Dan López de Sa (lopezdesa)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Horden, John and López de Sa, Dan. 2021. “Groups as Pluralities.” Synthese 198(11): 10237–10271, doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02715-y.
López de Sa, Dan. 2000. “Non-Objective Truths.” Theoria 66: 229–234.
López de Sa, Dan. 2001. “Theoretical Identifications and Rigidity for Predicates.” in Actas del congreso Teorı́as Formales y Teorı́as Empı́ricas: Aspectos Fundacionales, Onto-semánticos y Pragmáticos, edited by José Miguel Sagüillo, José L. Falguera, and Concha Martı́nez-Vidal, pp. 611–621. Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela.
López de Sa, Dan. 2003. “Response-Dependencies: Colors and Values.” Tesis Doctoral, Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofı́a de la Ciencia.
López de Sa, Dan. 2006a. “Is ‘Everything’ Precise?” Dialectica 60(4): 397–409.
López de Sa, Dan. 2006b. “Flexible Property Designators.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 73: 221–230.
López de Sa, Dan. 2007a. “The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15(2): 269–279. Reprinted in Baghramian (2014, 49–59).
López de Sa, Dan. 2007b. “Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 117–123.
López de Sa, Dan. 2007c. “The Chief Supreme Court Justice: A Metaphysical Puzzle?” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 39(115): 61–68.
López de Sa, Dan. 2008a. “Presuppositions of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement.” in Relative Truth, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 297–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.001.0001.
López de Sa, Dan. 2008b. “Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem.” Philosophers' imprint 8(1).
López de Sa, Dan. 2009a. “Disjunctions, Conjunctions, and their Truthmakers.” Mind 118(470): 417–425, doi:10.1093/mind/fzp063.
López de Sa, Dan. 2009b. “Can One Get Bivalence from (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(2): 273–282.
López de Sa, Dan. 2010a. “How to Respond to Borderline Cases.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 327–339. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
López de Sa, Dan. 2010b. “The Makings of Truth: Realism, Response-Dependence, and Relativism.” in New Waves in Truth, edited by Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen and Cory D. Wright, pp. 191–204. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
López de Sa, Dan. 2011. “The Many Relativisms: Index, Context, and Beyond.” in A Companion to Relativism, edited by Steven D. Hales, pp. 102–117. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444392494.
López de Sa, Dan. 2012. “What does it take to Enter into the Circumstance?” Philosophical Studies 159(1): 147–153.
López de Sa, Dan. 2013a. “Vagueness as Semantic Indecision: Metaphysical Vagueness vs Indeterminate Reference.” Metaphysica 14(2): 197–209.
López de Sa, Dan. 2013b. “Rigid vs Flexible Response-Dependent Properties.” in Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Supervenience, and Response-Dependence, edited by Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder, and Alexander Steinberg, pp. 393–418. Basic Philosophical Concepts. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzhj9.
López de Sa, Dan. 2014a. “Audience in Context.” Erkenntnis 79(1): 241–253.
López de Sa, Dan. 2014b. “Lewis vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many.” Synthese 191(6): 1105–1117.
López de Sa, Dan. 2014c. “What Could Vague Objects Possibly Be?” in Vague Objects and Vague Identity. New Essays on Ontic Vagueness, edited by Ken Akiba and Ali Abasnezhad, pp. 257–273. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science n. 33. Cham: Springer.
López de Sa, Dan. 2015. “Expressing Disagreement: A Presuppositional Indexical Contextualist Relativist Account.” Erkenntnis 80(suppl., 1): 153–165.
López de Sa, Dan. 2017. “Making Beautiful Truths.” in Semantics of Aesthetic Judgements, edited by James O. Young, pp. 38–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714590.001.0001.
López de Sa, Dan and Zardini, Elia. 2006. “Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker?” Analysis 66(2): 154–157.
López de Sa, Dan and Zardini, Elia. 2007. “Truthmakers, Knowledge and Paradox.” Analysis 67(3): 242–250.
López de Sa, Dan and Zardini, Elia. 2011. “No-No. Paradox and Consistency.” Analysis 71(3): 472–478.

Further References

Baghramian, Maria, ed. 2014. The Many Faces of Relativism. London: Routledge.