Richard Double (double)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Double, Richard. 1976. “The Inconclusiveness of Kripke’s Argument against the Identity Theory.” Auslegung. A Journal of Philosophy 3(3): 156–165.
Double, Richard. 1979. “Taylor’s Refutation of Epiphenomenalism.” Journal of Critical Analysis 8: 23–28.
Double, Richard. 1981. “Central state materialism.” Philosophical Studies (Maynooth) 28: 229–237.
Double, Richard. 1983a. “Nagel’s Argument That Mental Properties are Nonphysical.” Philosophy Research Archives 9: 217–222.
Double, Richard. 1983b. “Searle, Programs and Functionalism.” Nature and System 5: 107–114.
Double, Richard. 1985. “Phenomenal Properties.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46: 383–392.
Double, Richard. 1987. “The Computational Model of the Mind and Philosophical Functionalism.” Behaviorism 15: 131–139.
Double, Richard. 1989. “Puppeteers, Hypnotists, and Neurosurgeons.” Philosophical Studies 56: 163–173.
Double, Richard. 1991a. The Non-Reality of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Double, Richard. 1991b. “Determinism and the Experience of Freedom.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 1–8.
Double, Richard. 1992. “How Rational Must Free Will Be?” Metaphilosophy 23: 268–278.
Double, Richard. 1994. “How to Frame the Free Will Problem.” Philosophical Studies 75: 149–172.
Double, Richard. 1996. Metaphilosophy and Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Double, Richard. 1999. “Morality, Impartiality, and What We Can Ask of Persons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 36(2): 149–158.
Double, Richard. 2002. “Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, pp. 506–528. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. Second edition: Kane (2011), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195178548.001.0001.
Double, Richard. 2004. “The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(2): 411–422.