Aaron James (james-a)
Cited in the following articles
Neopragmatist Inferentialism and Derogatory TermsContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
James, Aaron. 2007. “Constructivism about Practical Reasons.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(2): 302–325.
James, Aaron. 2011. “The Significance of Distribution.” in Reasons and Recognition. Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, edited by Richard Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, pp. 276–305. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001.
James, Aaron. 2012a. Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199846153.001.0001.
James, Aaron. 2012b. Assholes. A Theory. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co.
James, Aaron. 2013a. “Contractualism and Political Liberalism.” in The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy, edited by Gerald F. Gaus and Fred B. D’Agostino, pp. 317–328. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
James, Aaron. 2013b. “Political Constructivism.” in A Companion to Rawls, edited by Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy, pp. 251–264. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328460.
James, Aaron. 2014. “Reply to Critics [Reply to Beitz (2014), Julius (2014), Barry (2014), Olson (2014)].” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2): 286–304.
James, Aaron. 2017. “Investor Rights as Nonsense – on Stilts.” in Just Financial Markets? Finance in a Just Society, edited by Lisa Herzog, pp. 205–230. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Further References
Barry, Christian. 2014. “The Regulation of Harm in International Trade: A Critique of James’s Collective Due Care Principle [on James (2012a)].” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2): 255–263.
Beitz, Charles R. 2014. “Internal and External.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2): 225–238.
Julius, A. J. 2014. “Practice Independence.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2): 239–254.
Olson, Kristi A. 2014. “Autarky as a Moral Baseline.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(2): 264–285.