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Ben Bradley (bradley-b)

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Bibliography

    Bradley, Ben. 1998. Extrinsic Value.” Philosophical Studies 91(2): 109–126.
    Bradley, Ben. 2002. Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107(1): 23–44.
    Bradley, Ben. 2004a. When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Noûs 38(1): 1–28.
    Bradley, Ben. 2004b. Critical Notice of Zimmerman (2001).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(2): 492–494.
    Bradley, Ben. 2007a. How Bad is Death? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37(1): 111–128.
    Bradley, Ben. 2007b. A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare.” Philosophical Studies 133(1): 45–53.
    Bradley, Ben. 2009. Well-Being and Death. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557967.001.1.
    Bradley, Ben. 2010. Eternalism and Death’s Badness.” in Time and Identity, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein, pp. 271–282. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 4. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.001.0001.
    Bradley, Ben. 2012. Fischer on Death and Unexperienced Evils [on Fischer (2009)].” Philosophical Studies 158(3): 507–513.
    Bradley, Ben. 2014. Objective Theories of Well-Being.” in The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, edited by Ben Eggleston and Dale E. Miller, pp. 220–238. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Bradley, Ben. 2015a. Well-Being. Cambridge: Polity Press.
    Bradley, Ben. 2015b. Is Death Bad for a Cow? in The Ethics of Killing Animals, edited by Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner, pp. 51–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396078.001.0001.
    Bradley, Ben. 2016. Well-Being and Death.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, edited by Guy Fletcher, pp. 320–328. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Bradley, Ben. 2017. Character and Consequences.” in Questions of Character, edited by Iskra Fileva, pp. 78–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357703.001.0001.
    Bradley, Ben, Feldman, Fred and Johansson, Jens, eds. 2012a. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195388923.001.0001.
    Bradley, Ben, Feldman, Fred and Johansson, Jens. 2012b. Introduction: Philosophy of Death.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, edited by Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson, pp. 1–4. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195388923.001.0001.
    Bradley, Ben and McDaniel, Kris. 2013. Death and Desires.” in The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death, edited by James Stacey Taylor, pp. 118–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751136.001.0001.
    McDaniel, Kris and Bradley, Ben. 2008. Desires.” Mind 117(466): 267–302, doi:10.1093/mind/fzn044.
    Zimmerman, Michael J. and Bradley, Ben. 2019. Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/.

Further References

    Fischer, John Martin. 2009. Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Zimmerman, Michael J. 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.