Neil Campbell (campbell-n)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Campbell, Neil. 1997. “The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 373–382.
Campbell, Neil. 1998. “Anomalous Monism and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.” Dialectica 52(1): 23–39.
Campbell, Neil. 2000a. “Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States.” Synthese 124(2): 239–256.
Campbell, Neil. 2000b. “Supervenience and Psycho-Physical Dependence.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 39: 303–316.
Campbell, Neil. 2002. “Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence: A Reply to Botterell (2002).” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 41: 163–167.
Campbell, Neil. 2003. “Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and His Critics.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 31(1–2): 149–157.
Campbell, Neil. 2004. “Generalizing Qualia Inversion.” Erkenntnis 60(1): 27–34.
Campbell, Neil. 2005. “Explanatory Epiphenomenalism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(220).
Campbell, Neil. 2008. Mental Causation. A Nonreductive Approach. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
Campbell, Neil. 2009. “Why we should Lower Our Expectations about the Explanatory Gap.” Theoria 75(1): 34–51.
Campbell, Neil. 2010. “Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation.” Theoria 76(3): 207–220.
Campbell, Neil. 2011. “Mental Causation.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by James Garvey, pp. 190–202. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Campbell, Neil. 2012. “Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument.” Erkenntnis 76(1): 137–145.
Campbell, Neil. 2013a. “Do MacDonald and MacDonald Solve the Problem of Mental Causal Relevance?” Philosophia 41(4): 1149–1158.
Campbell, Neil. 2013b. “Reasons and the First-Person: Explanatory Exclusion and Explanatory Pluralism.” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 52(1): 25–42.
Campbell, Neil. 2015. “Does Same-Level Causation Entail Downward Causation?” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação 8(2): 53–66.
Campbell, Neil. 2017. “Self-Forming Actions, Snap Decisions, and Indeterminism: A Problem for Kane’s Libertarianism.” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação 10: 15–34.
Campbell, Neil and Moore, Dwayne. 2009. “On Kim’s Exclusion Principle.” Synthese 169: 75–90.
Moore, Dwayne and Campbell, Neil. 2010. “Functional Reduction and Mental Causation.” Acta Analytica 25(4): 435–446.
Moore, Dwayne and Campbell, Neil. 2015. “On the Metaphysics of Mental Causation.” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação 8(2): 3–16.

Further References

Botterell, Andrew. 2002. “Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence: A Reply to Campbell (2000b).” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 41: 155–162.