, let us make a detour by literature, a very rich domain regarding the debate on artistic intentions.

First, I should say what I take "artistic intentions" to mean here. The use of this notion can vary depending on the philosophers who write about this subject and when I don't specify otherwise, I will use the term "intention" in a broad sense. This vagueness will allow me to encompass the different uses and to bypass the important but off-topic philosophy of mind and metaphysics of the mental debates (such as whether intentions are better conceived as causal, functional, or volitional, whether they should be divided into time slices, if they always or only sometimes involve plans and so on).

I will here consider that the artists' intentions toward their works can be either (i) *behavioral or action-guiding intentions*: intentional actions being considered, as Paisley Livingston describes, as "the execution and realization of a plan, where the agent [here, the artist] effectively follows and is guided by the plan in performing actions that, in manifesting sufficient levels of skill and control, bring about the intended outcome" (2005: 14). They can also be (ii) *content-related intentions*, such as a musician's intention that his or her music expresses sorrow, such as a writer's intention that his or her book states that the modern world is fundamentally foolish, or such as a painter's intention that his or her painting doesn't represent anything. They can also be (iii) *type-related intentions*, such as the intentions that an author has regarding the literary category (satire, poem, tragedy, autobiography…) in which his or her work belongs or as a composer's intention to create a cha-cha-cha. They can also be (iv) *reaction-guiding intentions*, i.e. the artist's intentions about how the audience should respond to the work, whether intellectually, emotionally, politically or by considering a daily life topic in a new light. Finally, they can be what I would call (v) *ideological intentions*, which are the artist's philosophical, religious, or political ideas that have an influence on the artist's conception of the role he or she has as an artist. Because the

goals of the artists having such ideological intentions are directed toward life-time achievements, they differ from content-related intentions in the sense that they are generally not found in the content of a specific work but rather in the meaning of a whole œuvre or in the way artists have led their lives. They are thus a sort of meta-content intention, such as Oscar Wilde's intention to make art for art's sake, Adolf Loos's theory according to which the progress of culture is associated with the deletion of ornaments, Albert Camus' existentialism, or Leo Tolstoy's intention to make a true Christian art whose purpose is not creating beauty but sharing emotions.

These different descriptions of intention can overlap or even coincide. Typically, in Albert Camus's *The Plague*, his (v) ideological intentions about the role of the artist in the society are expressed through the character of Dr. Rieux, which is also the result of his (ii) content-related intentions and, of course, these two types of intentions led him to the project to write what he wrote, thus being also (i) action-guiding intentions. Often reaction-guiding and content-related intentions go hand by hand, for instance when a draftsman intends (iv) some people to be angry at the meaning that he or she intends (ii) to convey in a caricature. Meanings (iii) and (iv) overlap very often too, for instance when an author has the (iii) type-related intention that his or her work belongs to the satire genre and that he or she has the (iv) reaction-guiding intention that the audience believe it is not a serious text. When I don't specify which of these kinds of intentions I am considering, it can be any one of those.

The question on which I now want to focus regarding intentions in literature can be formulated as follows: are the intentions that the author actually had in writing his or her work vital or not to our understanding or interpretation of it?

A strong form of what is usually called *anti-intentionalism* would hold that they don't count at all; the work would then consist in what the text means apart from anything else, excluding by the same token interpretations informed by its context of creation, historical era, geopolitical situation as well as all of the author's other works, declarations, influences, actions, thoughts, etc. A defender of such a view is Roland Barthes (1984). The main motivation behind anti-intentionalism is to assume the role of the reader as a filter that can never be bypassed and to face the fact that he or she could never access what the author *really* meant in a text. According to anti-intentionalists, the background of the reader is really what would give a sense to the words read and since the meaning of the text would thus be created by the reader, one should be honest and admit not to care about what the author's intentions are (Barthes, 1984).

A strong form of *intentionalism* would hold that only an interpretation that perfectly fits the author's intentions[30] can be correct; the work would then consist in what the author actually intended it to be – something that, it would seem, only the author could fully be acquainted with, supposing that he or she is infallible about that, which is not incontestable. Defenders of such a view are Roman Ingarden (1973),

[30] Intentions can here be considered as any of the five senses distinguished above, but a large part of the debate is centered on (ii) content-related intentions.

E.D. Hirsch (1967), or Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels (1982). The main motivation behind intentionalism might be found in the slogan "there is no meaning without intentions". A tree, for instance, does not mean anything and neither the gestures of a sleeping person. On the contrary, every communicative act, of which literature is part, is fundamentally intentional, and that is how it acquires its meaning. According to strong intentionalists, this leads us to the conclusion that the meaning actually consists in the intended meaning.

Many difficulties have been stressed concerning these two extreme views; a more modest theory thus seems preferable.

An argument against a strong intentionalism is that we distinguish between literary practice and normal practical linguistic activity. For instance, in everyday conversations, the main goal of the speaker is to communicate to the hearer what he or she thinks or wants to say in a somewhat direct and practical way, whereas in a literary work, the text is supposed to have a certain autonomy, to be something that one interprets for its own sake. That is the reason why we wouldn't just discard a difficult poem if the writer instead explained what he had in mind in plain English instead of the intricate verses (Levinson, 1996: 177). The meaning of verses seems not to be replaceable by paraphrases.

Another argument is that, if the intentions of the author were the only thing that counts in interpretation, then an author could mean anything with any words used and the correct interpretation of those words would not be based in semantics but only in the author's thoughts –as in *Alice in Wonderland* when Humpy Dumpty tries to convince Alice that "glory" means "there's a knockdown argument" (Iseminger, 1996: 321). Of course, words don't just mean whatever the person using them wants them to mean, even if we normally want them to mean what they actually mean.

Now, an argument against strong anti-intentionalism is that we don't conceive literary works as we would conceive a random string of words that has acquired its meaning by chance. When we approach a literary text, we presuppose that it was written by a single mind (or several working together), has a purpose, is a sort of communication or expression, has a meaning, etc. –unlike what we presuppose reading a sequence of sentences generated by a randomized computer program (Levinson, 1996: 177). Another reason why one should refuse to consider literary works as anti-intentionalists do is that absurd and completely contradictory interpretations could then be given to the work without further ado, and that it would be acceptable and even reasonable to do so. Indeed, if the author's century, country, other works, milieu, directed audience, etc. are to be ignored in the analysis of one of his works, an enormous freedom is given to the interpreters who could then take it to mean whatever they want to understand in the words: a tragedy could be read as a satire. This problem is somewhat the reverse of the Humpy-Dumpty-ism reproached to strong intentionalism (Carroll, 2000: 79): the meaning of a word is not just what the reader wants it to mean, even if, most of the time, the reader wants them to mean what they actually mean.

In *Intention and Interpretation in Literature*, Jerrold Levinson defends a position, called hypothetical-intentionalism, situated between these two extremes. According to his view, the correct interpretation of a work corresponds to the best hypothesized *semantic* intentions the author had in writing the text, i.e. the best hypothesis that readers can formulate as to what the author tried to convey in the work.[31] Moreover, works of literature (poems, novels, short stories, etc.) are considered by Levinson to be a sort of utterance that the writer makes in a certain context. He thus proposes that we should call his way of viewing literary works "literances" (Levinson, 1996: 184). To be more precise, literances are:

> … texts presented and projected in literary contexts, whose meaning, it is understood by both author and audience, will be a function of and constrained by –though in ways neither might clearly predict– the potentialities of the text per se together with the generative matrix provided by its issuing forth from individual A, with public persona B, at time C, against cultural background D, in light of predecessors E, in the shadow of contemporary events F, in relation to the reminder of A's artistic œuvre G, and so on. (Levinson, 1996: 184)

If works of literature should be considered as literances, Levinson argues, it implies, firstly, that the receivers should not be ignoring the potential intentions that the author could have had in writing the work, as strong anti-intentionalists would have it. Secondly, it also implies that the actual intentions that the author had are not strictly determinative of the basic meanings of the work, as strong intentionalists think.

However, and this is important for us, in this article Levinson proposes a reservation to his hypothetical intentionalism: he considers that a part of the actual intentions that the author had in writing his or her work *do* count for a correct interpretation. This is what he calls *categorial* intentions and which he opposes to semantic intentions, for which hypothetical intentionalism applies:

> An author's intention to *mean* something in or by a text T (a semantic intention) is one thing, whereas an author's intention that T be *classified* or *taken* in some specific or general way (a categorial intention) is quite another. Categorial intentions involve the maker's framing and positioning of his product vis-à-vis his projected audience; they involve the maker's conception of what he has produced and what it is for, on a rather basic level; they govern not what a work is to mean but how it is to be fundamentally conceived or approached. (Levinson, 1996: 188)

As we can see, categorial intentions are both a kind of what I called type-related intentions (the author means a work to belong to a category) and a kind of reaction-guiding intentions (the author intends the audience to take it as such). Levinson writes that these categorial intentions are only epistemologically

[31] Note that semantic intention is a kind of what I call content-related intentions for literature but not the only one: George Perec's intention that *La Disparition* contain no "e" is, on the face of it, not a semantic intention but arguably a content-related one (even though it is not incoherent to see it as part of the "external" structure of the book rather than of its "internal" constituent and thus rather as a type-related intention than a content-related one). The "musical" value that words are supposed to have when pronounced, for instance in alliterations or assonances, is perhaps another example of a content-related intention that is not semantic.

extrinsic to the work, that is to say, that one couldn't always guess them by only consulting the work itself. He further notes that, sometimes, they couldn't be guessed even by consulting the œuvre of the writer and the historical context of creation surrounding the literance. Instead, in these cases, to know what the categorial intentions of the writer are, one might need to investigate the stances and decisions made by the artist, apparent only in the author's behavior or in ancillary materials and statements concerning the work.[32]

The main argument defending the view that hypothetical intentionalism doesn't apply for categorial intentions is that the latter –for instance, the writer's intention to create a poem rather than a mere diary entry, a shopping list, or a piece of visual art– determine a level of the work that is so basic to its understanding that, "without a knowledge of them, one is powerless even to begin to sort out its meanings, if any it has, by casting about for readings that could most reasonably be attributed to its contextually situated maker." (Levinson, 1996: 189).

As an illustration of the difference between the ways we view categorial and semantic intentions and of the importance of that, we could imagine that, in a distant future, the only information that we would have kept of Jonathan Swift was that he wrote *A Modest Proposal*. In this imaginary society, one would not know in what century he lived in, any of his other works, or even that he wrote something else. One would not know what contemporaries and later commentators thought of him or that he was a writer rather than an economist. In this scenario, a lot of people would certainly think that the text advances a horrific proposition made by a heartless person urging cannibalism and infanticide[33]. It is indeed what it seems to be if one only considers the *semantic* aspect carried by the words of Swift's famous work. One needs to somehow come to believe that this text belongs to the category "satire", and not to the apparent "economic essay" category, in order to properly understand the meaning of the text; the words' meaning is not sufficient to the work's meaning. Without background knowledge about who Swift was or about his other works, the text alone can be interpreted in both ways and it might be hard to come up with the idea that it is a satire. Indeed the best hypothesized meaning in this society might be that *A Modest Proposal* is a heartless solution to an economic problem.

But does that entail that, in such a society, the real meaning of this text is not ironic? I don't think so. I think that no matter what the best hypothesis about the text's meaning is, it remains a satire if that is the category in which the author has written his text. Only once you know that Swift's proposal is a parody of the economic essay genre can you come to a correct interpretation. In other words, you must classify it in the right category in order to understand it properly.

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[32] This point is very close to what Sherri Irvin argues for in her paper "The Artist's Sanction in Contemporary Art" (2005).

[33] When I was in high school, our French teacher once made us read this satire without telling us anything about it. Since he would sometimes make us read texts that were not literature and since virtually no one knew about Jonathan Swift in my class, our teacher expected us not to get that the text was ironic in the first place. It indeed worked. Only after he maieuticly pointed out some statements that seemed particularly strange for any kind of normal human being did one of us hesitantly wonder whether it could be satirical.

Now imagine that Swift actually copied *A Modest Proposal,* word by word, from an article called *The Best Solution,* which he had found in some mercantilist economical review and thought it was so absurd that it would suffice to reprint it under his name in a literary journal to turn it into its own parody[34]. If we were now to discover the "original" text, *The Best Solution*, its meaning could not be considered to be ironic, despite its semantic identity to Swift's text. Furthermore, I think that if people living far in the future where they wouldn't know anything about *The Best Solution's* context of creation and its author's identity, should still interpret its meaning to be serious, unlike *A Modest Proposal*.

The point is that if someone writes a text intending it to be a serious economic essay and that the best hypothesized intentions (taking into account what we know of the writer's œuvre, cultural background, etc.) do not allow one to decide whether it is serious or not, the categorial intentions of its author are what counts in the end and taking it as a satire would be an incorrect interpretation. In this case, one should inquire into the actual behavior and declarations made by the author, in order to attempt to figure out what was the actual categorial intention.

This is not the case, Levinson argues, for semantic intentions: once we know in what art category a literary work is to be taken, the way we approach its meaning is not so tightly dependent on the author's actual intentions: once you know that something is a poem rather than a shopping list, you try to find out the meaning it could have by trying to give your own interpretation of it and the interpretation is itself a valuable activity. For instance, if the meaning of a poem is not obvious, you don't read it and think "Mmmh the expression here is unclear, I'm going to ask the poet what is meant instead of wasting my time trying to figure it out by myself" but you would certainly do so if what you read was a shopping list. We value the activity of interpretation of a literary text for its own sake and we don't see literary texts as mere means to convey specific information. On the contrary we don't value the interpretations of shopping lists or of ordinary conversations for their own sakes but see them instead as means of conveying specific information. In any case, for an appropriate reaction to a text, we need to know if what we are dealing with is a shopping list or a poem, if it is an economical essay or a satire.

It is easy to imagine how categorial intentions can play a very basic role in the understanding of satires, but it is also very easy to imagine its importance with *cadavre exquis,* calligrams, automatic writings, puns, allusions, palindromes, anagramatic poems, etc. For instance, not to understand Appolinaire's intention to make a calligram with *La Colombe Et Le Jet D'Eau* rather than a normal poem is missing much of the poem's value. Accordingly, it is as easy to appreciate the importance of the fact that an author did *not* intend his or her writings to be considered in one of those categories, even when the words could be considered to fit anyone of them. For instance, it is easy to appreciate the importance of not reading Baudelaire's sonnets as meant to be calligrams, at the risk of evaluating them very poorly ("The shapes of these calligrams are very boring."). Once you start to ponder the importance of intentions

[34] Swift actually first published *A Modest Proposal* anonymously, but let us ignore this fact.

for a work to be taken in one of the categories above and not be considered in any of the other ones, you can start to appreciate the fundamental level of categorial intentions for interpretations and how hypotheses about the meaning of the literary works not only depend on them but are strongly based on them.[35]

Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism about literary works seems to me to be a good starting point to understand the importance of intentions in musical ontology, especially because the notion of categorial intentions seems very well fitted to the study of musical genres, as we will see below. Unfortunately for us, only a rather small part of Levinson's essay is dedicated to the specific subject of categorial intentions and, of course, the essay is about literary works and not about music. Some of the questions that concern us here are thus not addressed. For instance: (i) If categorial intentions play such a fundamental role in the interpretation of artworks, how can one find out about them for such or such artwork? (ii) Do all categorial intentions play the fundamental role Levinson pointed out for some of them? Are artists restricted in some way about the kind of categorial intentions they should or can have? If they are restricted, how so?

One could find in other essays a way to hypothesize Levinson's semantic intentions about this subject[36] and, in a note, he indicates that the idea behind this discussion is to be found in Kendall Walton's famous essay "The Categories of Art". This essay can help us answering the above questions and would also allow us to come back to the topic of musical genre. Let us then go on with it.

