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Dorothy L. Grover (grover-d)

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Bibliography

    Grover, Dorothy L. 1972. Propositional Quantifiers.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 1(2): 111–136. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 2).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1973. Propositional Quantification and Quotation Contexts.” in Truth, Syntax and Modality. Proceedings of the Temple University Conference on Alternative Semantics, edited by Hugues Leblanc, pp. 101–110. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 68. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 10).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1976. Williams on Truth [review of Williams (1976)].” Philosophical Books 17(3): 97–101.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1977. Inheriters and Paradox.” The Journal of Philosophy 74: 590–604. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 4).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1979. Prosentences and Propositional Quantification.” Philosophical Studies 35: 289–297. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 5).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1981a. Truth.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 10(3–4): 225–252. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 6).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1981b. Truth: Do We Need It? Philosophical Studies 41: 69–103. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 7).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1983. Berry’s Paradox.” Analysis 43: 170–176. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 8).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1990a. On Two Deflationary Truth Theories.” in Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, edited by Michael J. Dunn and Anil Gupta, pp. 1–17. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 9).
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1990b. Truth and Language-World Connections.” The Journal of Philosophy 87(12): 671–687.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 1992. A Prosentential Theory of Truth. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, doi:10.1515/9781400862689.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 2001. The Prosentential Theory: Further Reflections on Locating Our Interest in Truth.” in The Nature of Truth. Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 505–526. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Lynch et al. (2021), doi:10.7551/mitpress/4884.001.0001.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 2002. On Locating Our Interest in Truth.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 120–132. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 2004. How Significant is the Liar? in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 177–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 2011. Language: Does It ‘Fit’ the World? [Comments on Millgram (2009)].” Analysis 71(2): 322–333.
    Grover, Dorothy L. 2012. On Describing the World.” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 238–262. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
    Grover, Dorothy L. and Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. 1973. Quantifying in and out of Quotes.” in Truth, Syntax and Modality. Proceedings of the Temple University Conference on Alternative Semantics, edited by Hugues Leblanc, pp. 17–47. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics n. 68. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 11).
    Grover, Dorothy L., Camp, Joseph L., Jr. and Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. 1975. A Prosentential Theory of Truth.” Philosophical Studies 27(1): 73–124. Reprinted as Grover (1992, ch. 3), doi:10.1007/bf01209340.

Further References

    Millgram, Elijah. 2009. Hard Truths. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1002/9781444310764.
    Williams, Christopher J. F. 1976. What is Truth? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.