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Sinan Dogramaci (dogramaci)

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Philosophers' Imprint

Cited in the following articles

Should we Hope Apparent Atrocities Are Illusory?

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Bibliography

    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2010. Knowledge of Validity.” Noûs 44(3): 403–432.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2012. Apriority.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian K. Russell and Delia Graff Fara, pp. 768–781. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2013. Intuitions for Inferences.” Philosophical Studies 165(2): 371–399.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2014. A Problem for Rationalist Responses to Skepticism.” Philosophical Studies 168(2): 355–369.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2015a. Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.” Noûs 49(4): 776–799.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2015b. Forget and Forgive: A Practical Approach to Forgotten Evidence.” Ergo 2(26): 645–677.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2016a. Reasoning without Blinders: A Reply to Valaris (2016).” Mind 125(499): 879–893.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2016b. Knowing Our Degrees of Belief.” Episteme 13(3): 269–287.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2017. Explaining Our Moral Reliability.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(S1): 71–86, doi:10.1111/papq.12153.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2018a. Rational Credence Through Reasoning.” Philosophers' imprint 18(11).
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2018b. Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 107–128. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12118.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2020. What is the Function of Reasoning? On Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative and Justificatory Theories.” Episteme 17(3): 316–330.
    Dogramaci, Sinan. 2021. Are we Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective.” Ergo 8(18): 523–550, doi:10.3998/ergo.1155.
    Dogramaci, Sinan and Horowitz, Sophie. 2016. An Argument for Uniqueness about Evidential Support.” in Philosophical Issues 26: Knowledge and Mind, edited by Christoph Kelp and Jack C. Lyons, pp. 130–147. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.

Further References

    Valaris, Markos. 2016. Supposition and Blindness.” Mind 125(499): 895–901.