3.2. The categories of art and their criteria

In this section I will present Walton's essay in order to understand more fully and give further arguments for the importance of art categorizations in general, and of musical genres in particular, for the æsthetics and ontology of art. I will also link this article to Levinson's essay in order to answer some of the questions raised above. In particular, I will identify Levinson's notion of categorial intention with one of the criteria Walton gives to assess whether a work W belongs to an art category C. Note already that by art category, Walton not only refers to the literature genres discussed by Levinson (such as a novel or a satire) but any of the ways we group artworks together, whether by common groupings such as historical

[35] A notion similar to Levinson's categorial intentionalism but which tries to avoid intentions as constitutive of the nature of artworks can be found in "The Artist's Sanction in Contemporary Art" by Sherri Irvin (2005). The big difference between the notion of categorial intention and the artist's sanction is that, for Irvin, if an artist has an intention about the nature of his or her work that he or she doesn't or can't make publicly recognized, it shouldn't count as determining the nature of the work : only public sanctions count. Other than this point, Irvin's article supports what I defend here. There is no space for me to argue why I prefer to take Levinson's notion of categorial intention but see Thomasson (2010) for arguments against the artist's sanction as completely replacing the artist's categorial intentions.

[36] C.f. "Defining Art Historically" and its two sequels: "Refining Art Historically" and "Expending Art Historically" as well as "Musical Literacy", "Musical Expressiveness" (Levinson, 1996 & 2011), "Hypothetical intentionalism: statement, objections, and replies" (Levinson, 2006), or the review of Paisley Livingston *Art and Intentions : A Philosophical Study* (Levinson, 2007).

periods (a pottery from the Hellenistic Period), artistic movements (a German expressionist movie), or geographical provenance (a Mesopotamian mosaic), but also by other forms of sorting such as technical characteristics (a lithography), and even unconventional classifications (all the musical pieces with exactly 3875 notes).

An important aspect of Walton's very rich paper is the attack that he makes against the view according to which all of the æsthetic properties of a work derive from its perceptual properties alone[37]. The general argument goes roughly as follows: Firstly, the historical context of an artwork's creation as well as the artists' intentions in creating it are not part of the perceptible aspect of artworks but do count regarding what art category it is to be taken in. Secondly, the category to which a work is taken to belong by a spectator matters for the æsthetic perception he or she has of it. Thirdly, there are categories that fit a work correctly and others that do not; the spectator is more or less right in his categorial attributions. Hence, the æsthetic properties of an artwork depend on other things than its perceptible properties, namely to what category of art it belongs.

In the defense and elaboration of the second point, I propose to present Walton's *guernicas* thought experiment. Rather than paraphrasing him, let me quote it in full:

> Imagine a society which does not have an established medium of painting, but does produce a kind of work of art called *guernicas*. *Guernicas* are like versions of Picasso's "Guernica" done in various bas-relief dimensions. All of them are surfaces with the colors and shapes of Picasso's "Guernica", but the surfaces are molded to protrude from the wall like relief maps of different kinds of terrain. Some *guernicas* have rolling surfaces, others are sharp and jagged, still others contain several relatively flat planes at various angles to each other, and so forth. Picasso's "Guernica" would be counted as a *guernica* in this society –a perfectly flat one– rather than as a painting. […] This would make for a profound difference between our æsthetic reaction to "Guernica" and theirs. It seems violent, dynamic, vital, disturbing to us. But I imagine it would strike them as cold, dark, lifeless, or serene and restful, or perhaps bland, dull, boring –but in any case *not* violent, dynamic, and vital. (Walton, 1970, 345)

In the defense and elaboration of the third point, Walton gives four criteria to determine in which category *C* a work *W* is correctly perceived, thus helping us with some of the questions raised by Levinson's essay.

The first criterion (that I will call the *standard features* criterion) is "the presence in *W* of a relatively large number of features standard with respect to *C*." (Walton, 1970: 357). A feature is standard with respect to a category when it is a feature in virtue of which works in that category belongs to it; in other words, when a work doesn't have a feature standard with respect to a category, then it would normally not be part of that category. This might seems complicated but it is rather obvious. For instance, the fact that

[37] As Walton notes, literary works are not happily conceived as perceptual ones. As a consequence, he concentrates on visual and musical art in this paper even though he considers his remarks to apply to works of literature as well, when suitable modifications are made (Walton, 1970: 335, n.5)

a work is flat is standard with respect to the category of paintings. That means that if a work doesn't have a flat surface, it normally wouldn't be part of the category of paintings; objects stuck on a canvas is a standard feature with respect to the category of collage but not to the category of paintings. Thus, it is quite normal that, in order to belong to a specific category, W should have a large number of features standard for C.

The second criterion (that I will call the *charity principle*) is "the fact, if it is one, that *W* is better or more interesting or pleasing æsthetically, or more worth experiencing when perceived in *C* than it is when perceived in alternative ways." (Walton, 1970: 357). For instance, it makes sense to suppose that an impressionist painting doesn't belong to the classical portrait category *because* it has more æsthetic value when considered as painted with the goals and techniques the impressionist movement had rather than with those of the *pompier* painters (the painting would, for instance, seems expressive rather than unskillful and lively rather than irrealistic).

But these two criteria together are not sufficient to determine the right category in which to perceive a work. As Walton argues, a mediocre work can be taken to be a masterpiece if it is considered in a far-fetched category imagined by someone whose purpose is to valorize the work by making up an *ad hoc* classification. For instance, if the mediocre work lacks ingenuity "we might devise a set of rules in terms of which the work finds itself in a dilemma and then ingeniously escapes from it, and build these rules into a set of categories." (Walton, 1970: 360) But of course, a mediocre work shouldn't turn *ipso facto* into a neglected masterpiece only because someone has made up a category where the work fulfills or even exceeds skillfully all of the category's fancied criteria. Such categories seem illegitimately attributed.

Walton's example is somewhat eccentric and perhaps only those with a penchant for modality will find it convincing. Anyway, I think that we can make the same point with actual examples showing why we need further criteria in order to classify works in the right categories for an optimal æsthetic evaluation. Eric Satie's *musique d'ameublement* (furniture music) is, in some respect, very similar to some airport or shopping mall Muzak; the latter shares a lot of standard features with the furniture music category. Indeed, both of these kinds of music fit a mere hearing rather than an active listening; they are instrumental; they are repetitive; they avoid any kind of drastic changes in their melodies, harmonies, rhythms, or timbres; they are very consonant; their rhythms are moderate; etc. Although their resemblance could perhaps make their categories apparently indiscernible, the musical genres to which they belong are very different: Eric Satie's furniture music is ironic, it was first created in 1917, it denounces the way music is considered as a mere consummation product, it mocks the early 20th century bourgeoisie, its meaning cannot be guessed by hearing it, it is quite visionary, and so on, and so forth. Clearly, taking some elevator Muzak to be part of the furniture music category makes it more interesting and perhaps even more worth experiencing than if it is taken to be what it is meant to be. Even though it

is surely not hurtful to experience elevator music as if it had the same properties as furniture music, it is not the right category in which to put it, especially when evaluating the artistic worth of the music. Accordingly, we need stricter criteria for cases where standard features and the charity principle are not sufficient for accurate or apt categorization.

The third criterion (that I will call the *categorial intentions* criterion) is "the fact, if it is one, that the artist who produced *W* intended or expected it to be perceived in *C,* or thought of it as a *C*." (Walton, 1970: 357). This criterion corresponds quite well to what Jerrold Levinson calls "categorial intentions" and matches pretty much with the quotation above (Levinson, 1996: 188). The differences are that, firstly, Walton's description also encompasses the artist's expectation with respect to the audience, secondly, that the criterion is disjunctive, being either reaction-guiding intentions ("intended or expected it to be perceived in *C*") *or* type-related intentions ("thought of it as a *C*"), when Levinson's categorial intentions include both, and, thirdly, that it is not restricted to literature but applies to all arts.

I take the latter difference to be unimportant since taking Levinson's notion as applicable to other arts doesn't clash with what he writes elsewhere and seems indeed quite natural.

The second difference (thought and/or intention), on the contrary, could be significant, since it is imaginable that an artist thinks of his or her work as belonging to a certain category but doesn't intend or expect the audience to take it as such. Nevertheless, I consider that such thoughts are in reality not important for us since, if, on one hand, the artist's thought "*W* belongs to *C*" has nothing to do with any reaction-guiding intentions about the way his or her work should be classified, this thought is a private one which is not meant to be communicated in any way and thus seems to have no importance to how the work is to be perceived by others; just as the thought: "Oh, it's funny, my work begins with the word 'Animals' just like such and such other works". If, on the other hand, the artist's thought "*W* belongs to *C*" is related to reaction-guiding intentions about the way his or her work should be classified, the thought "*W* belongs to *C*" is certainly part of these reaction-guiding intentions: if I intend you to consider my work to be a sculpture, then my thought that it is a sculpture is part of my intention.

The first difference between Walton and Levinson's definitions (expected *or* intended vs. intended) can also be important since an artist can intend his or her work to be perceived in a specific category but not expect the audience to understand it straight away, supposing that his or her work would not be justly understood, at least for some time[38]. Anyhow, Walton refers only to intentions and not to expectation in the rest of the essay. I thus think that the expectation part of this criterion can be ignored.

[38] This seems to have been the case with Arnold Schönberg's first dodecaphonic works, as we will see below. Furthermore, he is supposed to have said that, for the present time, it was more important to him that the audience understands his old, more accessible works (such as *Verklärte Nacht*), because he considered them to be necessary steps to understand the inevitability of dodecaphony as a historical continuation. He thus might have not expected the public to classify his dodecaphonic works in the right category even though he intended that they do so eventually.

Consequently, I think that the three differences between Walton's third criterion and Levinson's categorial intentions can be ignored here and I shall hence take the two notions to be equivalent. Let us now proceed to the last criterion.

The fourth criterion (that I will call the *societal* criterion) is "the fact, if it is one, that *C* is well established in and recognized by the society in which *W* was produced. A category is well established and recognized by a society if the members of the society are familiar with works in that category, consider a work's membership in a fact worth mentioning, exhibit works of that category together, and so forth –that is, roughly, if that category figures importantly in their way of classifying works of art. […] The categories in which a work is correctly perceived, according to this condition, are generally the ones in which the artist's contemporaries did perceive or would have perceived it." (Walton, 1970: 357-358). As examples of well established and recognized categories in our society, he mentions impressionist painting and Brahmsian music. As examples that are not, he mentions "paintings with diagonal composition containing green crosses and pieces of music containing between four and eight F-sharps" (Walon, 1970: 358)[39]. We could add the far-fetched categories mentioned above that turn mediocre works into unrecognized masterpieces in an *ad hoc* and unjustified way.

Let us note that the first two criteria (standard features and charity principle) can be said to be epistemologically intrinsic to the works –in the sense that we can determine if they apply by introspecting the work alone. For instance, whether an object possesses the feature "being flat" –which is standard for paintings– can be assessed just by looking at the object. And the question "Does this painting possess more æsthetic value when seen as impressionist or when seen as neo-classic?" can be answered by looking at it alone. On the other hand, the last two criteria (intentions and societal) are partly epistemologically extrinsic: we cannot know them just by attending the work. We cannot answer the question "Did the sculptor mean this work as a pietà?" if we don't have some information about its origin. And we cannot say whether the category "pietà" was socially recognized at the time of the work's creation just by looking at a sculpture. These two criteria are based on the artworks' non-perceptual æsthetic qualities, whose importance Walton stresses in this article.

In order to see how the third (categorial intentions) and fourth (societal) criteria play different roles, the best cases to look at are the ones where they diverge. Walton gives a nice example for us, being a musical one (Walton, 1970: 360-361): During the early days of twelve-tone music, dodecaphony was neither recognized nor well established. As Arnold Schönberg's writings later showed[40], the composer

[39] Kendall Walton adds after listing these four criteria that "the mechanical process by which a work was produced, or (for example, in architecture) the non-perceptible physical characteristics or internal structure of a work, is relevant." (Walton, 1970: 358) but he doesn't discuss these further because he considers them to have too limited an applicability. It is interesting though to note that the distinction between recorded and written music discussed above seems to be of that sort (c.f. Gracyk, 1996, or Kania, 2005).

[40] Schönberg was not to publish a developed text accounting for the mechanism behind his dodecaphonist compositions before 1941, which actually is the only article where he explains in details his method, although one of his student, Erwin Stein published an article in 1924, four years after the creation and one year after the publication of the first twelve-tone piece,

intended his earliest twelve-tone works to be heard as such but virtually no one, beside his closest associates and some of his students, would have heard them in this category, even assuming they could really hear them in that category. Thus, between the early 20's and the societal recognition of dodecaphony as a new genre, which arguably began around the 40's, the third and the fourth criteria given by Walton were divergent with respect to the category in which Schönberg's works should be classified. The author's intentions clearly diverged from the way his music was recognized in society.

Furthermore, I agree with Walton when he writes that the judgments of people who heard Schönberg's 1920's compositions in another category and thus thought that they were formless or chaotic pieces were wrong. If anything, Schönberg's dodecaphonic music cannot be considered chaotic once you know its mechanism[41]. I also agree with Walton about the fact that this would have been true even if Schönberg had worked entirely alone, if none of his contemporaries would have classified his music as dodecaphonic (Walton, 1970: 361).

I think that this historical example shows that categorial intentions not only play a significant role in literature, but also in music. Furthermore, and this is an important point, it gives a strong support to Levinson's point according to which hypothetical intentionalism's interpretation scheme –which takes into account only the first, the fourth, and occasionally the second of Walton's criteria– is sometimes not sufficient to get the right interpretation of a work.

Indeed, when the first dodecaphonic work, the op.23, was published, the standard features criterion would have made it part of some post-romantic modern piano music, perhaps on par with Schönberg's previous piano works or with Bartók's 1910's piano works (which share with op. 23 the features of not having a tonality). The fourth criterion, optimistically, would have made it part of free-atonality, along with his students Berg and Webern; a category that then arguably began to be recognized and more or less established. The second criterion, the charity principle, would have clearly not been sufficient to be able to find the rules governing the category of dodecaphony. Even Gustav Mahler, who considered Schönberg to be his protégé, conducting his works and giving him money until he died in 1911, admitted to not understanding some of his works (Stuckenschmidt, 1977), and that was back when Schönberg was still composing in a style close to some of his contemporaries, like Richard Strauss, and thus not as hard to understand as the style of his op.23. The method used in this work is clearly too complicated to be guessed by just studying the score, however thoroughly, to say nothing of a mere hearing. The charity principle couldn't have led anyone not knowing Schönberg's composition method (which is the essence

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explaining part of the "method" used by his master. One of the reasons why he finally decided to publish an article on the details of his compositional method is that, as he writes, even trained people knowing the basic idea of twelve-tone music often didn't understand it and couldn't appreciate its value (Schönberg, 1977: 162-187)

[41] As Jerrold Levinson pointed out to me, that might only show that the works were not *structurally* chaotic (or random) but they might yet be *aurally* chaotic (or incomprehensible). It is indeed arguable whether knowing the structure of dodecaphonic works makes them aurally more coherent or not. The point remains the same, however, whether we conceive the audience's mistake to be only about the works' structure or about their hearability as well.

of his categorial intentions and the dodecaphonic genre) to classify his music as dodecaphonic. And I think that this is true even for an ideal audience taking the best hypothesized intentions to be the "meaning of the work", that is, an audience who would know that the work had issued forth "from individual A, with public persona B, at time C, against cultural background D, in light of predecessors E, in the shadow of contemporary events F, in relation to the reminder of A's artistic œuvre G, and so on." (Levinson, 1996: 184).

