Daniel Giberman (giberman-d)
Email:
dgiberman(at)gmail.com
Cited in the following articles
Mereology is not a Guide to (In)conceivabilityContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Giberman, Daniel. 2009. “Who They Are and What de se: Burge on Quasi-Memory.” Philosophical Studies 144(2): 297–311.
Giberman, Daniel. 2012a. “T-Gunk and Exact Occupation.” American Philosophical Quarterly 49(2): 165–174.
Giberman, Daniel. 2012b. “Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars).” Philosophical Studies 160(2): 305–321.
Giberman, Daniel. 2014a. “Tropes in Space.” Philosophical Studies 167(2): 453–472.
Giberman, Daniel. 2014b. “Passing Through: Why Intrinsic-to-a-Time Endurantism should Not Persist.” Analytic Philosophy 55(1): 89–101.
Giberman, Daniel. 2015a. “A Topological Theory of Fundamental Concrete Particulars.” Philosophical Studies 172(10): 2679–2704.
Giberman, Daniel. 2015b. “Is Mereology a Guide to Conceivability?” Mind 124(493): 121–146, doi:10.1093/mind/fzu142.
Giberman, Daniel. 2015c. “Junky Non-Worlds.” Erkenntnis 80(2): 437–443.
Giberman, Daniel. 2016a. “Moving Parts: A New Indexical Treatment of Context-Shifting Predication.” Synthese 193(1): 95–124.
Giberman, Daniel. 2016b. “Indiscernibility Does Not Distinguish Particularity.” Thought 5(4): 249–256.
Giberman, Daniel. 2019. “On Stage with Gunk.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(2): 228–238.