Max Kölbel (koelbel)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Byrne, Darragh and Kölbel, Max, eds. 2009. Arguing About Language. London: Routledge.
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Kölbel, Max, eds. 2008. Relative Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001.
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Kölbel, Max, eds. 2012. The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Second edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2014).
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Kölbel, Max, eds. 2014. The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic. First edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2012).
Kölbel, Max. 1997a. “Expressivism and the Syntactic Uniformity of Declarative Sentences.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 29(87): 3–51.
Kölbel, Max. 1997b. “Expressivism and the Geach Objection.” in Analyomen 2. Volume II: Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, edited by Georg Meggle, pp. 164–170. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 17. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Kölbel, Max. 1998. “Lewis, Language, Lust and Lies.” Inquiry 41(3): 301–315.
Kölbel, Max. 1999. “Saving Relativism from Its Saviour.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 31(91): 91–103.
Kölbel, Max. 2000a. “A Criterion of Objectivity.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 15(2): 209–228.
Kölbel, Max. 2000b. “Edgington on Compounds of Conditionals.” Mind 109.
Kölbel, Max. 2001. “Two Dogmas of Davidsonian Semantics.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(12): 613–625.
Kölbel, Max. 2002. Truth without Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kölbel, Max. 2004a. “Indexical Relativism vs Genuine Relativism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12(3): 297–313. Reprinted in Baghramian (2014, 32–48).
Kölbel, Max. 2004b. “Sainsbury’s Programme [on Sainsbury (2002)].” Philosophical Books 45(3): 187–196.
Kölbel, Max. 2004c. “Faultless Disagreement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 53–73.
Kölbel, Max. 2007a. “How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15(2): 281–288. Reprinted in Baghramian (2014, 60–67).
Kölbel, Max. 2007b. “Review of Baghramian (2004).” Philosophical Books 48(4): 368–371.
Kölbel, Max. 2008a. “Introduction: Motivations for Relativism.” in Relative Truth, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 1–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001.
Kölbel, Max. 2008b. “ ‘True’ as Ambiguous.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(2): 359–384.
Kölbel, Max. 2009. “The Evidence for Relativism.” Synthese 166(2): 375–395.
Kölbel, Max. 2010a. “Vagueness as Semantic.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 304–326. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Kölbel, Max. 2010b. “Literal Force: A Defence of Conventional Assertion.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Language, edited by Sarah Sawyer, pp. 108–137. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kölbel, Max. 2011a. “Global Relativism and Self-Refutation.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 11–30. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
Kölbel, Max. 2011b. “Conversational Score, Assertion, and Testimony.” in Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Herman Cappelen, pp. 49–78. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.001.0001.
Kölbel, Max. 2012a. “New Directions in the Philosophy of Language.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 251–265. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Second edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2014).
Kölbel, Max. 2012b. “Should we be Pluralists about Truth?” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 278–297. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
Kölbel, Max. 2013. “The Conversational Role of Centered Contents.” Inquiry 56(2–3): 97–121.
Kölbel, Max. 2014. “Agreement and Communication.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 1): 101–120.
Kölbel, Max. 2015a. “Relativism 1: Representational Content.” Philosophy Compass 10(1): 38–51.
Kölbel, Max. 2015b. “Relativism 2: Semantic Content.” Philosophy Compass 10(1): 52–67.
Kölbel, Max. 2018. “Perspectival Representation and Fallacies in Metaethics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48(3–4): 379–404.
Kölbel, Max. 2020. “Relativism and Perspectival Content.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 496–506. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
Kölbel, Max and Weiss, Bernhard, eds. 2004. Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance. London: Routledge.

Further References

Baghramian, Maria. 2004. Relativism. London: Routledge.
Baghramian, Maria, ed. 2014. The Many Faces of Relativism. London: Routledge.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark, ed. 2002. Departing from Frege. Essays in the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge.