Valerie Gray Hardcastle (hardcastle-vg)
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Bibliography
Güzeldere, Güven, Flanagan, Owen, Jr. and Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2000. “The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons from Blindsight.” in The New Cognitive Neurosciences, 2nd ed., pp. 1277–1284. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. First edition: Gazzaniga (1995).
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1991. “Partitions, Probabilistic Causal Laws, and Simpson’s Paradox.” Synthese 86(2): 209–228.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1992. “Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences.” Philosophy of Science 59: 408–428.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1993. “The Naturalists versus the Skeptics: The Debate over a Scientific Understanding of Consciousness.” Journal of Mind and Behavior 14: 27–50.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1994a. “Indicator Semantics and Dretske’s Function.” Philosophical Psychology 7: 367–382.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1994b. “Psychology’s ‘Binding Problem’ and Possible Neurobiological Solutions.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 1: 66–90.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1994c. “Philosophy of Psychology Meets the Semantic View.” in PSA 1994: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by David L. Hull, Micky Forbes, and Richard M. Burian, pp. 24–34. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1995a. Locating Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1995b. “Computationalism.” Synthese 105: 303–317.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1995c. “A Critique of Information Processing Theories of Consciousness.” Minds and Machines 5: 89–107.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1996a. How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1996b. “Functionalism’s Response to the Problem of Absent Qualia.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 357–373.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1996c. “How We Get There from Here: Dissolution of the Binding Problem.” Journal of Mind and Behavior 17: 251–266.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1996d. “The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 3: 7–13. Reprinted in Shear (1997, 61–68).
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1996e. “Discovering the Moment of Consciousness? I: Bridging Techniques at Work, & II: An ERP Analysis of Priming Using Novel Visual Stimuli.” Philosophical Psychology 9: 149–196.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1996f. “Ways of Knowing.” Consciousness and Cognition 5: 359–367.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1997a. “[Explanation] is Explanation Better.” Philosophy of Science 64: 154–160.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1997b. “Consciousness and the Neurobiology of Perceptual Binding.” Seminars in Neurology 17: 163–170.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1997c. “When a Pain is Not.” The Journal of Philosophy 94: 381–409.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1998. “On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 1–25.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1999a. “Scientific Papers Have Various Structures.” Philosophy of Science 66(3): 415–439.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 1999b. “On Being Importantly Necessary for Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 8: 152–154.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2000b. “How to Understand the N in NCC.” in Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 259–264. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2001. “Consciousness: Chili of the Brain.” Consciousness and Cognition 10: 418–420.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2002. “On the Normativity of Functions.” in Functions. New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, edited by André Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman, pp. 144–156. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2004. “HOT Theories of Consciousness: More Sad Tales of Philosophical Intuitions Gone Astray.” in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. An Anthology, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 277–314. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 56. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2007. “The Theoretical and Methodological Fondations of Cognitive Neuroscience.” in Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, edited by Paul R. Thagard, pp. 295–312. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 12. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2008. “Neurobiology.” in The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology, edited by David L. Hull and Michael E. Ruse, pp. 275–290. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2009. “The Interface between Psychology and Neuroscience.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, pp. 164–179. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2011. “Quine’s Ontological Relativity.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 588–603. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2015. “Perception of Pain.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 530–541. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2016a. “ ‘The Horrid Doubt’: Naturalism and Evolutionary Biology.” in The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, edited by Kelly James Clark, pp. 109–123. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118657775.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2016b. “Pain, Chronic Pain, and Suffering.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, edited by Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon, and Harold Kincaid, pp. 124–133. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2017a. “Evolution and Mind: An Overview.” in The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and Philosophy, edited by Richard Joyce, pp. 227–236. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2017b. “A Brief and Potted Overview on the Philosophical Theories of Pain.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain, edited by Jennifer Corns, pp. 19–28. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2018a. “Lone Wolf Terrorists and the Impotence of Moral Enhancement.” in Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives, edited by Michael Hauskeller and Lewis Coyne, pp. 271–291. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray. 2018b. “Why Brain Images (Probably) should Not Be Used in US Criminal Trials.” in The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy, edited by David Boonin, pp. 25–38. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray and Flanagan, Owen, Jr. 1999. “Multiplex vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders.” The Monist 82(4): 645–657.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray and Raja, Vicente. 2018. “The Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” in The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 235–247. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray and Stewart, Matthew C. 2005. “Localization in the Brain and Other Illusions.” in Cognition and the Brain. The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, edited by Andrew Brook and Kathleen A. Akins, pp. 27–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray and Stewart, Matthew C. 2009. “fMRI: A Modern Cerebrascope? The Case of Pain.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, edited by John Bickle, pp. 179–199. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.001.0001.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray and Stewart, Rosalyn W. 2008. “Reduction and Embodied Cognition: Perspectives from Medicine and Psychiatry.” in Being Reduced. New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, edited by Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup, pp. 20–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001.
Further References
Shear, Jonathan, ed. 1997. Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.