Schönberg's case is pretty peculiar in at least two ways. First, few artists have been as aware of the category in which their works should be considered. Secondly, the recognition of dodecaphony as a societal established category took a pretty long time to happen, compared to other new musical categories like electro-acoustic music. But his case is far from being the only one in music history where a composer intends his or her works to be taken as being part of a category that is not yet well established in his or her society. To name but a few, we could mention: Philippe de Vitry's *Ars Nova* isorythmic motets that were considered not to reach the *Ars Antiqua*'s standards of clarity in the music and emphasis on the text; Monteverdi's madrigals that were considered as not respecting Zarlino's rules for the preparation and resolution of dissonances (*prima pratica*) when they weren't meant to do so (being meant to be considered as belonging to the then new *seconda pratica*); the opening *Allegro* from Beethoven's *Third Symphony* that has been mistaken as being in classical sonata form and so reproached for having too long a development, for having new themes arising after the exposition, and for having too early an entry of the theme by the horn in the recapitulation[42] ; Satie's *musique d'ameublement* that was considered as concert music (during the first presentation, Satie got mad at his audience because they were listening quietly to the music instead of chatting to it and walking around like in restaurants).

Consequently, I think it fair to conclude that, first, categorial intentions can play a decisive role in the understanding of music since categories such as musical genres seem to be strongly determined by the author's intention to produce a work in such or such a category and that these categories play a significant role in the way we evaluate artworks. Second, the role played by categorial intentions in art ontology and æsthetic evaluation cannot be replaced by intrinsic or contextual features of the work, since the importance of these intentions sometimes cannot be guessed just by attending the work itself with the acquaintance of its public context of creation, historical background, and the like. Thirdly, anyhow, let us not forget the importance of the non-intentional and non-contextual features of works in being classified in such or such category (standard features and charity principle criteria) even though it might be obvious that they also play an important role. These three conclusions can help us to formulate three more desiderata for our analysis of musical genres:

[42] A funny anecdote is that, during the first rehearsal, Beethoven's disciple Ferdinand Ries said something like « That damned hornist ! Can't he count ? It sounded so wrong ! » about the "early" reexposition of the theme. Beethoven is said to have not forgiven him for a long time.

(10) Whether a musical output O has to be taken to belong to a musical genre G can be reliably determined by the intentions that the creators of O have that O should be taken as belonging to G.

(11) Whether a musical output O has to be taken to belong to a musical genre G cannot be entirely guessed by listening to O, one also has to find out about its context of emergence, cultural background, or other features epistemologically extrinsic to O.

(12) Whether a musical output O has to be taken to belong to a musical genre G can also depend on features that are epistemologically intrinsic to O such as its standard features with respect to such and such categories and whether O is best perceived if perceived in G.

With these considerations in mind, we can now come back to the questions that were not addressed in Levinson's essay and see how Walton could help us answering them:

– If categorial intentions play such a fundamental role in the interpretation of artworks, how can one find out about them for such or such artwork?

Walton has given us four criteria to determine whether a work W belongs to the art category C (the standard features, charity principle, categorial intentions, and societal criteria) which can help in figuring out what kind of categorial intentions are at stake in a given work. Of course, it is not always possible (perhaps not even for the artist) to spell out all the categorial intentions but Walton's criteria seem to allow for a satisfying basis to begin with.

– Do all categorial intentions play the fundamental role Levinson pointed out for some of them?

In Levinson's essay, only normal literature or poetry categories are discussed (e.g. satires, sonnets, …) but Walton mentions far-fetched and strange categories (such as paintings with diagonal composition containing green crosses and pieces of music containing between four and eight F-sharps) which seem to play important roles neither in æsthetics nor in ontology of artworks. Anyhow, it is possible that an artist intends his or her work to be taken as part of such weird categories. We can see here that there is a tension between the importance that categorial intentions seem to sometimes play and the fact that they can as well potentially be idle, or even illegitimate, as we have seen above that some categories can be thus labeled, which leads us to the next question. (We will see in the next part how I think one should deal with this possible tension with respect to musical genres.)

– Are artists restricted in some way about the kind of categorial intentions they should or can have?

It appears that they could be restricted in a way since not all categories seem to be legitimate for such or such artwork. For instance, if someone draws a line on a canvas and intends it to be a symphony, this intention certainly goes beyond what categorization in art (even nowadays) seems to allow. Furthermore, the category of works with five G-sharps between the eighth and tenth measures just doesn't make any sense from the perspective of æsthetic evalutation. On the face of it, what seems to me quite problematic with the latter category is that it puts together into a box that is relevant for æsthetic evaluation (i.e. an art

category) works from all over the planet and from all ages even though they share no relevant similarities. So even if an artist intended all of his or her works to be taken as part of such a category and tries to publically legitimize this category as an important interpretation factors of his or her œuvre (which seems to be acceptable), it would be absurd if this artist then tries to convince everybody that we should also evaluate from the point of view of his or her made-up art category works of Bach's, Hendrix's, or Machaut's with five G-sharps between the eight and tenth measures. It would be similar to judging Picasso's "Guernica" to be a *guernica.* Æsthetically, in our world, the fact that all these works share this feature is idle even though it perhaps wouldn't be for this imagined artist's work. In any case, it is not because one artist has made clear that he or she has the categorial intention to create works with this precise feature that a legitimate category is thus created for all the works sharing these categories' features. Obviously, Bach, Hendrix, and Machaut somehow intended some of their works to have five G-sharps between the eight and tenth measures since they certainly had the action-guiding intention to have the notes they had in their works, and we don't have proofs denying they had the categorial intention that their audience should group these works together and take them as part of this specific category. But even if it was the case, would we not still think of this grouping as unimportant for music history and not worthy to be called a legitimate musical genre? I would say so and we could thus think that artists' categorial intentions are restricted in the way that not all musical genres can become legitimate. Alternatively, we could say that the artist's categorial intentions are not restricted but rather that we shouldn't take all of their categorial intentions to be determinative of the musical genres in which the work should be perceived. In both cases, there is a sort of "legitimate-category" restriction. I will come back to this important point with respect to musical genres in the next part.

– If they are restricted, how so?

If one accepts the societal criterion given by Walton to be important, it leads to think that the recognition by society of normal cultural practice seems to play an important role in defining what categories are legitimate. Anyhow, it is definitely not the only factor, otherwise there would never be new legitimate categories. Indeed, when a category is new, creating in this category cannot be recognized as a normal cultural practice. In the case of dodecaphony, for instance, the category now seems completely legitimate in part because of its long-standing artistic merits and historical influence but it would be hard to argue that Schönberg's categorial intentions weren't legitimate when this category was novel and not yet recognized. Anyhow, so far, the factors that make unrecognized categories legitimate remain unclear. Why is it, exactly, that the five-G-sharp-between-the-eighth-and-tenth-measures and the paintings-with-diagonal-composition-containing–green-crosses categories should be illegitimate although categories that also seem weird such as musical-works-whose-melodies-does-not-repeat-a-tone-before-it-has-played-the-

other-eleven (dodecaphonism) or poems-with-an-ABBA-ABBA-CCD-EDE-structure (French sonnet) are normally legitimate?[43].

In the next section, I will present a model for an analysis of musical genres based on John Searle's notion of status function (2010) which will help me spell out what I think can be said to answer these questions.

PART 4. MUSICAL GENRES AS STATUS FUNCTIONS

4.1. Status functions

According to Searle, the distinctive feature of human social reality is that we can attribute functions to objects or people that don't possess them in virtue of their physical constitutions only. Examples are pretty much everywhere: the president of the United States, sport clubs, money, marriage, private properties, universities, churches, etc. Those are instances of what he has baptized *status functions*. My hypothesis is that we can analyze musical genres as being further examples of these. Before I explain how, I will give a concise description of how status functions are defined by Searle, and then explain more thoroughly their different parts.

A status function is (a) a sort of function that has two particular features: first, (b) it needs collective recognition to be created and to continue its existence, second, (c) the entities possessing this function are able to perform it not in virtue of their physical structures, or at least not solely in virtue of them, but in virtue of an imposition of that status on those entities, which status needs to be collectively recognized. (Searle, 2010: 59). The imposition and collective recognition of that status is done (d) through acts that have the logical form of the Declaration speech-acts, which Searle calls Status Function Declarations. Furthermore, when a Status Function Declaration is successful, it always gives the status function what he calls (e) a deontic power. (Searle, 2010: 94-103).

(a) A function, according to Searle, is a cause that serves a purpose. Functions would thus differ from physical causes, such as what makes my pen fall if I drop it, because the latter don't involve purposes. Purposes are value-based entities and would be what give functions their normative component. The clue to the normative component that purposes bring to functions, according to Searle, is that once we have described something in terms of functions, we can describe this thing normatively. We don't do that for causes without purposes. For instance, we would not say that my pen falls in a good or bad way, or that your pen falls better than mine, or that what makes my pen fall is malfunctioning. But we do say such things for functions, even natural ones: we say that my heart pumps blood in a good or bad way, that this

[43] Note that they can be illegimitate in anomalous cases where the artist fails by lack of skill or knowledge to fit into the desired features, e.g. if I make a sculpture and intend it to be dodecaphonic

heart does it better than that one, or that what makes my heart pump blood is malfunctioning (Searle, 2010: 59). According to Searle, we consider that hearts have functions and are not merely physical causes because we value life. We don't consider that cancers have functions because we don't value the existence of malignant tumors as such. This would also be why we normally don't consider that magnetic fields or viruses or sunspots have functions: we normally don't ascribe to these natural causes any purposes.

(b) Unlike physical causes (e.g. magnetism, pressure, or fire) and unlike *natural* functions (e.g. heart pumps blood, sex allows reproduction, or chlorophyll makes light's energy absorbable), status functions are entities that acquire their functions (e.g. presidents govern countries, money allows commerce, marriage creates social bounds, etc.) through a collective recognition of those functions, which is possible thanks to a certain attitude, a collective intentionality, directed toward them. For Searle, there exist two common sorts of collective attitudes that should be analyzed as collectively intended.

The first one is cooperation, as when I play the piano and you the clarinet and we cooperate in performing a duet. Searle's analysis of cooperation basically consists in saying that an individual has the collective intention to achieve the action B (for example, performing the duet) by way of contributing to his or her own part, the singular action A (for example, playing the clarinet), and believes that his or her partners in the collective also have the same form of intention, namely achieving B by contributing to their part (for example, performing the duet by playing the piano). (Searle, 2010: 50-54)

The second is collective recognition, such as the fact that, in the United States, people recognize certain pieces of paper and metal as money. This is not a full-blown cooperation because I don't need to have any intention to collaborate in any particular way in order to participate to the collective recognition of money: I can just accept or acknowledge this fact without planning anything involving this collective recognition. I can also act on it and achieve cooperation thanks to this collective recognition, as when I actually go to the shop to buy something. The seller and I share the collective recognition of pieces of paper and metal as money and believe that we both accept these objects as such. That allows us to cooperate when I go to the shop and achieve the collective action of making a particular transaction, but we don't need to participate in such a cooperative transaction in order to collectively recognize certain physical objects as money (Searle, 2010: 56-58).

The point here is that status functions require a collective recognition in order to work as functions, even though they don't necessitate any cooperation. We cannot play a football game together if there is no cooperation between us, but we don't need to cooperate for the football rules to exist, people just need to recognize their existence and their function for them to exist. Furthermore, according to Searle, this collective recognition is necessary for the status function to exist as a function. If nobody but me recognizes a certain football rule as having the function I ascribed it, it won't be able to fulfill its desired function. I might continue to believe that my rule exists but it could not become the function that it is

suppose to be, namely a football rule, until other people recognize it as such and start playing according to this rule. Football rules, like money or nationalities, need to be recognized as such in order to fulfill their function and if people stop recognizing a football rule as having a function, Searle argues, it just ceases to be a football rule.[44]

(c) The second thing distinguishing natural functions and causes from status functions is that the latter are not entirely based on their physical features (Searle, 2010: 7). Hearts', sexes', or chlorophyll's natural functions can be explained solely on the basis of their biological constitutions, which, in turn, are solely based on their physical constitutions, which are not mind-dependent.

Note that we find in the behavior of other animals ascriptions of functions to objects that don't otherwise play that role. For instance objects used to build birds' nests, beavers' dams, or the sticks that primates use to dig food from the ground acquire new functions through these animals' ascriptions. In these cases, there are some objects (e.g. a stick) that serve a cause (e.g. reaching ants in narrow cracks) because some animal ascribes them a purpose (e.g. get food) even though the objects would not have it otherwise (e.g. without a function ascription, a stick does not have the purpose of getting food for a primate, unlike the heart's purpose of keeping an animal alive by pumping blood). But that does not make them status functions because the functions of the nest's or the dam's constituents and the primates' stick depend solely on these objects' mind-independent structures. Indeed, it is not because branches and trunks are recognized by a community of beavers as dam's constituents that they can fulfill this function. Similarly it is not because of the bird's intentional attitude toward dried grass that it can function as a nest's building material. The functions of money, of judges, or of nationalities do depend on intentional attitudes, namely on collective recognitions, but the functions ascribed by animals other than humans to objects seems to always depend on these objects' mind-independent features. Even the alpha male in a chimpanzee's community acquires his status thanks to his physical strength and his societal regulation capacities: if another male shows a superiority in those biologically based capacities, he will become the new alpha male and enable him to fulfill the dominant male's function in the community (Low, 1989)[45].

This is not how presidential elections work. The president is elected according to the current laws and from then on fulfills the presidential functions according to the legislation in use, no matter what are his or her biological capacities. It does not matter for the president's status if somebody is stronger or more

[44] This last point is quite controversial. Indeed, one can argue that even if I am the only person on Earth still believing that a touchdown gives 7 points, this still is a football rule, even if it is not functioning as such anymore. The same can be argued about money: Deutschmark might be thought to still exist even if they cannot fulfill their function anymore. If that is correct, *pace* Searle, collective recognition is not necessary for status functions to exist even though it is necessary for them to fulfill their function. But does Deutschmark *qua* Deutschmark really still exist if it cannot fulfill money's function? In this essay, I am going to leave this difficult question on the side. What is important for us is to recognize that what Searle calls status functions, unlike natural functions and physical causes, are functions that can only work when they are collectively recognized as such.

[45] Exactly how close are chimpanzees' societal organization to humans' is a disputed subject. But, as Searle writes, if one finds out that other animals have justice courts, divorce, income tax or other institutional facts, it would not be an objection to his theory but a further subject of investigation (Searle, 2010: 7 n.2).

clever or better at regulating society than the president. Even if the president went into a coma, it would be legislations that would govern the eventual reattributions of the presidential functions. The non-physicality basis of status-function is even more obvious with fiat money: in nowadays banks, we don't even need to be able to exchange bits of papers against gold in order to ascribe them the function they have anymore.

