Gerd Gigerenzer (gigerenzer)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Gigerenzer, Gerd. 1998. “Psychological Challenges for Normative Models.” in Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems I: Quantified Representation of Uncertainty and Imprecision, edited by Philippe Smets, pp. 441–467. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2002. Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195153729.001.0001.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2006. “Bounded and Rational.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 115–133. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2007. Gut Feelings: Short Cuts to Better Decision Making. London: Penguin Books.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2008a. “Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics?” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 1–26. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2008b. “Reply to Comments [Sunstein (2008) and Driver and Loeb (2008)].” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 41–46. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2021. “What is Bounded Rationality?” in Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality, edited by Riccardo Viale, pp. 55–70. Routledge International Handbooks. London: Routledge.
Gigerenzer, Gerd and Seiten, Reinhard. 2001. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Gigerenzer, Gerd and Sturm, Thomas. 2012. “How (Far) Can Rationality Be Naturalized?” Synthese 187(1): 243–268.
Gigerenzer, Gerd and Todd, Peter M. 1999. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sturm, Thomas and Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2006. “How can we Use the Distinction Between Discovery and Justification? On the Weaknesses of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science.” in Revisiting Discovery and Justification. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction, edited by Jutta Schickore and Friedrich Steinle, pp. 133–158. Archimedes: New Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology n. 14. Dordrecht: Springer.

Further References

Driver, Julia and Loeb, Don. 2008. “Moral Heuristics and Consequentialism.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 31–40. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Sunstein, Cass R. 2008. “Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 27–30. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.