Genoveva Martí (marti-g)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Campdelacreu, Marta, Garcı́a-Moya, Rámon, Martı́, Genoveva and Terrone, Enrico. 2020. “How to Test the Ship of Theseus.” Dialectica 74(3), doi:10.48106/dial.v74.i3.06.
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Martı́, Genoveva, eds. 2014. Empty Representations. Reference & Non-Existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.001.0001.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1989. “Aboutness and Substitutivity.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14: Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 127–139. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1993. “The Source of Intensionality.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 197–206. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1994. “Do Modal Distinctions Collapse in Carnap’s System?” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 23(6): 575–593.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1995. “The Essence of Genuine Reference.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 24(2): 275–289.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1997. “Rethinking Quine’s Arguments on the Collapse of Modal Distinctions.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38: 276–294.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1998a. “Rigidity and the Description of Counterfactual Situations.” Theoria 64(3): 477–490.
Martı́, Genoveva. 1998b. “The Significance of the Distinction between Concept Mastery and Concept Possession [on Higginbotham (1998)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 163–167. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2002. “Review of Soames (2002).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 12(6).
Martı́, Genoveva. 2003a. “The Question of Rigidity in New Theories of Reference.” Noûs 37(1): 161–179.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2003b. “From the Necessary A Priori to the Plain False. Identity and Substitution.” Presented at the Summer School on the A Priori, Florence, June 26 - July 1, 2003.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2004. “Rigidity and General Terms.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105: 129–146.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2007a. “Substitution, Identity, and the Subject-Predicate Structure.” in Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry, edited by Michael O’Rourke and Corey Washington, pp. 93–117. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2007b. “Weak and Strong Directness: Reference and Thought [on Wettstein (2004)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 730–737.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2008. “Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions.” Dialectica 62(1): 43–57.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2009. “Against Semantic Multi-Culturalism.” Analysis 69(1): 42–48.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2012. “Reference.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 106–124. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Second edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2014).
Martı́, Genoveva. 2013. “Empirical Data and the Theory of Reference.” in Reference and Referring, edited by William P. Kabasenche, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater, pp. 63–82. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 9. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9581.001.0001.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2014. “Reference and Experimental Semantics.” in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, edited by Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill, pp. 17–26. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2015a. “Reference without Cognition.” in On Reference, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 77–92. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714088.001.0001.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2015b. “General Terms, Hybrid Theories and Ambiguity: A Discussion of Some Experimental Results.” in Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language, edited by Jussi Haukioja, pp. 157–172. Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2017. “Names, Predicates, and the Object-Property Distinction.” in Reference and Representation in Thought and Language, edited by Marı́a De Ponte Azcárate and Kepa Korta, pp. 14–19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martı́, Genoveva. 2020. “Experimental Semantics, Descriptivism and Anti-Descriptivism. should we Endorse Referential Pluralism?” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 329–344. Cham: Springer.
Martı́, Genoveva. n.d. “Review of Soames (2002).” Unpublished manuscript.
Martı́, Genoveva and Martinez-Fernández, José. 2010. “General Terms as Designators: A Defence of the View.” in The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, edited by Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, pp. 46–63. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 1. London: Routledge.
Martı́, Genoveva and Martinez-Fernández, José. 2011. “Self-Organisation in Dynamical Systems: A Limiting Result.” Synthese 181(2): 277–293.
Martı́, Genoveva and Martinez-Fernández, José. 2021. “Rigidity of General Terms.” in The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, edited by Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson, pp. 283–294. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Higginbotham, James. 1998. “Conceptual Competence.” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 149–162. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co., doi:10.2307/1522965.
Soames, Scott. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195145283.001.0001.
Wettstein, Howard K. 2004. The Magic Prism: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195160525.001.0001.