(d) According to Searle, the only thing that is needed to create a status function, and by doing so allowing it to fulfill its function, is a successful Status Function Declaration. Status Function Declarations are constituted by acts and/or language occurrences that have the logical form of the Declaration speech-act and which declare a status function to exist. Declarations are one of the five kinds of speech acts in Searle's taxonomy. These are (i) *Assertives* (e.g. statements, propositions, assertions, descriptions, etc.) whose point is to represent things and how they are. They can be literally true or false depending on whether they do their job or not since that their purpose is to be fitted to reality. Accordingly, we say that they have the word-to-world direction of fit (Searle, 2010: 69). (ii) *Directives* (e.g. orders, requests, commands, etc.) whose point it to try to get other people to do as directed. When successful, they can make the world adapt to them (as when I say "Go out!" and you actually go out), they thus have the world-to-word direction of fit (Searle, 2010: 69). (iii) *Commissives* (e.g. promises, vows, pledges, etc.) whose point is to commit the speaker to some actions. Like directives, they are successful when the world comes to be as said (as when I promise to come and that I come), and thus also have the world-to-word direction of fit (Searle, 2010: 69). (iv) *Expressives* (thanks, apologies, congratulations, exclamations, etc.) whose point is to express the speaker's feelings and attitudes about something that is generally presupposed to exist (Searle, 2010: 69). They convey information about the world and thus are similar to assertive. They differ, according to Searle, inasmuch as expressives don't aim at representing the world, but rather at pressing out or giving vent to one's internal states: « If I say "Ouch!" as a spontaneous expression of pain, I convey information but I do not represent anything […] If I say "Ouch!" when I am not in pain I may mislead and misinform, but I do not strictly speaking lie.» (Searle, 2010: 72-73). According to Searle, unlike assertives, they are not full-blown linguistic phenomena and are not literally true or false. Finally, there are (v) *Declarations* (e.g. baptism, pronouncement of marriage, declaration of war, etc.) whose point is to make something the case by declaring it to be the case. They thus have both word-to-world and world-to-word direction of fit: when successful, they both make the world change according to what is said and, by the same speech-act, represent how the world is.

In the famous cases of Declarations such as baptism, testament, or marriage –that John Austin first called "performative utterances" in *How to Do Things with Words*– one makes something the case by *explicitly* saying so. For instance, the priest makes it the case that you are married when he says "I now *pronounce* you husband and wife". In 1969, the British monarch made it the case that an ocean liner was named "Queen Elisabeth 2" when she said "I *name* this ship Queen Elisabeth the Second." These

examples where the type of speech-act is explicit ("I pronounce", "I name") are the purest cases of Declarations. However, according to Searle, we repeatedly make state of affairs exist by representing them as such, even if these representations are not explicitly Declarations. Indeed, for him, all of status functions are created by representations that have the form of Declarations (i.e. S represents X as Y in context C and *ipso facto* makes X a Y in context C), even in cases where there is no Declarations in the explicit sense. In order to distinguish cases where explicit Declarational speech acts occur, as in Austin's performative utterances, and the cases where the creation of a status function is made by representations that need not be explicit, Searle labels the latter Status Function Declarations (I will sometimes call those "SF Declarations" for short). Let us see with two examples how there can be SF Declarations without explicit Declarational speech-acts (Searle, 2010: 88-89 & 94).

I go to the bartender and order three beers of the same kind and bring them to my table. Without saying a word, I push one beer toward Jerry, another toward Julien, and keep one close to me. With my actions, I represented the fact that one beer is now Jerry's, another Julien's and the third mine, and, by this very representation, I made it the case that those three beers now have a specific owner, my action thus having the two directions of fit characteristic of Declarations. Even if no sips were taken, Jerry would not expect Julien to take the beer that is in front of him, as he would rightly consider it to be his. At the end of the day, the act of pushing the beers had the same result as if I had ceremonially said "I hereby declare this beer to be Jerry's, this other one to be Julien's, and the third to be mine."[46]

In the second example, we imagine a tribe that builds around its huts a stonewall too high to be climbed over, in order to prevent unauthorized access to the village. We then imagine that, after some decades, nothing is left of the wall but a line of stones. Despite the fact that it is then easy to cross it, people both inside and outside the community recognize the stones as a boundary that one is not supposed to cross unless authorized. In this case, the wall first was performing its function in virtue of its physical structure only, but it evolved into an object that achieves its function not in virtue of its physical structure but in virtue of the fact that there is a collective recognition of the line of stones as having a certain status. In this case, as with the beers, there is no explicit Declarational speech-act involved but the result is the same as if there had been one: people both inside and outside the community, through their attitude toward the line of stones, have been representing it as being a boundary and by the collective acceptance of this line as being a boundary, they have made it the case that the line is a boundary.

[46] This might not always be entirely true, as Jerrold Levinson pointed out to me. For instance, it would be possible that the beer I pushed toward Jerry was for him to shepherd until Joe arrives, as Jerry could be a teetotaler. The difference lies in the implicit agreements between participants in the recognition of status functions. It is true that there are differences between explicit speech-acts and implicit ones and that these differences might be important whether I ceremonially declare something to be the case or if only my actions are supposed to do the job. That is also the reason why for important and controversial questions, there are contracts printed on paper which have to be signed by their participants and that a handshake sometimes does not suffice. Anyhow, it is only a difference in degrees of precision of the representation collectively recognized (which can sometimes have an influence on its status function) and not of nature and so the point remains the same: in all these cases we can have proper Declarations, although sometimes no words have been uttered.

In both of these cases, the SF Declaration took the form "X (pushing the beers/the line of stones) count as a Y (ascription of ownership/a boundary) in a context C (a bar/a community) by representing it as a Y".[47]

If Searle is right, we live in a sea of status functions. Take for instance the activity I am engaged in at this very moment. I am writing my *mémoire* in order to complete a Master's degree from the University of Geneva, sitting at John Holliday's desk in one of the philosophy department's offices at the University of Maryland, where I am a regular visiting graduate student. This might seem very banal but it actually is an incredibly complex situation if one tries to analyze it as being constituted of status functions. For instance, the *words* I am typing count as my *mémoire* in the context of my *studies* and I have to do it because it says so in the *academic regulations* of the *Master's degree* in the *Faculty of Arts* at the *University of Geneva*, which in turn is constituted by *official buildings* and its *employees* that count as an *official educational institution* regulated by the *government* of *Switzerland*. The very fact that I am a regular *student* in *Geneva* but can also *legally* be in the *United States of America* as a *visiting graduate student* in another *university*, that *owns* the room in which I am sitting and that *ascribed* this *office* to a *graduate student* whose *name* is John and who agreed to *lend* it to me, is possible because of thousands of *agreements* and tacit or explicit *rules* recognized *internationally*. All of the italicized terms are status functions, and this is just the surface of it: one could describe the social basis of my situation in much more detail.

(e) Why do we bother to create such a complex world? According to Searle, the reason is that, in each case, the status function allows a certain *deontic power* to people that have a specific relationship to the status function. Searle uses the word "power" in a technical way that does not always correspond to daily uses of the word. Power, for Searle, includes, on one hand, capacities or abilities, which he calls *positive powers*, but also, on the other hand, incapacities and inabilities, which he calls *negative powers*. So, for instance, if a policeman has the positive power of arresting me, I have the negative power of being arrested by him. Examples of deontic positive powers are: rights, permissions, authorizations, and entitlements. Examples of negative deontic powers are: obligations, requirements, shackles, constraints, and duties. This might seem a bit strange but I will stick to Searle's terminology when using his theory.

Status functions, unlike natural functions, allow for powers that are not based on brute physical force but are powers that are agreed on or recognized. So for instance, having the status function of a

[47] Note that there can be cases of SF Declarations where there seems to be no X. For instance, there can be a corporation Y that exists without any physical X counting as the basis for it. In those cases, there arguably are social entities that do not coincide ontologically with any part of the physical reality. This is what Barry Smith has called "free-standing Y terms" (Smith, 2003: 19). Sometimes, there thus are no real Xs, but only something that, under certain circumstances, satisfies a certain condition that allows it to count as the social object Y. In the case of corporations, there are some laws that allow one to create a corporation out of nothing by filling up some documentations, paying certain taxes and sending a few letters. In our case, we don't need to go into the details of the analysis but here is the general form of Status Function Declarations that allow for cases where there are no real Xs: "We make it the case by Declaration that for any x that satisfies condition p, x has the status Y and performs the function F in C." (Searle, 2010: 99).

philosophy Master's student at the University of Geneva, I have the negative deontic power (the duty) of giving back my *mémoire* before I receive my degree, even if there is no one menacing me. I have created this obligation by a SF Declaration when I subscribed for the master's degree. Having this function, I also have the positive deontic power of getting discounts in some bookshops and, if I complete my degree as planned, I will have the positive power of being entitled to apply for being a doctorate student. Some deontic powers are very restricted. For instance, having an honorary degree from the university of Geneva does not even allow you to get a free coffee at the UNIGE cafeterias, but perhaps only to be considered with honor by the members of the University.

We now have all the elements to understand what status functions are and do. Let us then put them all together and see how they can be applied to musical genres. To do this, let us use Searle's description of the attribution of deontic power by Declaration, which summarizes in a way his main thesis:

> We collectively recognize or accept (there exists Y in C, and because S R Y (S has power (S does A))).
> In plain English, we collectively recognize that a Y status function exists in context C, and because a human subject S stands in a certain appropriate relation R to the status function Y in C, we further recognize that S has the power to do A, the acts determined by the Y status function. (Searle, 2010: 103)

4.2. Status functions and musical genres

Now, how does this scheme apply to musical genres? My hypothesis is that we can consider paradigmatic musical genres as status functions that bring about a specific sort of negative deontic power: *æsthetic constraints*. I don't think that it is the sole deontic power that musical genre as status function can bring but I think it is the most important one. We will see below other examples of deontic powers that musical genres' ascriptions can bring, but let us for now on focus on this specific one which I find to explain many of the features possessed by musical genres.

What are æsthetic constraints vis-à-vis a musical genre? To me, roughly, they consist in an æsthetic framework in which the music is expected to fit. By aesthetic framework, I mean a certain range of æsthetic properties of the music at which the composer or musician aims or that he or she tries to avoid. These æsthetic properties can be of all different kinds, from thin, e.g. being good for the melodic line, to very thick, e.g. not-being-too-bright for brasses. I will give examples of aesthetic constraints below.

Some questions that my hypothesis might raise could be: why would composers want to be shackled with a negative power, be it æsthetic? Why would they want to be constrained in the first place? It is difficult to answer for all composers and musicians comprehensively but let us see four reasons why this negative deontic power can be the source of positive ones. This will also allow us to give a more complete outline of what æsthetic constraints can be.

Firstly, æsthetic constraints permit inspiration and guidance. On a basic level, one can just follow the advice given by Johannes Fux in *Gradus Ad Parnamus* and arrive at a nice sounding piece, even if nothing extraordinary can come from merely following Fux's steps. On a different level, Olivier Messiaen's explanation of his compositional methods in *Technique de mon langage musical* also shows how strict constraints can serve as a framework where a certain coherence is achieved by the fact that the creation is restricted to a smaller domain of possibility. This is even the case when it is impossible to hear whether a composer has followed or has broken the rules: for instance, Messiaen proposes to create melodies where the notes' accentuations (piano, forte, pianissimo, etc.) follow series that are strictly repeated during the entire piece. Even if no one would hear whether one of the notes did or did not follow this rule, this æsthetic constraint can function both as a source of inspiration and as a way to give a certain musical coherence to the piece.

Secondly, æsthetic constraints, when understood by the audience, enable the demonstration of skills. So, for instance, in Baroque strict fugues, there must be one voice exposing the theme by itself, which is then exactly imitated by at least one other voice at a different height, which imitation runs until the end of the exposition. The two or more voices must also respect some counterpoint and harmonic rules, such as preparing dissonances, avoiding parallel fifths and octaves, avoiding low thirds, etc. When one gets to know these very strict constraints and how difficult it is to put them together in a smooth and expressive composition, one can only acknowledge the incredible skills that J.-S. Bach displayed in his *Art of Fugue,* for instance.

Thirdly, æsthetic constraints can allow for the communication of messages through music. For instance, in *Ein Musikalischer Spaß* [*A Musical Joke*], Mozart makes fun of bad composers of his time by purposely and exaggeratedly violating the æsthetic constraints that were then associated with the symphonic genre. A passage from a musicologist's commentary on Mozart's humor in this piece makes it clear:

> The funniest example of counterpoint is definitely found in the Fugato of the fourth movement, measures 28-48. A simpler fugal subject would certainly be hard to imagine, but the real humor lies more in the composer's treatment thereof, namely, he does nothing at all. Although this Fugato is written in five voices, again the composer finds it impossible to combine more than three at the time. (Lister, 1994 : 34)

It would certainly be hard to notice "the real humor" of the Fugato for someone who doesn't know what æsthetic constraints Mozart and his Viennese contemporaries were dealing with; just as it would have been hard for Mozart to transmit his witty mockery were the composers of his time not trying to respect those constraints.

Fourthly, on a more general basis, æsthetic constrains can serve as a comparative frame for the æsthetic evaluation of works. For instance, if I compose an orchestral work and label it "sinfonietta"

rather than "symphony", my audience is supposed to understand that my work is meant to be smaller in scale and lighter in approach than a standard symphony. On the contrary, if I label my work "symphony", I should expect my audience to compare it to masterpieces by Mahler, Beethoven, or Brahms. Moreover, if I label my orchestral work "symphonic poem", my audience will expect me to have composed it as a musical illustration of an extra-musical subject, such as a novel, a short-story, a poem, a painting, a landscape, or a philosophical work (as for Strauss's *Also Spracht Zarathustra*). As a composer, I can expect my audience to evaluate my symphonic poem in the tradition begun by Liszt rather than in the tradition of symphonic works although the two works belonging to these genres may not be differentiable by perception alone.

Now, let us see how Searle's analysis of SF Declaration can be applied to musical genres with an obvious example of æsthetic constraints: strict counterpoint rules. If a composer from the 16th century intends his or her piece to be taken as belonging to the religious motet genre, he or she would have to follow the æsthetic constraints given by some counterpoint rules associated with religious motets of that time, for instance in avoiding parallel fifths or unprepared dissonances on the *tempus*. Accordingly, if you recognize that such a piece is a religious Renaissance motet, you would have recognized that the composer has this negative deontic power, i.e. that he or she ought to respect certain counterpoint rules.[48] If he or she does not respect this deontic power and transgresses some counterpoint rules, you could take it to be an unfortunate violation of your expectations. You could also modify the genre attribution you gave to the piece and thus ignore the deontic power you first recognized the composer to have, for instance, by thinking that it might be an early Baroque motet or that it was not meant to be sung in churches despite its religious appearance.

Note that if the Renaissance composer intentionally violates the counterpoint rules in force, it rarely means that he or she is to be blamed for that. Violation of deontic powers thus should not be identified with a truly reprehensible action, even if it might be considered as such by those recognizing the status function as justly grounded. This is the case for whatever kind of deontic power. For instance, as a citizen of today's Iran, one is collectively recognized as having the negative deontic power of being forbidden to have homosexual relations, but it does not mean that if an Iranian citizen violates such deontic power, his

[48] One might argue that it is possible to recognize that something is a religious Renaissance motet without knowing that it was composed with such and such counterpoint rules and thus not to recognize the fact that the composer ought to respect those constraints in this genre. This objection is not entirely founded since I think it fair to say that one doesn't need to be able to spell out the rules in order to expect the composer to follow them: if someone is able to differentiate between a Renaissance religious motet and one from the early Baroque era, I think that this person would be expecting the Renaissance motet to resolve all dissonances on the *tempus* or to have a stable bass line which does not "jump", for instance, even if this person doesn't know that he or she expects these things. Indeed, two of the key differences that allow one to distinguish between religious motets from the Renaissance and from the early Baroque era is that dissonances were treated much more freely at the turn of the 17th century and that the *basso continuo* made the bass-lines much less fluid. Even if one does not know *that* this is what differentiates these genres but knows *how* to notice it, I assume that this person expects the Renaissance religious motet to respect the counterpoint rules that were then in force and that were relaxed with Monteverdi, Schütz, and their followers.

or her actions are blameworth. The violation of deontic powers can easily be positive when the status function is established on inappropriate grounds.

However, examples of artists being blamed by their contemporaries because of the violation of some æsthetic constraints are easy to find. Indeed it seems that all new forms of artistic expressions have been considered immoral by some conservative contemporaries. But, at least in all the cases I can think of, it is hard to argue that the conservative contemporaries' moral judgments were justified. For instance, it would be hard to convince someone that Plato was right in considering the mixolydian mode as a perversion. Thus, let us not consider the expression "violations of deontic powers" to always refer to something that is morally bad, especially when it comes to music. Rather, the violation in question often is a violation of the audience's expectation of how the composers or musicians were supposed to compose or play considering that their music was being recognized as part of a specific genre involving certain tacit or explicit æsthetic constraints.

