Daniel Jacobson (jacobson-d)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2000a. “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(1): 65–90, doi:10.2307/2653403.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2000b. “Sentiment and Value.” Ethics 110(4): 722–748.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2003. “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism).” in Philosophy and the Emotions, edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, pp. 127–146. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/S1358246100007931.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2006. “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David Copp, pp. 186–218. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195147790.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2009. “Regret and Irrational Action.” in Reasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall, pp. 179–199. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2010. “Demystifyng Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, edited by Peter Goldie, pp. 585–615. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2014. “Wrong Kinds of Reason and the Opacity of Normative Force.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IX, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 215–244. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel, eds. 2015. Moral Psychology and Human Agency. Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.001.0001.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2017. “Whither Sentimentalism? On Fear, the Fearsome, and the Dangerous.” in Ethical Sentimentalism. New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber, pp. 250–267. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316105672.
D’Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel. 2023. Rational Sentimentalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256402.001.0001.
Jacobson, Daniel. 1997. “In Praise of Immoral Art.” Philosophical Topics 25(1): 155–199.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2002. “An Unsolved Problem for Slote’s Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.” Philosophical Studies 111(1): 53–67.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2003. “J.S. Mill and the Diversity of Utilitarianism.” Philosophers' imprint 3(2).
Jacobson, Daniel. 2005. “Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8: 387–409.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2006. “Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation.” in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, edited by Matthew Kieran, pp. 342–355. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 5. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2008a. “Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill.” The Philosophical Review 117(2): 159–191.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2008b. “Does Social Intuitionism Flatter Morality or Challenge It?” in Moral Psychology, Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 219–232. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7573.001.0001.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2011. “Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2012. “Moral Dumbfounding and Moral Stupefaction.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume II, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 289–316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.001.0001.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2013. “Regret, Agency, and Error.” in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, volume I, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 95–125. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199694853.001.0001.
Jacobson, Daniel. 2016. “Mill on Freedom of Speech.” in A Companion to Mill, edited by Christopher Macleod and Dale E. Miller, pp. 440–453. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118736739.
Jacobson, Daniel and D’Arms, Justin. 2006. “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 99–126. Oxford: Oxford University Press.