Noah M. Lemos (lemos-nm)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Lemos, Noah M. 1987. “Review of Robins (1984).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47(4): 685–688, doi:10.2307/2107242.
Lemos, Noah M. 1994. Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lemos, Noah M. 1997. “Chisholm, the A Priori, and Epistemic Principles.” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 609–628. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 25. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Lemos, Noah M. 1998a. “Organic Unities.” The Journal of Ethics 2(4): 321–337.
Lemos, Noah M. 1998b. “Common Sense and a Priori Epistemology.” The Monist 81(3): 473–487.
Lemos, Noah M. 2001. “Commonsensism in Ethics and Epistemology.” in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, edited by Matthias Steup, pp. 204–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195128923.001.0001.
Lemos, Noah M. 2002. “Epistemology and Ethics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul K. Moser, pp. 479–512. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
Lemos, Noah M. 2003. “Review of Zimmerman (2001).” Mind 112(447): 587–590.
Lemos, Noah M. 2004a. Common Sense. A Contemporary Defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lemos, Noah M. 2004b. “Epistemic Circularity Again.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 254–270. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lemos, Noah M. 2007a. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lemos, Noah M. 2007b. “Hedonism and the Good Life [on Feldman (2004)].” Philosophical Studies 136(3): 417–423.
Lemos, Noah M. 2008. “Moore and Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 330–347. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
Lemos, Noah M. 2009. “Sosa on Epistemic Circularity and Reflective Knowledge [on Sosa (2009)].” Metaphilosophy 40(2): 187–194.
Lemos, Noah M. 2010a. “Summation, Variety, and Indeterminate Value.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13(1): 33–44.
Lemos, Noah M. 2010b. “The Common Sense Tradition.” in A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, 2nd ed., pp. 53–61. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444315080.
Lemos, Noah M. 2011. “Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane’s Theory of Free Will.” Dialectica 65(1): 31–48.
Lemos, Noah M. 2013. “Objective Value and Requirements.” in Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, edited by John Turri, pp. 21–32. Philosophical Studies Series n. 118. Dordrecht: Springer.
Lemos, Noah M. 2016. “Love, Beneficence, and the Hedonic Constraint.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(3): 259–267.
Lemos, Noah M. 2019a. “Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil.” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume IX, edited by Lara Buchak, Dean W. Zimmerman, and Philip Swenson, pp. 165–182. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845492.001.0001.
Lemos, Noah M. 2019b. “Foundationalism and Coherentism in Moral Epistemology.” in The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, edited by Aaron Z. Zimmerman, Karen Jones, and Mark Timmons, pp. 375–386. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Feldman, Fred. 2004. Pleasure and the Good Life. Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019926516X.001.0001.
Robins, Michael H. 1984. Promising, Intending and Moral Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217250.001.0001.
Zimmerman, Michael J. 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.