Philip Kremer (kremer-p)

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Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Kremer, Philip. 1989. “Relevant Predication: Grammatical Characterizations.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 18(4): 349–382.
Kremer, Philip. 1993a. “Quantifying Over Propositions in Relevance Logic: Nonaxiomatizability of Primary Interpretations of \(\forall P\) and \(\exists P\).” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 58(1): 334–349.
Kremer, Philip. 1993b. “The Gupta-Belnap Systems \(S''\) and \(S*\) are Not Axiomatizable.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34(4): 583–596.
Kremer, Philip. 1997a. “Dunn’s Relevant Predication, Real Properties, and Identity.” Erkenntnis 47(1): 37–65.
Kremer, Philip. 1997b. “Propositional Quantification in the Topological Semantics for S4.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38(2): 295–312.
Kremer, Philip. 1997c. “On the Complexity of Propositional Quantification in Intuitionistic Logic.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 62(2): 529–544.
Kremer, Philip. 1997d. “Defining Relevant Implication in Propositionally Quantified S4.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 62(4): 1057–1069.
Kremer, Philip. 1998a. “Relevant Identity: A Technical Result.” Unpublished manuscript, Yale University.
Kremer, Philip. 1998b. “Dynamic Topological Logic.” Unpublished manuscript, Yale University.
Kremer, Philip. 1999. “Relevant Identity.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 28(2): 190–222.
Kremer, Philip. 2000. “On the ‘Semantics’ for Languages with their own Truth Predicates.” in Circularity, Definition, and Truth, edited by André Chapuis and Anil Gupta, pp. 217–246. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
Kremer, Philip. 2006. “The Revision Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/truth-revision/.
Kremer, Philip. 2009. “Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 38(4): 363–403.
Kremer, Philip. 2010. “How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 39(4): 344–367.
Kremer, Philip. 2014a. “Quantified Modal Logic on the Rational Line.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 7(3): 439–454.
Kremer, Philip. 2014b. “Indeterminacy of Fair Infinite Lotteries.” Synthese 191(8): 1757–1760.
Kremer, Philip. 2015. “The Revision Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/truth-revision/.
Kremer, Philip and Kremer, Michael. 2003. “Some Supervaluation-Based Consequence Relations.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 32(3): 225–224.
Kremer, Philip and Rivello, Edoardo. 2023. “The Revision Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/truth-revision/.
Kremer, Philip and Urquhart, Alasdair. 2008. “Supervaluation Fixed-Point Logics of Truth.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 37(5): 407–440.
Lance, Mark Norris and Kremer, Philip. 1994. “The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment I: Four Systems of Non-Relevant Commitment Entailment.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 23(4): 369–400.
Lance, Mark Norris and Kremer, Philip. 1996. “The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment II: Systems of Relevant Commitment Entailment.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(4): 425–449.