Kein Profilbild | No profile picture | Utilisateur n'as pas d'image
https://philosophie.ch/profil/gustafsson-je

Johan E. Gustafsson (gustafsson-je)

Cité.e dans les articles suivants

Alternative Possibilities and the Meaning of 'Can'

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

No contributions yet

Bibliography

    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2010. A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences.” Dialectica 64(2): 251–257.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2011a. A Note in Defence of Ratificationism.” Erkenntnis 75(1): 147–150.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2011b. Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem.” Philosophia 39(2): 289–296.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2011c. An Extended Framework for Preference Relations.” Economics and Philosophy 27(2): 101–108.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2013a. Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations.” The Philosophical Quarterly 63(252): 476–491.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2013b. The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity.” The Journal of Philosophy 110(8): 460–464.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2014a. Combinative Consequentialism and the Problem of Act Versions.” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 585–596.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2014b. Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’ .” Noûs 48(3): 466–473.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2015. Sequential Dominance and the Anti-Aggregation Principle.” Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1593–1601.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2016. Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better.” Thought 5(2): 108–118.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2017. A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.” Analysis 77(4): 705–715, doi:10.1093/analys/anx103.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2018. Bentham’s Binary Form of Maximizing Utilitarianism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26(1): 87–109.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2019. Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable? Analysis 79(2): 193–202.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2020a. A Patch to the Possibility Part of Gödel’s Ontological Proof.” Analysis 80(2): 229–240.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2020b. Dennett and Taylor’s Alleged Refutation of the Consequence Argument.” Analysis 80(3): 426–433.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. 2020c. Permissibility Is the Only Feasible Deontic Primitive.” in Philosophical Perspectives 34: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 117–133. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12137.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. and Peterson, Martin. 2012. A Computer Simulation of the Argument from Disagreement.” Synthese 184(3): 387–405.
    Gustafsson, Johan E. and Torpman, Olle. 2014. In Defence of My Favourite Theory.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95: 159–174.