Now, some musical genres, like Renaissance motets, but also classical sonatas or dodecaphonic pieces, have precise æsthetic constraints that the audience expects to be respected if recognizing the pieces to belong to these genres. In these cases, it is easy to see how æsthetic constraints can be considered as negative deontic powers that the composers or musicians need to respect. My hypothesis though is that *most* musical genres go with æsthetic constraints coming from their collectively recognized status[49]. Let us then see with another example how this could be true of genres that don't have clearly spelled out æsthetic constraints. To do so, let us now rephrase Searle's description of the ascription of deontic power replacing "status function" by "musical genre" and fleshing out the variables by a specific example.

> We collectively recognize that a Y musical genre (electric folk) exists in context C (music history of the 20th century), and because a human subject S (Bob Dylan) stands in a certain appropriate relation R (that of singer-songwriter and creator of recordings such as *Bringing It All Back Home*) to the musical genre Y in C, we further recognize that S has the power to do A (mixing British-Invasion rock rhythms and instrumentations with folk-protest lyrics and musical structures), the acts determined by the Y musical genre.

I took Bob Dylan's electric folk music as an example because the genre to which it belongs does not have clearly spelled out rules but it still allows to clearly see how a genre attribution goes with a deontic power attribution, namely æsthetic constraints.

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[49] An analysis that resembles Searle's in some points but which (unlike Searle) treats in a certain depth artworks is Amie Thomasson's (2014) notion of artifacts as well as her (2010) notion of new ontological kinds in art. She considers that to make an artwork, just as to make any artifact, is "to intend to make something that is *to be recognized as subject to certain norms of use, treatment, regard,* etc. by an appropriate (intended) audience." (Thomasson, 2014: 64) The main difference with my hypothesis is that she considers that artifacts (and thus artworks) cannot be categorized by their functions (for a view closer to mine concerning the relation between artworks and artifacts, see "Artworks as Artifacts" in Levinson (2006)). Anyhow, if one agrees to consider that the function of a genre is to give to its members "norms of use, treatment, regard, etc." and to consider aesthetic constraints as a kind of these, then there are virtually no oppositions between her thesis and mine and her articles would actually bring grist to my mill.

When Dylan first played electric folk in the mid 1960's, there was a division in the audience between those who recognized Bob Dylan's new musical production as a legitimate token of the then emerging electric folk genre and those who considered that he was making a perverse kind of folk-protest music. This division is now known as the *Electric Dylan Controversy*. I will briefly explain it in order to see an example of æsthetic constraints linked with musical genres but not to strict rules.

By 1965, Bob Dylan had achieved the status of leading songwriter of what is sometimes called the American folk music revival, a genre that emerged during the Great Depression with figures such as Woody Guthrie and Pete Seeger. In particular, he was seen as a proponent of protest-songwriting, making his music part of the sub-genre known as folk-protest music. Among other things, this sub-genre shared with Woody Guthrie and Pete Seeger's early folk-revival the property of being completely acoustic and mostly individual-based, the singer performing by him- or herself, using only an acoustic guitar or a banjo, with perhaps a harmonica around his or her neck and a tambourine attached to the foot.

But on Side One of Bob Dylan's *Bringing It All Back Home*, released in 1965, a rock band with electric guitars, an electric bass, and a set of drums accompanied him. They were playing in the rock style that was then new to Americans, inspired by British Invasion bands such as the Who, the Kinks, and the Beatles. When Dylan played his new music at the Newport Folk Festival that same year, a festival where he had been very well received during the two preceding editions, a part of the audience booed his and his rock band's performance and they left the stage after three songs.

A reason often given to explain the audience's strong reaction is that this kind of instrumentation and style of rock was associated with commercially successful bands such as the Beatles and imitating their music could be interpreted as an attempt to make money with music, which would have been considered by a part of the protest-folk fans as selling one's soul to the Devil of Capitalism. Anyhow, as the album's lyrics make it obvious, Dylan had not turned into a fervent capitalistic businessman between 1964 and 1965. The messages of his new songs remained faithful to his previous protest-songs' themes and ideals. Furthermore, a few minutes after he left the stage, he came back by himself with an acoustic guitar instead, and played two songs (one of them from *Bringing It All Back Home*) to which the crowd exploded with applause (Lerner, 2007). Critics usually say that a part of the crowd considered Dylan going electric as a betrayal to protest-folk. In other words, they considered that a protest-folk singer-songwriter ought not to play music with electric guitars and drums. According to me, that is to say that the part of the crowd that booed Dylan did not recognize what is now known as electric folk –the mix of protest-folk and British-Invasion rock– to be a legitimate genre. If they had recognized it, they would have accepted that a protest-folk singer could play with a rock band; they would have given Bob Dylan the deontic power of mixing protest-song lyrics with rock sounds.

We can describe the Newport Folk Festival reticent crowd as follows, and oppose it to the description above:

> We collectively recognize that a Y musical genre (protest-folk) exists in context C (music of the Newport Folk Festival), and because a human subject S (Bob Dylan) stands in a certain appropriate relation R (that of singer-songwriter and creator of his first four albums) to the musical genre Y in C, we further recognize that S has the (negative) power to do A (to not sing along a rock band but to stick to the acoustic guitar and harmonica), the acts determined by the Y musical genre.

If I am right then, an analysis along these lines can be given to explain the reason why a part of the crowd booed Dylan: they took Dylan's performance to be part of the protest-folk genre and were not able to recognize that it actually was an electric-folk performance. A similar analysis could then be given for the cases mentioned above where a composer intended his or her works to be taken as being part of a category that was not yet well established in his or her society and where a part of the audience reacted in a depreciative way for the wrong types of reasons: Philippe de Vitry's *Ars Nova* isorythmic motets, Monteverdi's *seconda pratica* madrigals, the non-strictly classical *Allegro* from Beethoven's *Third Symphony*, Satie's *musique d'ameublement,* or Schönberg's dodecaphonic music. In all these cases, the audience would have mistakenly reproached the composers for not respecting the æsthetic constraints of a then standard musical genre when the composers were actually creating a new one with new æsthetic constraints.

But was it really a mistake from the audience's part or was it that the composers or the musicians did not succeed in transmitting the fact that they were composing or playing in a different genre? In any case, it seems to me, the intentions they had that their pieces should be taken in a certain genre failed to be transmitted, at least to a part of the audience. In other words, their categorial intentions were not able to lead to a completely successful SF Declaration. This leads us to the relation between categorial intentions and SF Declarations.

4.3. Pre-generic, and dia-generic intentions

Until now, I have mostly been concerned with examples of categorial intentions and SF Declarations of composers or musicians that were creating or playing in *new* musical genres, since those are probably the most telling and the most interesting examples. Anyhow, the most common cases of categorial intentions and SF Declarations with respect to musical genres are the ones where the latter already exist and the composers or musicians need only to conform to the established genres' recognized features or conventions. The categorial intention that a work should be taken as belonging to an already existing genre and the categorial intention that it should be taken as belonging to a new one are rather different and one should distinguish them properly. One should also distinguish those from the cases where the categorial intentions fail to make the musical work part of the intended genre. Of course, the case where

there is no categorial intention even though the music is taken to belong to a musical genre is again another possible case. Let me now clarify these distinctions and give examples.

I will call categorial intentions about genres that already are collectively recognized (a) *dia-generic intentions,* since this kind of intentions goes *through* (dia-) a categorial intention about a genre (and not a made-up category), which must already exist as a genre, that is to say as a collectively recognized status function. Since black metal is a genre that is widely collectively recognized, I can create a piece of music that I mean to be taken by the audience as belonging to the black metal genre. In order to do so, I will try to observe what I consider to be the æsthetic constraints that black metal musicians are expected to respect and make my audience understand it. Note that, in some cases, it is possible to have a dia-generic intention without having precisely in mind what the æsthetic constraints of the music should be like. For instance, it is possible that I have the categorial intention to be in the continuation or in the musical tradition of such and such musicians (for instance, I want to make music in the vein of Nirvana and Green River), although I can't tell you what the æsthetic constraints of grunge music are[50]. That is to say I can have the intention that the music I make should be taken as belonging to a musical category to which Nirvana and Green River belong without consciously intending my music to respect grunge's æsthetic constraints (because, for instance, I don't know that these bands are considered grunge). What needs to be intended is that the work should be considered as belonging to a musical category that is a musical genre and that this intention has an effect on the way the music is to be classified.

According to the hypothesis that genres are status functions, when one has a categorial intention about a musical category that is not yet recognized by anybody, this musical category cannot be a genre, since the genre does not yet exist. Thus I will call categorial intentions about musical categories that will, or are meant to, become genres (b) *pre-generic intentions*.[51] Pre-generic intentions thus allow for two different cases: either (b1) *conscious pre-generic intentions,* when the artist intends his or her work to be part of a future musical genre or (b2) *non-conscious pre-generic intentions,* when the artist does not intend it, is not conscious of his intention being about a new genre, but has a categorial intention about a musical category which is in the process of becoming a genre. But if the genre does not yet exist, how can a musician intend his or her work to belong to it? The difference, to me, is that when a musician wants to

[50] This is similar to the case discussed in the previous footnote.

[51] Is there a type of categorial intentions vis-à-vis genres situated in between pre- and dia-generic intentions? Maybe, for instance, when Webern and Berg were the only followers of Schönsberg's dodecaphonism, their intentions that their works should belong to this genre were neither pre-generic (because they were not creating anything new) nor fully dia-generic (since dodecaphonism was arguably not yet an existing genre). In these kinds of in-between cases, I think it might not be worth distinguishing categorial intentions from either pre-generic or dia-generic intentions since the question is rather whether the genre exists or not than if they have a different kind of intention. Moreover, it is also possible to have a mix of the two kinds of intentions: Webern and Berg's intention to create works belonging to dodecaphonism using their master's method seems dia-generic (even though one might argue that the genre existed only in a restricted context, namely within the small circle they formed with their master) but their intention that the general audience take their works as belonging to something new seems much closer to a pre-generic intention. Of course, it is hard to classify their intentions as being clearly either one of those two kinds, but distinguishing between pre-generic and dia-generic intentions seems to me sufficient to give a satisfactory analysis of such cases, where the categorial intention is not clearly either about a fully recognized genre or an emerging one.

create a piece in a new genre, he or she intends to make a piece that is to be taken as part of a collectively recognized status that enables this category to perform a musical function in a way that it couldn't without the collective recognition of the status. In the case of (b2), a musician would want to create something new without intending it to become a collectively recognized musical category. On the contrary, Arnold Schönberg, Pierre Schaeffer, and Eric Satie intended to create new musical genres with their musical innovations, as testimonies about them or their writings show, and we can thus say that they had (b1) conscious pre-generic intentions.

In the cases of (a) dia-generic intentions and (b1) conscious pre-generic intentions, there can be failures. Most dia-generic intentions failures seem to me to be caused by a lack of skill or knowledge. For instance, I mean my song to be considered as speed metal but I am too slow a guitarist. Another example would be to mean a piece to belong to the symphony genre without knowing that there should be more than three musicians involved.

A failure of (b1) would be to try to create a new musical genre without succeeding. For instance, I create all my musical pieces on Mondays and mean them to be recognized as a new musical genre that I have invented called "made-on-Mondays" but nobody else finds any interest in taking my pieces to belong to such a category. Here is a third example (from actual history this time but unfortunately not from the music realm): André Breton, in the *Manifest of Surrealism* tries to put authors of the past in a new made-up category, which he labels surrealism. He thus says that Poe and Baudelaire, as well as Hugo in his best moments, are surrealist. Anyhow, if we now consider surrealism to be a legitimate category, we don't apply it to pre-20th century artists.

Finally, there can be (c) non-generic intentions. There can be two cases: we can imagine an artist creating without categorial intentions at all because, for instance, he is in a trance (which arguably is not art), secondly that his categorial intentions are not either directed at a genre or at a category that would later become a genre. For instance, John Cage's categorial intention that *4'33''* should be taken to belong to the musical realm is not about any musical genre in particular and it is very doubtful that the object of his categorial intention would ever become a musical genre.[52]

In the case of (b2) non-conscious pre-generic intentions, one has a pre-generic intention without intending that the category in which the work is meant to belong will become a musical genre. For instance, when DJ Kool Herc first developed what later became known as hip-hop music, he might not have intended his music to be taken as a genre of its own. Maybe he only intended that his music should be taken as something new and exciting in the South Bronx block-parties he was organizing from 1973 on. DJ Kool Herc might have had the categorial intention that the new DJing technique he invented would

[52] However, this is interestingly debatable: Cage is reported to have wanted to direct the attention of the audience to the noise (and the silence) of the concert hall and that *that* was what the music of *4'33''* was made of (Kostelanetz, 2003 : 69-70) and this categorial intention arguably makes it a pre-generic intention about what would later be known as noise music. Paul Hegarty (2007) thus argues in his history of noise music that *4'33''* is the first noise music work.

be considered as a positive innovation within the block-party community of the early 70s but not that it should be taken as creating a new musical genre although, today, his invention is considered as having created hip-hop music. He certainly did not intend that the DJing technique he invented –which consisted in looping break-beats from the vinyl he was playing in order to extend the rhythm-based parts of these songs, which were the dancers' favorite parts and the best for his stage partner MC Coke La Rock to show his crowd-entertaining skills (which would later become known as "rapping")– would become the basis for one of the most popular musical genres of the next three decades. Anyhow, if he had the intention that his musical developments should be taken as belonging to another musical category than the one to which the regular block-party DJs belonged at the time, that is to say that what he was doing was to be recognized as *something new* and not just qualitatively better or more original than the other block-party DJs' performances and, furthermore, that this intention found a response in his audience which eventually led to the creation of the hip-hop genre classification, he would have had a pre-generic intention as this categorial intention would somehow have caused the creation of a musical genre. In other words, according to me, even if he did not intend to create a genre, if he had the categorial intention that his innovation should be taken as a new musical category by his crowd and since this intention was to be the causal starting point of the hip-hop music genre (to use Searle's formulation: if S had represented X as Y in context C and *ipso facto* made X a Y in context C), then he would have had a pre-generic intention.

Note that it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between (a) a dia-generic intention and (b1) a conscious pre-generic intention because it is sometimes difficult to pin down a precise time when a status function becomes effective. For instance, and to take an example outside the musical realm for a change, when Thomas Jefferson first wrote what is now considered to be the Declaration of Independence, it was not yet a full-blown SF Declaration but rather an attempt at a declaration. When it became of full-blown SF Declaration, turning the Thirteen British Colonies into The United States of America, is for historians to decide. Even though the Independence Day officially celebrates the 4th of July 1776, when the Congressmen of the Thirteen Colonies voted unanimously for the text of the declaration, what perhaps completed successfully the collective speech act came as late as 1783, when the British Government signed the Treaty of Paris. Indeed, before 1783, the Declaration might not have been a SF Declaration since it was not representing reality accurately from international point of view: the British Empire was still the official possessors of the Thirteen Colonies according to their own laws and some of America (such as New York) was still being held by British troops. In any case, my point is that in some situations, it is not clear when a status function becomes genuinely efficient. What are the exact birthdates of

dodecaphonism, *musique concrète*, or *tragédie lyrique* are historical problems that might be impossible to solve precisely[53].

