Mathias Frisch (frisch-m)
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Bibliography
Dardashti, Radin, Glynn, Luke, Thébault, Karim P. Y. and Frisch, Mathias. 2014. “Unsharp Humean Chances in Statistical Physics: A Reply to
Beisbart
(2014).” in New Directions
in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. González, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas E. Uebel, and Marcel Weber, pp. 531–542. The
Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective n. 5. Cham:
Springer.
Frisch, Mathias. 1999. “Van Fraassen’s Dissolution of Putnam’s Model-Theoretic
Argument.” Philosophy of Science 66: 158–164.
Frisch, Mathias. 2005. Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality. A
Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195172159.001.0001.
Frisch, Mathias. 2007. “Causation, Counterfactuals, and Entropy.”
in Causation, Physics and the Constitution of
Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, edited by Huw Price and Richard Corry, pp. 351–396. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Frisch, Mathias. 2009. “Philosophical Issues in Electromagnetism.”
Philosophy Compass 4(1): 255–270.
Frisch, Mathias. 2010a. “Causes, Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88(4): 655–672.
Frisch, Mathias. 2010b. “Does a Low-Entropy Constraint Prevent Us from Influencing
the Past?” in Time, Chance, and
Reduction: Philosophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics,
edited by Gerhard Ernst and Andreas Hüttemann, pp. 13–33. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Frisch, Mathias. 2012.
“Kausalität in der Physik.” in
Philosophie der Physik, pp. 411–426. Frankfurt
a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Frisch, Mathias. 2013. “Time and Causation.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, edited
by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, pp. 282–300. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118522097.
Frisch, Mathias. 2014a. Causal Reasoning in Physics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Frisch, Mathias. 2014b. “Models and Scientific Representations Or: Who is Afraid
of Inconsistency?” Synthese 191(13): 3027–3040.
Frisch, Mathias. 2014c. “Why Physics Can’t Explain Everything.” in
Chance and Temporal Asymmetry,
edited by Alastair Wilson, pp. 221–240.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199673421.001.0001.
Frisch, Mathias. 2020. “Causation in Physics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/causation-physics/.
Frisch, Mathias. 2021. “Causal Explanation in Physics.” in
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of
Physics, edited by Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson, pp. 454–465. Routledge
Companions. London: Routledge.
Frisch, Mathias, Lynes, Philippe and Wood, David, eds. 2018. Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental
Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press, doi:10.5422/fordham/9780823279500.001.0001.
Winsberg, Eric, Frisch, Mathias, Merikangas Duncan, Karen and Fine, Arthur I. 2000. “Review of Cartwright (1999).”
The Journal of Philosophy 97(2): 403–408.
Further References
Beisbart, Claus. 2014. “Good Just Isn’t Good Enough: Humean Chances and
Boltzmannian Statistical Physics.” in New Directions in the Philosophy of Science,
edited by Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis
Dieks, Wenceslao J. González, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas E. Uebel, and Marcel Weber, pp. 511–530. The
Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective n. 5. Cham:
Springer.
Cartwright, Nancy. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study in the Boundaries of
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.