Joshua Gert (gert-j)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Gert, Bernard and Gert, Joshua. 2016. “The Definition of Morality.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/morality-definition/.
Gert, Bernard and Gert, Joshua. 2020. “The Definition of Morality.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/.
Gert, Joshua. 2000. “Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely Justificatory Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 37(3): 227–243.
Gert, Joshua. 2002a. “Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy.” The Philosophical Quarterly 52.
Gert, Joshua. 2002b. “Korsgaard’s Private-Reasons Argument.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(2): 303–324.
Gert, Joshua. 2003a. “Brute Rationality.” Noûs 37(3): 417–446.
Gert, Joshua. 2003b. “Two Concepts of Rationality.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(3): 367–398.
Gert, Joshua. 2003c. “Review of Raz (1999).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3): 745–748.
Gert, Joshua. 2004a. Brute Rationality. Normativity and Human Action. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gert, Joshua. 2004b. “Value and Parity.” Ethics 114: 492–520.
Gert, Joshua. 2004c. “Intentional Action and Nearly Certain Success.” Ratio 17(2).
Gert, Joshua. 2005a. “A Functional Role Analysis of Reasons.” Philosophical Studies 124(3): 353–378.
Gert, Joshua. 2005b. “A Light Theory with Heavy Burdens.” Philosophical Studies 126(1): 57–70.
Gert, Joshua. 2006a. “The Color of Mirrors.” American Philosophical Quarterly 43(4): 369–377.
Gert, Joshua. 2006b. “Mistaken Expressions.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36(4): 459–480.
Gert, Joshua. 2007a. “Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.” The Philosophical Review 116(4): 533–562.
Gert, Joshua. 2007b. “Cognitivism, Expressivism, and Agreement in Response.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume II, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 77–110. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gert, Joshua. 2007c. “Beyond Moore’s Utilitarianism.” in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 307–324. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gert, Joshua. 2008a. “Putting Particularism in its Place.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89: 312–324.
Gert, Joshua. 2008b. “Vague Terms, Indexicals, and Vague Indexicals.” Philosophical Studies 140(3): 437–445.
Gert, Joshua. 2009a. “Colour, Emotion and Objectivity.” Analysis 69(4): 714–721.
Gert, Joshua. 2009b. “Desires, Reasons, and Irrationality.” American Philosophical Quarterly 46(4): 319–332.
Gert, Joshua. 2009c. “Toward an Epistemology of Certain Substantive a Priori Truths.” Metaphilosophy 40(2): 214–236.
Gert, Joshua. 2009d. “Response-Dependence and Normative Bedrock.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79(3): 718–742.
Gert, Joshua. 2009e. “Williams on Reasons and Rationality.” in Reading Bernard Williams, edited by Daniel Calcutt, pp. 73–93. London: Routledge.
Gert, Joshua. 2010a. “Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.” Noûs 44(4): 669–690.
Gert, Joshua. 2010b. “Fitting-Attitudes, Secondary Qualities, and Values.” Philosophical Topics 38(1): 87–105.
Gert, Joshua. 2011a. “Naturalistic Metaethics at Half Price.” in New Waves in Metaethics, edited by Michael Sean Brady, pp. 36–61. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/9780230294899.
Gert, Joshua. 2011b. “Morality and Practical Reason.” in The Continuum Companion to Ethics, edited by Christian B. Miller, pp. 77–97. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Republished as Miller (2015).
Gert, Joshua. 2012a. Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality and Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657544.001.0001.
Gert, Joshua. 2012b. “Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction.” The Philosophical Review 121(4): 611–618.
Gert, Joshua. 2013. “Color Constancy and Dispositionalism.” Philosophical Studies 162(2): 183–200.
Gert, Joshua. 2015a. “Fine-Grained Colour Discrimination without Fine-Grained Colour.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(3): 602–605.
Gert, Joshua. 2015b. “Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons.” Inquiry 58(5): 439–459.
Gert, Joshua. 2017. Primitive Colors. A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198785910.001.0001.
Gert, Joshua. 2018a. “Neo-Pragmatism, Morality, and the Specification Problem.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 447–467.
Gert, Joshua. 2018b. “Underdetermination by Reason.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 443–460. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Gert, Joshua. 2021a. “The Analogy Between Colour and Value.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 107–120. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
Gert, Joshua. 2021b. “Primitivist Objectivism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 299–310. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
Gert, Joshua, ed. 2023. Neopragmatism: Interventions in First-Order Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894809.001.0001.

Further References

Raz, Joseph. 1999. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199248001.001.0001.