Jessica A. Brown (brown-j)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Brown, Jessica A. 1995. “The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access.” Analysis 55: 149–156.
Brown, Jessica A. 2000a. “Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100: 115–135.
Brown, Jessica A. 2000b. “Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(3): 659–676.
Brown, Jessica A. 2003. “Externalism and the Fregean Tradition.” in Epistemology of Language, edited by Alex Barber, pp. 431–457. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Jessica A. 2004. Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. Contemporary Philosophical Monographs n. 4. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Brown, Jessica A. 2005a. “Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism?” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219).
Brown, Jessica A. 2005b. “Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219).
Brown, Jessica A. 2005c. “Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 69: 71–100. “Epistemological Contextualism,” ed. by Martijn Blaauw.
Brown, Jessica A. 2005d. “Doubt, Circularity and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.” in Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 1–14. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Brown, Jessica A. 2006. “Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres.” Philosophical Studies 130(3): 407–435.
Brown, Jessica A. 2007. “Externalism in Mind and Epistemology.” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 13–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Jessica A. 2008a. “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.” Noûs 42(2): 167–189.
Brown, Jessica A. 2008b. “Knowledge and Practical Reason.” Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1135–1152.
Brown, Jessica A. 2008c. “The Knowledge Norm for Assertion.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 89–103. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brown, Jessica A. 2009a. “Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 767–780. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2009b. “Sosa on Scepticism [on Sosa (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 143(3): 397–405.
Brown, Jessica A. 2010. “Knowledge and Assertion.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81(3): 397–405, doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.x.
Brown, Jessica A. 2011a. “Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence.” Dialectica 65(4): 493–516.
Brown, Jessica A. 2011b. “Fallibilism and the Knowledge Norm for Assertion and Practical Reasoning.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 153–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0007.
Brown, Jessica A. 2012a. “Words, Concepts and Epistemology.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 31–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2012b. “Practical Reasoning, Decision Theory and Anti-Intellectualism.” Episteme 9(1): 43–62.
Brown, Jessica A. 2013a. “Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic Norms.” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 326–342. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Brown, Jessica A. 2013b. “Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics.” Analysis 73(4): 626–635.
Brown, Jessica A. 2013c. “Intuitions, Evidence and Hopefulness.” Synthese 190(12): 2021–2046.
Brown, Jessica A. 2013d. “Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science.” Analysis 73(2): 220–227.
Brown, Jessica A. 2013e. “Immediate Justification, Perception, and Intuition.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 71–88. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2014a. “Shifty Talk: Knowledge and Causation.” Philosophical Studies 167(2): 183–199.
Brown, Jessica A. 2014b. “Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem.” Noûs 48(1): 179–192.
Brown, Jessica A. 2015. “Evidence and Epistemic Evaluation.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 39–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2016. “Anti-Intellectualism and Ignorance.” in The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, edited by Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw, pp. 114–131. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9780511820076.
Brown, Jessica A. 2017a. “Blame and Wrongdoing.” Episteme 14(3): 275–296.
Brown, Jessica A. 2017b. “The Gettier Case and Intuition.” in Explaining Knowledge. New Essays on the Gettier Problem, edited by Rodrigo Martins Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter Klein, pp. 191–212. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2018a. Fallibilism. Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198801771.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2018b. “Pragmatic Approaches to Belief.” in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 26–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198758709.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2020. “The Norm of Assertion and Blame.” in The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 807–828. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. 2022. “Group Evidence.” in Philosophical Issues 32: Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Deborah Perron Tollefsen, pp. 164–179. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12220.
Brown, Jessica A. 2024. “Moral Encroachment and Evidence.” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 371–380. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Brown, Jessica A. and Cappelen, Herman, eds. 2011a. Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. and Cappelen, Herman. 2011b. “Assertion: An Introduction and Overview.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. and Gerken, Mikkel, eds. 2012a. Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. and Gerken, Mikkel. 2012b. “Introduction. Knowledge Ascriptions: Their Semantics, Cognitive Bases, and Social Functions.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 1–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.
Brown, Jessica A. and Simion, Mona, eds. 2021. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198847205.001.0001.

Further References

Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001.