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Krister Bykvist (bykvist)

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Workshop on Value Exploration, Workshop on Valuable Experience

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Bibliography

    Arrhenius, Gustaf, Bykvist, Krister, Campbell, Tim and Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth, eds. 2022. The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190907686.001.0001.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2002. “Alternative Actions and the Spirit of Consequentialism.” Philosophical Studies 107(1): 45–68.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2003. “The Moral Relevance of Past Preferences.” in Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 115–136. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2007a. “Violations of Normative Invariance: Some Thoughts on Shifty Oughts.” Theoria 73(2): 98–120.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2007b. “The Good, the Bad, and the Ethically Neutral.” Economics and Philosophy 23(1): 97–105.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2007c. “The Benefits of Coming into Existence.” Philosophical Studies 135(3): 335–362.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2009. “No Good Fit: Why the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value Fails.” Mind 118(469): 1–30.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2010. “Can Unstable Preferences Provide a Stable Standard of Well-Being?” Economics and Philosophy 26(1): 1–26.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2013. “Time and Morality.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, pp. 549–562. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118522097.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2014. “Utilitarianism in the Twentieth Century.” in The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, edited by Ben Eggleston and Dale E. Miller, pp. 103–124. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2015a. “Being and Wellbeing.” in Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, edited by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, pp. 87–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684908.001.0001.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2015b. “Value and Time.” in The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, edited by Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, pp. 117–135. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.001.0001.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2015c. “Reply to Orsi.” Mind 124(496): 1201–1205.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2017. “Moral Uncertainty.” Philosophy Compass 12(3), doi:10.1111/phc3.e12408.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2018a. “Review of Lord and Maguire (2016).” Analysis 78(1): 180–183.
    Bykvist, Krister. 2018b. “Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Reasons.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 821–838. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
    Bykvist, Krister and Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2007. “Does Thought Imply Ought?” Analysis 67(4): 277–285.
    Bykvist, Krister and Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2014. “Belief, Truth, and Blindspots.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 100–122. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
    Bykvist, Krister and Olson, Jonas. 2009. “Expressivism and Moral Certitude.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(235): 202–215.
    Bykvist, Krister and Olson, Jonas. 2019. “What Matters in Metaethics [critical notice of Parfit (2017)].” Analysis 79(2): 341–349.
    Macaskill, William, Bykvist, Krister and Ord, Toby. 2020. Moral Uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198722274.001.0001.

Further References