Anjan Chakravartty (chakravartty)
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Bibliography
Chakravartty, Anjan. 1998.
“Semirrealism.” Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 29(3): 391–408.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2001. “The Semantic or Model-Theoretic View of Theories and
Scientific Realism.” Synthese 127: 325–345.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2003. “The Dispositional Essentialist View of Properties and
Laws.” International Journal of Philosophical
Studies 11(4): 393–413.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2004. “Stance Relativism: Empiricism versus Metaphysics [Review
of van Fraassen
(2002)].” Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 35(1): 173–184.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2005. “Causal Realism: Events and Processes.”
Erkenntnis 63(1): 7–31.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2007a. A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Knowing the
Unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487354.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2007b. “Six Degrees of Speculation: Metaphysics in Empirical
Contexts.” in Images of
Empiricism. Essays on Science and Stances, with a reply from Bas C. van
Fraassen, pp. 183–208. Mind Association Occasional
Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.001.0001.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2008. “What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You: Realism and the
Unconceived [on Stanford (2006)].”
Philosophical Studies 137(1): 149–158.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2009. “Making a Metaphysics for Nature [review of Bird
(2007)].” Metascience 18(1): 75–79.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2010a. “Metaphysics between the Sciences and Philosophies of
Science.” in New Waves in
Philosophy of Science, edited by P. D. Magnus and Jacob Busch, pp. 59–77. New
Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2010b. “Perspectivism, Inconsistent Models, and Contrastive
Explanation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 41(4): 405–412.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2010c. “Truth and Representation in Science: Two Inspirations
from Art.” in Beyond Mimesis and
Convention. Representation in Art and Science, edited by
Roman Frigg and Matthew C. Hunter, pp. 33–50. Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 262. Dordrecht: Springer.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2011a. “Scientific Realism and Ontological
Relativity.” The Monist 94(2): 157–180.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2011b.
“Scientific Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/scientific-realism/.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2011c. “A Puzzle about Voluntarism about Rational Epistemic
Stances.” Synthese 178(1): 37–48.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2012. “Ontological Priority: The Conceptual Basis of
Non-Eliminative, Ontic Structural Realism.” in Structural Realism. Structure, Object, and
Causality, edited by Elaine M. Landry and Dean P. Rickles, pp. 187–206. The
University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science
n. 77. Dordrecht: Springer.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2013a. “On the Prospects of Naturalized
Metaphysics.” in Scientific
Metaphysics, edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid, pp. 27–50. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.001.0001.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2013b. “Realism in the Desert and in the Jungle: Reply to French (2013), Ghins (2013), and Psillos
(2013).” Erkenntnis 78(1): 39–58.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2013c. “Dispositions for Scientific Realism.” in
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy. The New
Aristotelianism, edited by John Greco and Ruth Groff, pp. 113–127. London: Routledge.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017a. Scientific Ontology. Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics
and Voluntarist Epistemology. New York: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190651459.001.0001.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017b. “Case Studies, Selective Realism, and Historical
Evidence.” in EPSA 15 – Selected
Papers. The 5th Conference of the European Philosophy of Science
Association in Düsseldorf,
edited by Michaela Massimi, Jan-Willem
Romeijn, and Gerhard Schurz, pp. 13–24. European Studies in Philosophy of Science n. 5.
Cham: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-53730-6.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017c. “Saving the Scientific Phenomena: What Powers Can and
Cannot Do.” in Causal Powers, edited
by Jonathan D. Jacobs, pp. 24–37. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198796572.001.0001.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017d. “Particles, Causation, and the Metaphysics of
Structure.” Synthese 194(7): 2255–2271.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017e. “Reflections on New Thinking about Scientific
Realism.” Synthese 194(9): 3379–3392.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017f. “Realism, Antirealism, Epistemic Stances, and
Voluntarism.” in The Routledge
Handbook of Scientific Realism, edited by Juha Saatsi, pp. 225–236. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203712498.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2017g.
“Scientific Realism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/scientific-realism/.
Chakravartty, Anjan. 2018. “Truth and the Sciences.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by
Michael Glanzberg, pp. 602–624.
Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Chakravartty, Anjan and van Fraassen,
Bas C. 2018. “What is Scientific
Realism?” Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the
History and Philosophy of Science 9(1): 12–25.
Further References
Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and Properties.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227013.001.0001.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 2002. The Empirical
Stance. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
French, Steven. 2013. “Semi-Realism, Sociability and Structure.”
Erkenntnis 78(1): 1–18.
Ghins, Michel. 2013. “Semirealism, Concrete Structures and Theory
Change.” Erkenntnis 78(1): 19–27.
Psillos, Stathis. 2013. “Semirealism or Neo-Aristotelianism?”
Erkenntnis 78(1): 29–38.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 2006. Exceeding our Grasp. Science, History, and the Problem of
Unconceived Alternatives. New York: Oxford University Press,
doi:10.1093/0195174089.001.0001.