Alex Gregory (gregory-a)
Cited in the following articles
The Attitudinalist Challenge to Perceptualism about EmotionContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Gregory, Alex. 2013. “The Guise of Reasons.” American Philosophical Quarterly 50(1): 63–72.
Gregory, Alex. 2014. “A Very Good Reason to Reject the Buck-Passing Account.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92(2): 287–303.
Gregory, Alex. 2016a. “Normative Reasons as Good Bases.” Philosophical Studies 173(9): 2291–2310.
Gregory, Alex. 2016b. “Hedonism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, edited by Guy Fletcher, pp. 113–123. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Gregory, Alex. 2017a. “Might Desires Be Beliefs about Normative Reasons for Action?” in The Nature of Desire, edited by Federico Lauria and Julien Amos Deonna, pp. 201–218. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.001.0001.
Gregory, Alex. 2017b. “How Verbal Reports of Desire May Mislead.” Thought 6(4): 241–249.
Gregory, Alex. 2018. “Why do Desires Rationalize Actions?” Ergo 5(40): 1061–1081.
Gregory, Alex. 2021. Desire as Belief: A Study of Desire, Motivation, and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198848172.001.0001.