Lorne Falkenstein (falkenstein)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Falkenstein, Lorne. 1989. “Kant’s Argument for the Non-Spatiotemporality of Things in Themselves.” Kant-Studien 80(3): 265–283.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1990a. “Berkeley’s Argument for Other Minds.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 7(4): 431–440.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1990b. “Was Kant a Nativist?” Journal of the History of Ideas 51: 573–597. Reprinted in Kitcher (1998, 21–44).
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1991. “Kant, Mendelssohn, Lambert, and the Subjectivity of Time.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 29(2): 227–251.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1994. “Intuition and Construction in Berkeley’s Account of Visual Space.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32(1): 63–84.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1995a. Kant’s Intuitionism. A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1995b. “Hume and Reid on the Simplicity of the Soul.” Hume Studies 21(1): 25–45.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1997a. “Hume on Manners of Disposition and the Ideas of Space and Time.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 79(2): 179–201, doi:10.1515/agph.1997.79.2.179.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1997b. “Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism in Hume’s Account of Belief.” Hume Studies 23(1): 29–72.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 1998. “A Double Edged Sword? Kant’s Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof of the Immortality of the Soul and its Implications for His Theory of Matter.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29(4): 561–588.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2000a. “Hume’s Finite Geometry: A Reply to Mark Pressman [on Pressman (1997)].” Hume Studies 26(1): 183–185.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2000b. “Reid’s Account of Localization.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(2): 305–328.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2001. “Langton on Things in Themselves: Critique of Langton (1998).” Kantian Review 5: 49–64.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2002a. “Hume and Reid on the Perception of Hardness.” Hume Studies 28(1): 27–48.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2002b. “Étienne Bonnot de Condillac.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/condillac/.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2005a. “Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic.” in A Companion to Kant, edited by Graham H. Bird, pp. 140–153. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996287.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2005b. “Condillac’s Paradox.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 43(4): 403–435.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2006a. “Space and Time.” in The Blackwell Guide to Hume’s Treatise, edited by Saul Traiger, pp. 59–76. Blackwell Guides to Great Works. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470776377.ch4.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2006b. “Nativism and the Nature of Thought in Reid’s Account of Our Knowledge of the External World.” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, edited by Terence Cuneo and René van Woudenberg, pp. 156–179. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2009. “Hume and Baxter on identity over time [on Baxter (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 146(3): 425–433.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2010. “Étienne Bonnot de Condillac.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/condillac/.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2012. “The Psychology and Epistemology of Hume’s Account of Probable Reasoning.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Hume, edited by Alan Bailey and Dan O’Brien, pp. 104–130. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2013. “Classical Empiricism.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, pp. 102–119. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118522097.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2014a. “Theories of Perception I: Berkeley and His Recent Predecessors.” in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, edited by Aaron V. Garrett, pp. 338–359. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2014b. “Theories of Perception II: After Berkeley.” in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy, edited by Aaron V. Garrett, pp. 360–380. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2015. “Berkeley on Situation and Inversion.” in The Battle of the Gods and Giants Redux. Papers presented to Thomas M. Lennon, edited by Patricia Easton and Kurt Smith, pp. 300–334. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History n. 248. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2016. “Hume and the Contemporary ‘Common Sense’ Critique of Hume.” in The Oxford Handbook of Hume, edited by Paul Russell, pp. 729–753. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199742844.001.0001.
Falkenstein, Lorne. 2017. “Hume on Temporal Experience.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience, edited by Ian Phillips, pp. 42–52. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Falkenstein, Lorne and Grandi, Giovanni Battista. 2003. “The Role of Material Impressions in Reid’s Theory of Vision: a Critique of Gideon Yaffe’s ‘Reid on the Perception of the Visible Figure’ .” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2: 117–133.
Falkenstein, Lorne and Grandi, Giovanni Battista. 2017. “Étienne Bonnot de Condillac.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/condillac/.
Falkenstein, Lorne and Welton, David. 2001. “Humean Contiguity.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 18(3): 279–296.

Further References

Baxter, Donald L. M. 2007. Hume’s Difficulty. Time and Identity in the Treatise. Routledge Studies in Eighteenth Century Philosophy n. 8. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203940259.
Kitcher, Patricia, ed. 1998. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Critical Essays. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Langton, Rae. 1998. Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243174.001.0001.
Pressman, H. Mark. 1997. “Hume on Geometry and Infinite Divisibility in the Treatise.” Hume Studies 23(2): 227–244.