Daniel Kahneman (kahneman)
My contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Kahneman, Daniel, Beyth-Marom, R. and Lanir, Z. 1984. “Probabilistic Forecasting as
Decision-AID.” Working Paper, The
Hebrew University.
Kahneman, Daniel and Fredrick, Shane. 2005. “A Model of Heuristic Judgment.” in
The Cambridge Handbook to Thinking and
Reasoning, edited by Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison, pp. 267–294. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kahneman, Daniel and Lovallo, D. 1993. “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective
on Risk Taking.” Management Science 39: 17–31.
Kahneman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul and Tversky, Amos, eds. 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. 1979a. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk.” Econometrica 47: 263–291. Reprinted
in Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1988,
183–214).
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. 1979b. “On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply
to Jonathan Cohen.” Cognition 7: 409–411.
Kunreuther, Howard G., Novemsky, Nathan and Kahneman, Daniel. 2000. Making Low
Probabilities Useful. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Risk
Management; Decision Processes Center, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1977. “Causal Thinking in Judgment under
Uncertainty.” in Logic,
Foundations of Mathematics, and Computability Theory. Part One of the
Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology
and Philosophy of Science, London, Ontario, Canada, 1975,
edited by Robert E. Butts and Jaakko
Hintikka, pp. 167–191. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of
Science n. 9. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1986. “The Framing of Decisions and the Evaluation of
Prospects.” in Logic,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science VII: Proceedings of the Seventh
International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,
Salzburg, 1983, edited by Ruth Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dorn, and Paul Weingartner, pp. 503–520. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of
Mathematics n. 114. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel. 1990. “Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions.” in The Limits of
Rationality, edited by Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, pp. 60–89. Chicago, Illinois: The
University of Chicago Press.
Further References
Gärdenfors, Peter and Sahlin, Nils-Eric, eds. 1988.
Decision, Probability, Utility: Selected Readings.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.