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Tamás Demeter (demeter)

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Bibliography

    Demeter, Tamás. 2002. Supervenient Causation and Programme Explanation.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 64: 83–93.
    Demeter, Tamás, ed. 2004. Essays on Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy. Studien zur Österreichischen Philosophie n. 38. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2009a. Two Kinds of Mental Realism.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40(1): 59–71.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2009b. Folk Psychology is Not a Metarepresentational Device.” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5(2): 19–38.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2010. In Defence of Empty Realism.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41(1): 195–197.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2012. Hume’s Experimental Method.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20(3): 577–599.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2013a. Review of Schantz and Seidel (2011).” Metascience 22(2): 475–479.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2013b. Mental Fictionalism: The Very Idea.” The Monist 96(4): 483–504.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2014. Enlarging the Bounds of Moral Philosophy: Newton’s Method and Hume’s Science of Man.” in Newton and Empiricism, edited by Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser, pp. 171–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199337095.001.0001.
    Demeter, Tamás. 2016. David Hume and the Culture of Scottish Newtonianism. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
    Schliesser, Eric and Demeter, Tamás. 2020. Hume’s Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/hume-newton/.
    Zemplén, Gábor Á. and Demeter, Tamás. 2010. Being Charitable to Scientific Controversies: On the Demonstrativity of Newton’s Experimentum Crucis.” The Monist 93(4): 640–656.

Further References

    Schantz, Richard and Seidel, Markus, eds. 2011. The Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of (Scientific) Knowledge. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 43. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.