Daniel Z. Korman (korman)
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Bibliography
Bengson, John, Grube, Enrico and Korman, Daniel Z. 2011. “A New Framework for Conceptualism.”
Noûs 45(1): 167–189.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2005. “Law Necessitarianism and the Importance of Being
Intuitive.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(221).
Korman, Daniel Z. 2007. “The Naive Conception of Material Objects: A
Defense.” PhD dissertation, Austin, Texas: Philosophy
Department, University of Texas.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2008. “Unrestricted Composition and Restricted
Quantification.” Philosophical Studies 140(3):
319–334.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2009. “Eliminativism and the Challenge from Folk
Belief.” Noûs 43(2): 242–264.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2010a. “The Contingent A Priori and the Publicity of a Priori
Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 149(3):
387–393.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2010b. “Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds, and the Charge of
Arbitrariness.” in Oxford Studies
in Metaphysics, volume V, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 119–144. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2010c. “The Argument from Vagueness.”
Philosophy Compass 5(10): 891–901.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2011.
“Ordinary Objects.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/ordinary-objects/.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2014a. “The Vagueness Argument against Abstract
Artifacts.” Philosophical Studies 167(1): 57–71.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2014b. “Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary
Objects.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14(13).
Korman, Daniel Z. 2015a. Objects. Nothing out of the Ordinary. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.001.0001.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2015b. “Fundamental Quantification and the Language of the
Ontology Room.” Noûs 49(2): 298–321.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2016.
“Ordinary Objects.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/ordinary-objects/.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2020a. “The Metaphysics of Establishments.”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98(3): 334–348.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2020b. “Summary of Korman (2015a).”
Analysis 80(3): 511–513.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2020c. “Conservatism, Counterexamples and Debunking [on Korman
(2015a)].” Analysis 80(3): 558–574.
Korman, Daniel Z. 2020d.
“Ordinary Objects.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/ordinary-objects/.
Korman, Daniel Z. and Carmichael, Chad. 2016.
“Composition.” Oxford Philosophy Handbooks
Online, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.9.
Korman, Daniel Z. and Carmichael, Chad. 2017. “What do the Folk Think about Composition, and Does it
Matter?” in Experimental
Metaphysics, edited by David Rose, pp. 187–206. Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London:
Bloomsbury Academic.
Korman, Daniel Z. and Locke, Dustin. 2020a. “Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking
Arguments.” in Oxford Studies in
Metaethics, volume XV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 309–331. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198859512.001.0001.
Korman, Daniel Z. and Locke, Dustin. 2020b. “Evolutionary Debunking and Moral
Relativism.” in The Routledge
Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch, pp. 190–199. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London:
Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351052306.
Korman, Daniel Z. and Locke, Dustin. 2023. “Modal Security and Evolutionary Debunking.”
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47: Genealogy
of Belief: You Just Believe That Because …, edited by Peter
A. French, Howard K. Wettstein, and Yuval Avnur, pp. 135–156. Malden, Massachusetts:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.5840/msp202311243.