Dale Dorsey (dorsey-d)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Dorsey, Dale. 2006. “A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics.” Philosophical Studies 127(3): 493–523.
Dorsey, Dale. 2009. “Aggregation, Partiality, and the Strong Beneficence Principle.” Philosophical Studies 146(1): 139–157.
Dorsey, Dale. 2010a. “Three Arguments for Perfectionism.” Noûs 44(1): 59–79.
Dorsey, Dale. 2010b. “Truth and Error in Morality.” in New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, pp. 235–248. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dorsey, Dale. 2012a. The Basic Minimum. A Welfarist Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dorsey, Dale. 2012b. “Weak Anti-Rationalism and the Demands of Morality.” Noûs 46(1): 1–23.
Dorsey, Dale. 2012c. “Consequentialism, Metaphysical Realism and the Argument from Cluelessness.” The Philosophical Quarterly 62(246): 48–70.
Dorsey, Dale. 2012d. “Can Instrumental Value Be Intrinsic?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93: 137–157.
Dorsey, Dale. 2012e. “Subjectivism without Desire.” The Philosophical Review 121(3): 407–442.
Dorsey, Dale. 2012f. “Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle.” Philosophical Studies 157(2): 267–285.
Dorsey, Dale. 2013a. “The Authority of Competence and Quality as Extrinsic.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21(1): 78–99.
Dorsey, Dale. 2013b. “Two Dualisms of Practical Reason.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 114–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678044.001.0001.
Dorsey, Dale. 2013c. “Consequentialism, Cognitive Limitations, and Moral Theory.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume III, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 179–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
Dorsey, Dale. 2015a. “Political Liberalism, Political Independence, and Moral Authority.” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume I, edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, pp. 89–111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669530.001.0001.
Dorsey, Dale. 2015b. “Objectivity and Perfection in Hume’s Hedonism.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53(2): 245–270.
Dorsey, Dale. 2015c. “Welfare, Autonomy, and the Autonomy Fallacy.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96: 141–164.
Dorsey, Dale. 2016a. The Limits of Moral Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198728900.001.0001.
Dorsey, Dale. 2016b. “Welfarism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, edited by Guy Fletcher, pp. 417–428. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Dorsey, Dale. 2017. “Future-Bias: A (Qualified) Defense.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98: 351–373.
Dorsey, Dale. 2018. “The Focus of Interpersonal Morality.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VIII, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 32–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198828310.001.0001.
Dorsey, Dale. 2021a. A Theory of Prudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823759.001.0001.
Dorsey, Dale. 2021b. “Francis Hutcheson.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/hutcheson/.
Dorsey, Dale. 2022. “Ill-Being for Subjectivists.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46: Well-Being and Ill-Being, edited by Peter A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, Yuval Avnur, and Gwendolyn Bradford, pp. 87–107. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp20231432.