Rosanna Keefe (keefe-r)
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Bibliography
Keefe, Rosanna. 1995. “Contingent Identity and Vague Identity.” Analysis 55: 183–190.
Keefe, Rosanna. 1998. “Vagueness by Numbers.” Mind 107: 565–579.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2000a. Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2000b. “Supervaluationism and Validity.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 93–106.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2002a. “Review of Parsons (2000).” Mind 111: 466–470.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2002b. “When does Circularity Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102: 275–292.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2003a. “Context, Vagueness, and the Sorites.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 73–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2003b. “Unsolved Problems with Numbers: Reply to Smith.” Mind 112(446): 291–293.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2007. “Vagueness without Context Change.” Mind 116(462): 275–292.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2008. “Vagueness: Supervaluationism.” Philosophy Compass 3(2): 315–324.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2010a. “Supervaluationsm, Indirect Speech Reports, and Demonstratives.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 360–372. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2010b. “Teaching & Learning Guide for: Vagueness: Supervaluationism.” Philosophy Compass 5(2): 213–215.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2010c. “Relative Validity and Vagueness.” in The Force of Argument. Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley, edited by Jonathan Lear and Alex Oliver, pp. 127–143. London: Routledge.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2011. “Phenomenal Sorites and Looking the Same.” Dialectica 65(3): 327–344.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2012. “Modelling Vagueness: What Can We Ignore?” Philosophical Studies 161(3): 453–470.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2014. “What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be.” Synthese 191(7): 1375–1390.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2015. “Modelling Higher-Order Vagueness: Columns, Borderlines and Boundaries.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 89: 89–108.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2017. “Degrees of Belief, Expected and Actual.” Synthese 194(10): 3789–3800.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2021. “Prefaces, Sorites, and Guides to Reasoning.” in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability. Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, edited by Lee Walters and John Hawthorne, pp. 212–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198712732.001.0001.
Keefe, Rosanna and Leech, Jessica F. 2018. “Essentialism and Logical Consequence.” in Being Necessary. Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale, edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica F. Leech, pp. 60–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198792161.001.0001.
Keefe, Rosanna and Smith, Peter, eds. 1996. Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7064.001.0001.
Further References
Parsons, Terence D. 2000. Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250449.001.0001.