Tim Kraft (kraft-t)
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Bibliography
Kraft, Tim. 2011. “Warum Wissen nicht der allgemeinste faktive mentale Zustand ist.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 83: 33–65.
Kraft, Tim. 2013. “Sceptical Scenarios Are Not Error-Possibilities.” Erkenntnis 78(1): 59–72.
Kraft, Tim. 2014. “Transmission Arguments against Knowledge Closure are Still Fallacious.” Synthese 191(12): 2617–2632.
Kraft, Tim. 2017. “A New Argument for Distinguishing Rejection and Denial.” Logique et Analyse 60(239): 285–299.
Kraft, Tim and Wiegmann, Alexander. 2018. “Folk Epistemology and Epistemic Closure.” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume II, edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, pp. 71–103. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001.