Let us also keep in mind that in most cases, what I call here categorial and generic intentions might not be clearly formulated or might not even be recognized as such by the artist. Accordingly, distinguishing between (b1) conscious and (b2) non-conscious pre-generic intentions is not an easy task either. In some cases, a genre might emerge not from one person alone but from a group of people who might not even interact with each other. Take for instance what is now known as Delta blues. When Robert Johnson, John Lee Hooker, and the like were somehow creating the then new musical genre by their innovative use of the slide guitar, their specific rhythm emphasis, or the lyrical themes of their songs, they certainly were not having clear collective intentions to create a new genre. In any case, the new musical idiom they developed at the same time in the same region became an established musical categorization and I thus think it is unproblematic to consider that the categorial intentions they must have in making their music in this new idiom can be said to be a pre-generic intention anyway and to let the question open whether one of them or more wanted to thus create a new genre, making them conscious pre-generic intentions.

Now, with these distinctions in mind, we can come back to a question that remained unanswered at the end of the third part of this essay:

Why is it, exactly, that the five-G-sharp-between-the-eighth-and-tenth-measures and the paintings-with-diagonal-composition-containing–green-crosses categories should be illegitimate although categories that also seem weird such as musical-works-whose-melodies-does-not-repeat-a-tone-before-it-has-played-the-other-eleven (dodecaphonism) or poems-with-an-ABBA-ABBA-CCD-EDE-structure (French sonnet) normally are legitimate?

Let us remember that the discussion of the five-G-sharp-between-the-eighth-and-tenth-measures category was about an artist who not only wanted the audience to take his own work to be part of this category, but that all works with such features would be grouped together in an art category. Well, this looks like a failed pre-generic intention to me. On the contrary, Schönberg's intention that some works should be classified as musical-works-whose-melodies-does-not-repeat-a-tone-before-it-has-played-the-other-eleven was a successful pre-generic intention. Thus, if I am right, the difference between this illegitimate and that legitimate categorial intentions can be explained by the fact that the later became an established status function when it came to be considered as a legitimate musical genre but that the other can not. The difference then is that, in one case, the categorial intention somehow caused the creation by a collective recognition of a new social object: dodecaphonism, while in the other case, the categorial intention had no effect on the way we evaluate and classify art works.

[53] These cases can thus be considered to be examples of vagueness and, knowing the heated debate surrounding this theme in contemporary logics, epistemology, and ontology (as discussed, for instance, by Timothy Williamson or Kit Fine), I wouldn't dare to propose a solution.

Furthermore, as pointed out before, even categorial intentions about existing and well-established categories can be illegitimate. The example given above was if an artist draws a line on a canvas and intends it to be a symphony. In this case, the fact that it can be considered to be an illegitimate categorial intention also comes from a failure, but this time of a dia-generic intention.

Let us put together these conclusions and make desiderata of them:

(13) A categorial intention about a category that is not presently a genre can be described as legitimate if it is a successful pre-generic intention, that is to say if the pre-generic intention can somehow cause in a certain context the creation of a new genre, or described as illegitimate if it fails to do so.

(14) A categorial intention about a category that is already an existing genre can be described as legitimate if it is a successful dia-generic intention, that is to say if it can somehow cause an audience in a certain context to consider the musical outuput as belonging to the existing genre, or described as illegitimate if it fails to do so.

Now that a part of the bridge between categorial intentions and status functions has been crossed, we can deal with another one: cases where musical genres are ascribed to works although the composers or musicians who have created them did not intend the work to be part of such categories.

4.4. Exogenous vs. endogenous musical genres

In ethnology, scholars sometimes distinguish between social classifications that are done within a certain group of people (e.g. “We are skaters” or “I am punk”) and classifications that are done from the outside (e.g. “You are delinquent” or “They are hipsters”). The first type of classification is sometimes called *endogenous* (from inside) and the second one *exogenous* (from outside). Accordingly, in musical categorization, there are cases of endogenous musical genres classifications (e.g. “I have composed a symphony” or “We are a black metal band”) and exogenous classifications (e.g. “These musicians make degenerate music” or “Shostakovich’s *Lady Macbeth* is counter-revolutionary”). Note that most musical genre classifications are both used endo- and exogenously (e.g. “They are rappers” or “I rap”).

In paradigmatic cases of genre attributions, my hypothesis is that the genre’s deontic power gives the composer or the musician æsthetic constraints, that is to say, as I have tried to illustrate in the two preceding sections, an æsthetic framework that the music is expected by the audience to respect, considering the music as belonging to the genre. Anyhow, in some cases, musical genre classifications seem to have other goals. For instance, there can be cases of endogenous genre attributions whose function seems not to give æsthetic constraints to the works that belong to them as when one says: “I

make commercial music", "I make healing music", "I make sacred music", or even "I make propagandist music" [54]. Anyhow, the most frequent cases of musical genres whose function is not to give an æsthetic framework to its members is probably when musical genres are established not by artists but by individuals whose goals differ from art or æsthetics. In these cases of exogenous genre attributions, the genre's function might not represent the artist's categorial intentions. Obvious examples are the Stalianian "counter-revolutionary music" and the Hitlerian "degenerate music" (and their counterparts: revolutionary music and Aryan music). Let us look more closely at the first example from the perspective of my genre-as-status-function analysis by replacing the variables in Searle's characterization of SF Declaration as we have done for Bob Dylan:

(Let us remember that I follow Searle here in using "power" to mean a capacity or ability when the power is positive (e.g. authorization, permission, right, etc.) and a incapacity or inability when negative (e.g. interdiction, ban, constraint, etc.).)

> We collectively recognize that the Y musical genre (counter-revolutionary music) exists in the context C (Stalinian USSR), and because the human subject S (Shostakovich) stands in the relation R (being the composer of *Lady Macbeth*) to the status function Y in C, we further recognize that S has the power(s) to do A (e.g. a positive power: compose music which represents and promote ideals conflicting the USSR's, and a negative one: not being allowed to be played in state-controlled music institutions), the acts determined by the Y status function. (adapted from Searle, 2010: 103)

The powers taken as examples here, to have the (undesirable for Stalianian USSR) potential of composing counter-revolutionary music –that is to say music that promotes "bourgeois" ideals, such as formal research in music, rather than Marxist, such as pleasing the greatest number– and the incapacity to be played in state-controlled institutions, seem not to be of the same kind as the æsthetic constraints that I have tried to underline in preceding examples of genre attributions (e.g. electric-folk, dodecaphonism, musique d'ameublement, seconda prattica, etc.).

Indeed, these powers allowed by such status functions seem not to have much to do with musical or even æsthetic aims.[55] The powers attributed by the status function in question are rather closer to the

[54] In these cases, since the attributions are endogenous and thus should, in normal circumstances (e.g. when the subject making them is not under some pressure, as Shostakovich was when he apologized for making counter-revolutionary music (see below)), represent accurately the categorial intentions of the artist, I don't see why these attributions would be problematic, inaccurate, or wrong-headed. Anyhow, I consider them not to be paradigmatic cases of musical genres as they are not æsthetic classifications (although sacred music can arguably be a kind of æsthetic framework, that has to do with awe, venerations, or other sorts of experiences that could be both æsthetic and religious, and even indifferentiably so). I thus decided not to analyze such cases of non-æsthetic endogenous attributions more fully here (contrary to the problematic ones below) because of space restriction. A very brief argument for considering them as not being paradigmatic musical genres is to say that art-categories are about art, which is paradigmatically about æsthetics and not economy, politics, philosophy, religion, etc. and thus that, indirectly, musical genres are paradigmatically about æsthetics since they are kinds of art categories.

[55] There surely is a link between the attribution of these genres and æsthetics but it is minimal and very questionable. In the case of counter-revolutionary music, the æsthetic component brought by the genre attribution must be something like: if a work is counter-revolutionary, one should expect it to be too bizarre or too complex (because of the influence of perverse and elitist bourgeois ideology) for the Russian people to appreciate or understand it. In the case of degenerate music, the æsthetic component must be something like: if a music is degenerate, one should expect its author to be psychologically or morally

powers attributed to such status functions as rebels, terrorists, or enemies. Clearly, the kind of powers brought by being collectively recognized as a rebel, a terrorist, or an enemy seems to normally come from exogenous status functions attributions and often don't represent accurately the intentions (such as the intention of doing a *coup*, of protecting one's country borders, or of fighting an oppressive state) of the human subjects to which they apply. They rather seem to represent the intentions of the group of people that make such attributions (e.g. politicians having the intention to condemn the people who want to make a *coup* and thus label them rebels).

Accordingly, by creating the counter-revolutionary music status function and making it collectively recognized as applying to *Lady Macbeth,* for instance, Stalinian politicians can use this attribution in a similar manner, *mutatis mutandis*, as some people have used such labels as "rebel", "terrorist", or "enemy": there are cases of a collectively recognized representation of a X as a Y in context C, and Y being something that is undesirable in C although X is not always undesirable *per se*[56].

I think that an analysis of musical genres should be able to deal with cases such as counter-revolutionary music and degenerate music, but also that it should be able to point out to the fact that exogenous attributions failing to represent categorial intentions can be (and perhaps always are) wrong-headed from the perspective of æsthetic evaluation. As we have seen in the section about categories and intentions, accurate æsthetic evaluations must pay a close attention to the category in which an artist expects the audience to take his or her work to belong.

In the cases of degenerate music and counter-revolutionary music, the inadequacy of such attributions from the perspective of æsthetic evalution seems rather obvious. Anyhow, I think that there can be quite a lot of examples of exogenous musical genre attributions that fail to represent the musicans' categorial intentions even though they might not do so as obviously. Take for instance the genre "popular music" (not to be confused with "pop music"). Its use basically is to oppose this kind of music from two other genres of Western music: folk (or traditional) and classical (or art) music. Most of the time, however, this attribution disguises a connotation of either mercantile intentions from the part of the musicians or incapacity to produce sophisticated music, or both. In fact, it is typically an exogenous attribution, used mostly by classical music amateurs (from whom the term comes in the first place) or in academia (for instance, in "popular musicology"), but barely ever (to my knowledge at least) by the musicians who are labeled popular (e.g. in rock, rap, techno, etc.).

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inferior to the standard of the Aryan people and thus feel superior to it rather than try to understand æsthetically it or to give it an interest which normal works of art deserve.

[56] Thus, some American politicians have labeled certain Afghan mujahideen groups "terrorists" since 2001, although during the Reagan Administration, the same politicians have labeled the same groups "freedom fighters" when their military actions were directed against the USSR during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. By changing the label, they changed the representation and thus the powers that these mujahideen groups are collectively recognized to have in context C, which is where American propaganda is believed to be true representations of reality.

In fact, if one looks at the history of this term, one would see that it was first used in its modern sense (and not in the sense of well-liked, or orally transmitted) in the writing of music commentators of the Romantic era to denote a music that lacked the rigorously learned, strongly ordered, and highly trained aspect of what was labeled cultivated, serious, art, classical, or great music, but which also lacked the supposedly (from a typically romantic point of view) pure, authentic, ancestral, natural, or naïve aspect of folk music[57]. In particular, the term "popular music" came to be used to denote the new music of the mid-to-late 19th century that was tailored for an audience rapidly growing with the advent of industrialized urban centers. There, at this time, democratizing venues such as music halls, cabarets, café-concerts, and the like were popping up like mushrooms. Furthermore, pianos and other musical instruments as well as printed musical sheets became affordable for an important part of the population, thanks to new technologies in mass reproduction. Those socio-economical factors changed completely the Western musical world. Before the Industrial Revolution, there was no distinction between popular and folk music[58]. It is with the advent of an important and widespread commercial demand for entertainment, a stronger offer than ever in music-making artifacts, and a music whose goal was to reach the largest part of the urban population that the distinction between the two genres first occurred. Although sometimes impossible to differentiate from folk music by a mere hearing, music theorists and commentators of the time did not want to associate what was considered as a mercantile and artificial trend to the allegedly old, respectable, and authentic music of the people.

Accordingly, when the popular music genre emerged (that is to say, according to me, when the status function became collectively recognized in C), its use was similar to what we label "commercial music" nowadays. At the time, the use of this label and its connotation certainly represented accurately the goals that some music-businessmen wanted to reach (just as commercial music certainly does today), but its use has been generalized over time[59] to include whatever kind of new Western music created outside the context of the classical tradition, ignoring the fact that some can be very demanding and culturally elitist ones, at least as remote from the music business as classical music, and, despite the current use of the term, not suited to be called popular music, neither in the sense of success, nor of accessibility, nor of wide-spread appeal (take for instance, the music of early Klaus Schlutze or late Frank Zappa). Despite this shift in denotation, its negative connotation, associated with mercantile intentions and untrained musical capacities, has remained in the writings of many authors.

Thus, classifying some music as popular nowadays sometimes does not serve as an æsthetic framework in which to consider the music from the best possible perspective for evaluation, but rather as

[57] The "folk music" classification and its connotation having arguably began to emerge at the end of the 18th century with such authors as Jean-Jacques Rousseau or Johann Gottfried Herder (c.f. Gelbart, 2007).
[58] Although there certainly was new music created in urban centers, especially to dance to, that were neither court, nor sacred music, and seemed to correspond to what later came to be known as popular music
[59] By such commentators as Arnold Schönberg (1977), Belá Bartók (2006), or Theodor Adorno (1941) and, of course, many less famous ones.

a way to discriminate against some music, in a manner certainly less harmful and less obvious than such classifications as degenerate and counter-revolutionary music, but nevertheless effective. For instance, as I have pointed out in the introduction, this label can serve to disqualify certain genres from being subjects of studies in traditionalist departments of musicology[60] or in music schools: "We don't study such and such here because it's popular music."

The point that I want to make here is that, when the genre classifications are exogenous, one should be careful about the functions that such genre attributions can serve. A first question to ask would be: does this exogenous genre attribution represent accurately the categorial intentions of the musicians/composers? If the answer is positive, then we can treat it in the same way as an endogenous classification without further ado. If we cannot know or if the answer is negative, then, I think, we should ask: what kind of function is such a genre attribution meant to perform? Is it æsthetic? If so, is its goal to enhance or to diminish the æsthetic appreciation of the music to which it is attributed? If it is not æsthetic, then what kind of function does it serve? Why do the people who classify this music as such do so?

In the case of popular music, it seems to me that an important number of different cases are possible. It is not surprising that an umbrella term embracing such a large set of musical outputs, that is nearly always exogenous, and whose border is so blurry[61] can go with different functions depending on the context in which the attribution is done. For instance, the International Association for the Study of Popular Music (IASPM) might classify musical outputs as belonging to popular music not only for æsthetic reasons (such as: if a work is popular music, then one should normally expect it not to aim at contrapuntal sophistications) but as a reaction to the fact that, before its creation, only folk and classical music were studied in universities. Thus, by studying a musical output as part of popular musicology, they attribute to it the genre "popular music" and, in this context, this attribution gives it the privilege to be a legitimate object of academic studies by the same token as recognizing that if it was considered as not deserving such a status a few decades ago (otherwise it would be just "musicology" and not "popular musicology"). Thus, the function of popular music as a genre in this context, although it might not always represent the categorial intentions of the musicians or composers (e.g. Robert Johnson probably didn't care whether his music was to be considered as a legitimate object of academic studies), is positive and seems to me to be unproblematic as this function probably wouldn't go against the intentions of the musician or composer.

On the other hand, Theodor Adorno's ascription of a musical output belonging to the popular music genre is rather different. In his case, despite the æsthetic constraints that he ascribes to the genre[62], he

[60] In this sense, traditionalist departments of musicology are a wide majority in continental Europe: to my knowledge at least, only the Universities of Sorbonne, Paris, and Humboldt, Berlin, have musicology programs dedicated to popular music.
[61] One can see how vague the term "popular music" is by trying to answer such questions as: When did it begin? How can we differentiate it from contemporary folk music? Is jazz popular music? When was the first non-Western popular music created? Can there be popular music that is also art music? etc.).
[62] Which are completely bizarre and quite revealing. For instance he thinks that all popular songs have a chorus of 32 bars with a melodic range not exceeding one octave and one note (Adorno, 1941: 17).

assumes that members of this genre have the power to alienate the people listening to them and confuse them with American capitalist propaganda. Thus, in a context where everybody agrees with Adorno's notion of popular music, the function attributed to this genre is rather different from the one attributed by the IAMSP.

