Mark McCullagh (mccullagh-m)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

McCullagh, Mark. 2000. “Functionalism and Self-Consciousness.” Mind and Language 15(5): 481–499, doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00146.
McCullagh, Mark. 2002. “Self-Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(2): 365–380.
McCullagh, Mark. 2003. “Do Inferential Roles Compose?” Dialectica 57(4): 431–438.
McCullagh, Mark. 2005. “Inferentialism and Singular Reference.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(2).
McCullagh, Mark. 2007. “Understanding Mixed Quotation.” Mind 116(464): 927–946.
McCullagh, Mark. 2011a. “How to Use a Concept You Reject.” The Philosophical Quarterly 61(243): 293–319.
McCullagh, Mark. 2011b. “Critical Notice of Cappelen and LePore (2007).” Analytic Philosophy 52(4): 349–367.
McCullagh, Mark. 2018. “Kinds of Monsters and Kinds of Compositionality.” Analysis 78(4): 657–666.
Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani and McCullagh, Mark, eds. 2019. Williamson on Modality. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315184074.

Further References

Cappelen, Herman and LePore, Ernest. 2007. Language Turned on Itself. The Semantics and Pragmatics of Metalinguistic Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231195.001.0001.