Let us then summarize the main points here in another desideratum:

> (15) Musical genres can be attributed exogenously and endogenously. If a musical genre is attributed endogenously, one can treat it as representing a categorial intention. If a musical genre is attributed exogenously, one should investigate how close it can be to the artist's categorial intentions and what function it could serve in its contexts of attribution and recognition. If the genre attribution goes against the artist's intentions, it should be considered as an illegitimate or wrong-headed genre attribution.

I think that I have now spelled out all the principal ingredients for an analysis of musical genres. Let us then put them together.

PART 5. CONCLUSION

I will now propose an analysis of musical genre that I hope will summarize accurately the most important conclusions that we have reached along this essay. I will then show how the desiderata we have been collecting can be met with this analysis before concluding with a last (but intricate) example.

5.1. Analysis and desiderata

The musical genre G of the musical output O (e.g. a work, a performance, a recording, a composition, a draft, etc.) is (a) a status function, that is to say a social object created and maintained in existence by behaviors or speech-acts that have the logical form of declarations and that can exist only insofar as its status is collectively recognized as having a certain function in a certain context C. O can become a member of G (a G, for short) by (b) a successful endogenous genre attribution, which is a collectively recognized representation of O as a G in C caused by (b1) a successful pre-generic intention to create a new category in which O should be perceived and thus come to create a collective recognition of O as a G in C or by (b2) a successful dia-generic intention to create an O as a collectively recognized member of an existing G. In the cases of successful endogenous attributions, the representation of O as a G thus corresponds to the artists' intention that O should be perceived as a G in C. O can also become a G through (c) a successful exogenous genre attribution that O is a G, causing a collective recognition

that O is a G in C. In the case of exogenous genre attribution, the genre attribution (d) must represent, or at least not distort, the categorial intentions of the creator of O that O should be perceived in a certain category. This category may or may not be a genre when the artist created O but it should correspond to the musical genre attributed to O exogenously[63]*. The function of G can be diverse (e.g. economical, propagandist, legal, etc.) but in paradigmatic cases it gives to O when represented as a G (e) a set of æsthetic constraints that the musical output is expected to respect by the people who collectively recognize O as a G. These æsthetic constraints (f) must represent, or at least not distort, the musical features, the contextual origin, or other features of O that are constitutive of O's ontology. In the cases where (g) pre-generic and dia-generic intentions or where exogenous genre attributions are unsuccessful, that is to say when the artist's categorial intentions or the critic's attempt at a categorization fail to cause the intended collective recognition of O as a G, the status function cannot be created and thus G cannot become an existing musical genre. In the case where (h) the stipulations* (d) *or* (f) *are not respected, G can still be an existing musical genre but it would be an aesthetically or ontologically wrong-headed one.*

Let us now see how this analysis can deal with the fifteen desiderata accumulated during this essay. Let us start with the first three.

> (1) Musical genres, unlike styles, are not always strictly based on the formal features of the music but can possess a strong contextual anchorage such as a determined historical period, a geographical provenance, or a specific sociological origin.
> (2) Musical genres, unlike styles, can be conventionally constituted in some respects.
> (3) Musical genres, unlike forms, are not simply accurate representations of a certain feature of the musical output it applies to (such as its structure, its tempo, or the day when it was created), but further needs to somehow correspond to the way people usually classify music or be a convincing way of grouping musical outputs together.

These desiderata can be satisfied if musical genres are (as in (a)) status functions whose paradigmatic function is to give æsthetic constraints to O which (as in (f)) must represent, or at least not distort, the musical features as well as the contextual origin of O that are constitutive of O's ontology. Indeed, if such is their nature, then musical genres can, first, be based on whatever features the collective intentionality recognize as being constitutive of the musical genre. That is to say, the status function Y can be based on whatever X as long as it is recognized to be such. This allows (1) to potentially be satisfied since the

[63] As we have seen with Dj Kool Herc : in 1973, he may not have intended his new Dj techniques to be constitutive of a new musical genre (hip-hop music), but the categorial intentions I assume he had at the time (something like « I want the blockparty people to recognize my techniques as something new. ») happened to correspond to the basis for what would later be known as hip-hop music. Thus, according to me, his categorial intentions corresponded to the exogenous genre attribution although hip-hop music did not strictly speaking exist when he first developed his techniques by himself in 1973.

collective intentionality can recognize contextual features such as historical period or geographical provenance as the basis of the musical genre. For instance, in the case of Grand Opera, we collectively consider that only works produced in the 19th century can constitute a member of this genre. In other words, by collectively recognizing a musical work to belong to the genre Grand Opera, we take it to have been composed in a certain historical period (19th century) and that it thus has such and such cultural background and other contextual features which gives it specific æsthetic constraints. Furthermore, if these æsthetic constrains should represent the ontology of musical works and that Jerrold Levinson is right in saying that some historical features are part of musical works' ontology (at least in classical music c.f. Levinson (2011)), then it is natural that musical genres are based, among other things, on contextual features.

This aspect of status functions would also explain (2) since the features that are recognized as constituting the musical genre can also be conventional and that æsthetic constraints, for instance those of fugues, are sometimes based on conventions. Furthermore, (3) could be explained by the fact that, if musical genres are collectively recognized status functions, they indeed must either correspond to the way people usually classify music or be a convincing way of grouping works or other musical outuputs together (and thus allow it to become a successful declaration if such is not the case already, as is for new musical genres).

> (4) Musical outputs belonging to the same genre are æsthetically more similar to one another, on a general basis, than to musical outputs belonging to different musical genres and this allows to judge more easily the comparative worth of musical outputs belonging to the same musical genre.

If the function of G, in paradigmatic cases, is to give to O when represented as a G (as in (e)) a set of æsthetic constraints that O is expected to respect by the people who collectively recognize O as a G, then it makes sense that musical outputs belonging to the same genre are more æsthetically similar than musical outputs from foreign genres. Furthermore, the æsthetic constraints in question can serve as an evaluative framework that could allow, among other things, to compare works or other musical outputs from the same genre much more easily.[64]

[64] Note that this also goes well with Carl Dahlhaus's notion of masterpiece according to which masterpieces cannot exist without the notion of genre: a masterpiece would be something like the best work(s) in a referential that is the genre to which it belongs (Dahlhaus, 2004). For instance, if one takes into account only early romantic lieder, *Erlkönig* might be considered a masterpiece, but if one take into account all of early romantic music as genre of reference, it might not be considered a masterpiece since that place would be taken by works such as Beethoven's 9th symphony, his late string quartets, or perhaps Schubert's *Death and the Maiden* string quartet.)

(5) Musical genres can serve not only to differentiate between musical outputs but are also related to social distinctions among their audience; a musical genre is often associated to a specific social group.

This desideratum could be explained by the fact, if it is one, that musical genres are essentially (as in (a)) social object whose existence is created and maintained by collective recognition of their status and functions. Thus, apart from the æsthetic constraints that the music would be expected to respect, another function that they could have would be (in a way similar to literary clubs or terrorist groups) to allow an affiliation to a social group with certain recognized features, whether this affiliation be done either (as in (b)) endogenously or (as in (c)) exogenously. To take an example and see how that would work, we could one more time take Searle's description of the power of status function and apply it to this case:

> We collectively recognize that the Y musical genre (punk music) exists in the context C (70s Great-Britain), and because the human subject S (a British citizen) stands in the relation R (being a dedicated punk music fan) to the status function Y in C, we (British traditionalists) further recognize that S has the power(s) to do A (e.g. a positive power: refuses the traditional values of Britain; and a negative one: cannot be a respectable gentleman according to traditional British values), the acts determined by the Y status function. (adapted from Searle, 2010: 103)

In this example, the affiliation to the musical genre is done through moral values but one could imagine easily how the affiliation could also be done æsthetically or how the æsthetic functions of the musical genre could be linked with other (exo- or endo-) ways of grouping people socially (e.g. by economical class, by national pride, by wanting to state one's cultural origin as when rappers "represent their turfs" in rap music, etc.). Let us go on with the next three desiderata:

(6) Musical genres can be based on many different "levels" of a musical output such as its musical structure (e.g. rondo), its geographic origin (e.g. Malaysian music), its instrumentation (e.g. symphony), or the way it was recorded (e.g. lo-fi music) but not all musical genres are based on the same "levels" (e.g. there is no lo-fi classical music).

(7) The differences in the musical media used by the musicians or the composer can strongly determine the musical genre of the musical output produced (e.g. *musique concrète* works are creatively modified recording of noises).

(8) Basic musical genre distinctions (between jazz, folk, rock, or classical music) can be based on the creational origin of the musical output (e.g. whether a musical object is composed by an individual or a group of people, if it comes from an unknown source, if it is improvised, transmitted orally, or written down, etc.).

These three desiderata could be explained by the hypothesis according to which the genre's recognized æsthetic constraints –which are the musical genre's paradigmatic function and thus constitute the essence of the paradigmatic musical genre if they really are status functions (since the essence of status function is their function)– (as in (f)) must represent, or at least not distort, the musical features as well as the contextual origin of O that are constitutive of O's ontology. Indeed, depending on what the ontology of O is, according to this hypothesis, the æsthetic constraints of the genre to which it belongs can be based on different "levels" of the musical output, that is to say on different ontological layers. What are the ontological layers that are essential to O æsthetically is a question tackled by a few philosophers as we have seen with Goodman, Alperson, Levinson, Kanya, Gracyk, Pouivet, or Davies, and we can use their findings to illustrate my point. For instance, if Levinson is right in saying that a traditional classical music work (MW) is

> (MW) S/PM structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-*t*
> Where X is a particular person –the composer– and *t* is the time of composition. For the paradigmatic pieces we are concerned with [classical music works] the composer typically indicates (fixes, determines, selects) an S/PM structure [i.e. a compound or conjunction of a sound structure and a performing-means structure] by creating a score. The *piece* he thereby composes is the S/PM structure-as-indicated by him on that occasion. (Levinson, 2011: 93).

and that Kania is right in saying that, in paradigmatic cases:

> Rock musicians primarily construct *tracks*. These are ontologically thick works, like classical electronic works, and are at the center of rock as an art form. However, these tracks also manifest *songs*. Rock songs, like jazz songs, but unlike classical songs, tend to be very thin ontologically, allowing of alterations in instrumentation, lyrics, melody, and even harmony. […] Rather, they are studio *constructions*: thick works that *manifest* thin songs, without being *performances* of them. (Kania, 2005: 143-144).

and that (f) is accurate, then the æsthetic constraints of rock and classical music works should be based on different ontological features: rock as an attributed genre should represent the fact that the musician creates a track while classical music as an attributed genre should represent the fact that the musician creates an indicated musical structure. Thus, as (6) requires, rock as a genre is based on an ontological layer that is inexistent in traditional classical music works: recording processes. That, of course, is the reason why there is no lo-fi classical music[65]. Furthermore, as required by (7), the fact that musical genres can strongly be determined by the nature of the musical media pertains to the same reason. Indeed, the ontology of a musical work –for instance, its identity criteria (Can it exist in several places? Is

[65] Note that in the case of electronic classical music genres (such as *musique concrète* or *Elektronische Muzik*), since they are studio creations, one could imagine lo-fi sub-genres. Anyhow, they are not the traditional classical music works that Levinson writes about. And perhaps there will be such cases in the future.

this cover the original work or a copy?), its persistence criteria (Will this musical output cease to exist if I burn this score/all of its scores/this CD/this never-released master-tapes?), or its existence criteria (Was this music created when played the first time, when first imagined, or when penned down? Is the violin in this work one of its essential features or is it contingent?)– certainly depends on the medium used for O. Finally, (8) can also be satisfied by these criteria if the ontology of musical works (or musical outputs in general) is partly determined by their context and process of creation (as, for instance, Levinson points out for classical music in the same article) and the way it is diffused (orally, by scores, by using both, etc.).

Let us go on with the next two desiderata:

> (9) Some musical genre distinctions can be based on the type or capacity of audience intended by the musicians or composers (e.g. pop music as a genre seems to be based on the intended accessibility of its members and experimental music on the capacity of its members to surprise the audience with new ways of making music).
> (10) Whether a musical output O has to be taken to belong to a musical genre G can be strongly determined by the intentions that the creators of O have that their musical outputs should be taken as part of G.

According to my analysis, one should indeed always pay attention to what could have been the musical genre in which the creator of the musical output would want his or her audience to take it. Regardless of whether this intention is (as in (b1)) pre-generic, (as in (b2)) dia-generic, or unknown, and regardless of whether the genre attribution has been done (as in (b)) endogenously or (as in (c)) exogenously, categorial intentions seem to me to always be essential for accurate genre attributions.[66] Accordingly, if the creators of Lady Gaga's music want it to be accessible or if Aphex Twin intends his music to recognizably experiment with new forms of music making, these intentions should be considered seriously before one judges in what genre these music should be considered. I thus consider that the requirements (b), (b1), (b2) and (c)[67] satisfy the desiderata (9) and (10).

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[66] Even in the case of *art brut*, a category where we normally consider that the artist has no categorial intention about a specific art category. Indeed, since this category regroups works by artists who have received no influence from the art world –that is to say, we consider that art brut works are not made with the intention that they should be taken as belonging to a specific art category or tradition– the fact that art-categorial intention are absent from the artist's mind is extremely important for deciding in which category to consider his or her works. In this case, it is important to know that there are supposedly no categorial intentions directed toward a specific art movement, tradition, or other form of specific art category, as is normally the case with contemporary Western art. This importance of categorial intention even in a case where specific art-categorial intentions are absent is the reason why Jean Dubuffet found it necessary to invent this new category.

[67] To repeat: that W can become a G by (b) an endogenous genre attribution, which is a representation of W as a G caused by (b1) a successful pre-generic intention to create a new category in which W should be perceived and thus come to create a collective recognition of W as a G in a certain context or by (b2) a successful dia-generic intention to create a W as a collectively recognized member of an existing G. W can also become a G through (c) a successful exogenous genre attribution that W is a G, causing a collective recognition that W is a G in a certain context. In the case of exogenous genre attribution, the

(11) Whether a musical output O has to be taken to belong to a musical genre G cannot be entirely guessed by listening to O, one also has to find out about its context of emergence, cultural background, or other features epistemologically extrinsic to O.

(12) Whether a musical output O has to be taken to belong to a musical genre G can depend on features that are epistemologically intrinsic to O such as its standard features with respect to such and such categories and whether O is best perceived if perceived in G.

I think that one can adapt my remarks on desiderata (6), (7), and (8) to see how (11) can be met thanks to requirement (f) and the fact that G's æsthetic constraints and the ontology of O should determine which G O should belong to. To take only one example: although the original soundtrack of a movie about late eighteen-hundred Vienna might sound indistinguishable from the genre in which Mozart or Haydn composed, it would be a mistake to consider that the soundtrack and the *London Symphonies* belong to the same musical genre.

The same goes for the first part of (12): indeed, it is not hard to imagine how standard features of an O which are epistemologically intrinsic can be dependent on O's ontological features, such as, for instance, the instruments used for it, the notes by which it is constituted, or other such things which permit to classify musical outputs together just by attending, consulting, or listening to them (standard features criterion).

Furthermore, Walton's charity principle criterion according to which there is a better chance that O belongs to G if O is better perceived as a G (to which the second part of (12) is referring) could be explained by (e), i.e. by the fact, if it is one, that the function of G, in paradigmatic cases, gives to O when represented as a G a set of æsthetic constraints that the musical output is expected to respect by the people who collectively recognize O as a G. Indeed, if I know what the æsthetic constraints of a fugue is, there is a good chance that whatever fugue that is successfully conceived would be better perceived when considered as respecting these æsthetic constraints. The function of the genre fugue is partly determined by the fact that, if I perceive a fugue as belonging to it, the æsthetic experience I will be able to obtain by listening to it will be increased.

Let us go on with the last three desiderata:

(13) A categorial intention about a category that is not presently a genre can be described as legitimate if it is a successful pre-generic intention, that is to say if the pre-generic intention can

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genre attribution (d) must represent, or at least not distort, the categorial intentions of the creator of W that W should be perceive in a certain category.

somehow cause in a certain context the creation of a new genre, or described as illegitimate if it fails to do so.

(14) A categorial intention about a category that is already an existing genre can be described as legitimate if it is a successful dia-generic intention, that is to say if it can somehow cause an audience in a certain context to consider the musical output as belonging to the existing genre, or described as illegitimate if it fails to do so.

(15) Musical genres can be attributed exogenously and endogenously. If a musical genre is attributed endogenously, one can treat it as representing a categorial intention. If a musical genre is attributed exogenously, one should investigate how close it can be to the artist's categorial intentions and what function it could serve in its contexts of attribution and recognition. If the genre attribution cannot correspond to the artist's intentions, it should be considered as an illegitimate or wrong-headed genre attribution.

These three desiderata, reached at the end of this essay, find their counterpart in my analysis with the points (b) to (h). Taken with the hypothesis according to which musical genres are status functions, fulfilling them allowed me to bridge the gap between Searle's theory, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Walton and Levinson's papers on art categories and their link with the artist's intentions.

Concerning (13), we have seen examples of illegitimate categorial intentions in the section dedicated to Walton's essay ("paintings with diagonal composition containing green crosses and pieces of music containing between four and eight F-sharps" (Walton, 1970: 358)) and of failed pre-generic intentions of attempting to create a musical genre with the Made-on-Mondays example. In these cases, the artist's categorial intentions are illegitimate because (as in (g)) they fail to turn the made-up categories into a collectively recognize representation of O as a G and thus fail to achieve a full-fledged declaration that O has the status function G. As an example of legitimate pre-generic intention, we have seen the case of DJ Kool Herc (p.60) Bob Dylan (pp. 56-58), dodecaphonism (pp. 43-44), and I mentioned the cases of Beethoven's *Third Symphony*, Monteverdi's *seconda prattica*, Eric Satie's *musique d'ameublement* (p. 40) to name a few (although some cases were not entirely successful in the first place, they ended up becoming successful pre-generic intentions).

Concerning (14), I mentioned the failed dia-generic intentions of making a speed-metal song while being too slow a guitarist or of composing a symphony without knowing that it involves more than three musicians. In these cases, the artist fails to achieve a full-fledged declaration because he or she fails (as in (h)) to create an O that can be collectively recognized as a G. As examples of successful dia-generic intention, I mentioned the case of making black metal and grunge music (p.58).

Concerning (15), we have seen examples of illegitimate exogenous genre attributions with the degenerate and counter-revolutionary music. In these cases, (as in (h)) the representation of O as a G fail

to correspond to the categorial intention the artist had in creating O. With the case of popular music, we have also seen that the same exogenous genre attribution can acquire different functions depending on the context in which it is as its representation can change through time and use. I have also mentioned cases of successful exogenous genre attribution as with the case of Delta blues (p.62).

Note that the cases of illegitimate intentions or wrong-headed categories fall into two broad categories. First, there are the cases where the categorial intentions fail to make people collectively represent an O as a member G and thus fail to attribute to O G's function (as with the 3-musician symphony or the too slow speed-metal). Second, there are the cases where there is a collective recognition of O as a G and where O acquires G's function but where this function does not correspond to the artist's categorial intentions (as with the counter-revolutionary, the degenerate music, and the Made-on-Mondays genre as applied to other artists than the creator of this made-up category).

5.2. Recapitulation of the main points

I think that the most important aspects brought out by my analysis can be summarized as four points:

(i) Whether a musical output is considered to belong to such or such genre is an important matter for æsthetic evaluation. (ii) Musical genres are social objects (a kind of what John Searle calls *status functions*) owning their existence to a collective recognition of their status, which serves in paradigmatic cases to give to the musical outputs belonging to the genre a set of æsthetic constraints that the audience can expect to be respected. Furthermore, the fact, if it is one, that a musical output belongs to a specific musical genre and that it thus acquires a specific status function (iii) depends strongly on the ontological nature of the musical output which can consist not only in its musical structure, but also in its musical medium, its historical context of creation, its process of transmission, and other features. Finally, (iv) musical genres depend strongly on the intentions that the artists have that their musical output is to be taken as belonging to certain art categories by the audience, whether these categories are musical genres or not.

I now want to illustrate in a last example the advantages of considering musical genres as having these four characteristics (that I will respectively refer to as (i) the æsthetic-evaluation point, (ii) the status-functions point, (iii) the ontological-basis point, and (iv) the categorial-intentions point).

5.3. A last example: The Residents' Commercial Album

The Residents' 1980 *Commercial Album* is quite a complicated case for musical genre attribution and that is the reason why I decided to take it as a last illustration and challenge of the conception of musical genre proposed in this essay. What makes this album particular is that it plays and comments on the way

we usually classify music into genres. To see how, let me first set the cultural background of this album's released.

Between their first music release in 1972 and the *Commercial Album*, and beside their numerous music videos (which they pioneered) and other multi-media works, the Residents recorded six studio albums. I would describe all of them as being experimental rock: free rhythms that are often impossible to predict, not much or no repetition at all, barely any structured melodies, very unconventional sounds (created with electric guitar originally manipulated or far-fetched synthesizer sounds, as well as a strong use of studio effects), a lot of surprising harmonic changes, and the rare vocal parts contain surrealistic lyrics whose meaning is often hard to grasp and are sung by modified voices reminding of cartoon characters but with a weird twist making one feels almost uncomfortable listening to them. The last release before the *Commercial Album* was *Eskimo.* It is kind of a radio-play composed of live-action stories without dialogues picturing life in the Artic and accompanied by non-musical sounds (just like in *musique concrète*), strange percussions and synthesizer sounds, as well as wordless voices treated in the studio (sometimes resembling *Stimmung* by Stockhausen). After *Eskimo* the audience would have probably expected that their next album would be in the same experimental vein, but it was not exactly the case.

The *Commercial Album*, released in 1980 on the independent label created by the Residents, Ralph Records, differs quite drastically from the preceding albums. While their six preceding opuses are mostly composed of long and hard to follow instrumental improvisations, the *Commercial Album* is made of forty one-minute songs, all containing easy to remember melodies, most of them composed of one verse and one chorus. The sounds used and the voices are still very strange and unconventional, but the sound structures, beside the fact that the songs only last for one minute, resemble mainstream radio hits. In fact, listening to the album, one can have the impression that each of its songs is the pastiche of a particular sub-genre of pop music. "Love Leaks Out" is a reggae imitation, "My work is so behind" is a sort of country rock *à la* Johnny Cash, "Moisture" simulates calypso-inspired R'n'B, etc.

Things become clearer when one reads the liner notes of the album:

> Point one: Pop music is mostly a repetition of two types of musical and lyrical phrases, the verse and the chorus. Point two: These elements usually repeat three times in a three minute song, the type usually found on top-40 radio. Point three: Cut out the fat and a pop song is only one minute long. Then record albums can hold their own top-40, twenty minutes per side. Point four: One minute is also the length of most commercials, and therefore their corresponding jingles. Point five: Jingles are the music of America. Conclusion: This album is terrific in shuffle play. To convert the jingles to pop music, program each song to repeat three times. (Residents, 1980)

Clearly, the San Franciscan band played on their status of experimental rock act as well as on the conception that their audience had of pop music. But they went further than just pretending to pastiche pop songs: they found a way to diffuse their whole album on San Francisco's most popular Top-40 radio

of the time. In order to do so, they purchased forty one-minute advertisement slots such as to play each track of their album over three days. This resulted in an editorial of *Billboard*, the famous Top-40 magazine, wondering whether these one-minute jingles were advertisement or art (McDonough, 1980). Furthermore, they created for each song a music video in order to promote their album on the then emerging MTV.

Let us now see how the four points highlighted above apply to this peculiar case.

The (i) æsthetic-evaluation point seems to me to be quite obviously relevant here. I think that bypassing the importance of genre attribution for æsthetic evaluation is missing most of the *Commercial Album's* point. Whether you take this album to belong to pop music, as the Residents state it does, whether you take it to be in the same genre as their preceding works and ascribe it the experimental rock genre, or, finally, whether you take the *Commercial Album* to belong to the musical satire genre changes drastically how you would evaluate this album. As a pop music album, if the æsthetic constraints of this genre are something like being able to please the largest part of the population, it is a total failure. As an experimental album, if the æsthetic constraints of this genre are something like achieving a new way to express musical ideas by experimenting musical structures or instrumentations, it also is a failure, as nothing original comes from the strictly musical aspects of this album, all the melodies, harmonies, rhythms, or even sounds used had been around in rock for years or even for decades. Now, as a musical satire, if the æsthetic constraints of this genre are something like being "a comedic genre in which human or individual vices, follies, or shortcomings are ridiculed", as rateyourmusic.com (2014) describes this musical genre, its success must be acknowledged.

The (ii) status-function point helps to understand the meaning that the Residents wanted to convey with their *Commercial Album* in several ways. Firstly, we can analyze their assertions in the title and liner notes of the album as well as the fact that they aired it on San Francisco's most popular Top-40 radio station as SF Declaration pretenses. The musical and extra-musical components of this album show that they wanted to play with the collective recognition of the status of pop music as well as with their status as an experimental rock band. It thus seems to me that considering pop music and experimental music as being status functions, that is to say as depending on the collective recognition of their status as having specific functions, help to understand the Residents' approach.

For instance, they clearly played on two different conceptions of pop music which might represent two facets of the functions that this genre is recognized, in different contexts, to possess: on the one hand, the conception of a certain intelligentsia who considers pop music as a purely mercantile and musically uninteresting genre and, on the other hand, the conception of another type of elite: hit-makers, i.e. the musicians or producers making pop music, who want their productions to be as widely liked as possible and work on the music itself to reach such as goal. I think that the Residents mock both of these collective recognitions of pop music by having intentionally failed to respect both of these expected aspects of pop

music while pretending to have tried fulfilling both constraints. Indeed, they played with the intelligentsia's expectation and conception of pop music as mercantile and musically uninteresting by diffusing their songs as ads and explicitly equating them with ad jingles in the album liner notes. They thus made fun of the intelligentsia's conception of pop music as being popular merely because most people buy what commercial radio plays and what ads tell them to buy, as people come to like any song after having heard it a few times on the radio. On the other hand, they played with the expectations of hits-makers that pop songs should have a certain format that is easy to diffuse on the radio and catches the attention of the listener, which often results in 3-minute songs with verse-chorus structures and melodies that are easy to retain. If pop music is a social object whose existence is determined by a collective recognition of this genre as having the function of, in one context, being merely a mercantile tool and, in another context, pleasing the most part of the populace, then one can analyze the extra-musical content of the *Commercial Album* as parodying the way people collectively give its status to pop music in such and such contexts.

The (iii) ontological-basis point can be highlighted here when one considers the ontology of contemporary pop music and the way the Residents played on this aspect of the genre as well. In particular, I would like to take as examples the three songs that the Residents added to the forty one-minute tracks in the CD reissuing of the *Commercial Album.* These three songs (that they had already recorded and for which they had made music videos during the same period as the forty original tracks) are covers of James Brown's "This is A Man's Man's World", Ray Charles' "Hit the Road Jack", and Elvis Presley's "Jailhouse Rock". The Residents covered these songs respecting the lyrics, melodies, harmonies, instrumentations, and (more or less) rhythmic aspects of these three songs but recorded them using very strange instrumental sounds and with their characteristic twisted-cartoon voices. The results are completely awkward and ridiculous versions of those three legendary hits. By keeping the same sound-structures as would have been notated on scores, they nevertheless transformed completely these songs. My point here is that, if Gracyk, Kania, and Pouivet are right in saying that rock works' ontology consists in replete recordings, much thicker artworks than classical music's, whose properties not only consist in their lyrics, melodies, harmonies, rhythms, and instrumentations but also in all the properties achieved in the interpretation by the recorded musicians and the rest of the studio work, then the Residents' covers of those three songs are not faithful at all. On the contrary, if one considers that, in a manner similar to older popular songs which were meant to be diffused by musical sheets only, James Brown, Ray Charles, and Elvis Presley's songs' ontology consists only in their lyrics, melodies, harmonies, rhythms, and instrumentations (as indicated by S at *t*), then the Residents' cover should be considered faithful. Of course, when one hears the results, one would find it hard to argue that they indeed are faithful covers. I think that the Residents have thus played on what rock songs consist of (studio creations) versus what older popular songs consist of (sound-structures as indicated in a score (by

S at *t*)). The same kind of analysis can be given with the forty one-minute songs of the original album as they also play on the fact that those songs as indicated on a score (as sound-structures) could be taken to be potential pop hits (if one would play them three times in a row) but with the studio works done by the Residents, they clearly cannot be taken to be so.

As for the (iv) categorial-intentions point, it is also relevant here because, to fully understand the meaning and significance of the *Commercial Album,* I think that one should try to understand properly what kind of artifact the Residents intended their audience to take this work to be. Beside the æsthetic significance of the genres they played with, the importance of their declarations in the album liner notes, the kind of media they used, the creational origin, inspirations, context of creation, and cultural background of this work, it is also valuable as a means of interpretation to try and figure out what were the actual categorial intentions of the Residents in creating the *Commercial Album.* Thus, Randy, the Residents' singer, has once stated that "The Residents are a group of so-called artists, performers, and musicians who have pretended to be a faceless and freaky rock band for the past 40 years." (Residents, 2014). Although it is always hard with the Residents to know whether they are being serious or not, it seems to me that there is something true to learn from this quotation about their categorial intentions in making of their *Commercial Album*. Indeed, their play on the opposition between pop and experimental music and what the audience should consider their music to be as well as on the status of advertisements and art, two domains strongly opposed to each other in today's artworld, is perhaps best understood if one assumes that they intended their audience to take their album conception and its extra-musical context of creation, diffusion, its music videos, etc. not as acts coming from a proper rock band but rather as something closer to some kind of art performance, something like a dada happening. In any case, in order to fully understand what they have achieved with this album, one has to figure out first what kind of object they meant to create, and it is certainly not just a simple rock album.

Whatever musical genre is attributed to this album, I hope to have convinced you that, although this subject matter is not often spoken of in æsthetics or in musicology, it is an important question from both the points of view of evaluation and understanding of music and that one has to possess quite a deep knowledge about both musical and extra-musical features of this album, or any other musical outputs, in particular the way it was conceived and the way it was meant to be received.

Aknowledgements :

During the writing of this essay, I have been very grateful to both my supervisors so I wanted to acknowledge this here. Many thanks to Julien Deonna, for being open-minded and kind enough to let me work on this subject as well as allowing me to write most of it on the other side of the Atlantic even though nothing at the University of Geneva was officially intended for this kind of arrangements, and countless thanks to Jerrold Levinson for, first, agreeing to help me with this work although he had no obligations whatsoever to do so and didn't even know who I was when he said yes, and, secondly, for helping me with everything in College Park, from the organization of an office space to the concerts invitations, en passant par de bons moments autour d'une bière! Thanks also go to the *Fondation Boninchi* and the *Foundation Zdenek et Michaela Bakala* for their financial support and, finally, I also wanted to thank Adrien Dœrig for painstakingly proofreading this long essay.

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