Sarah McGrath (mcgrath-s)

Cité.e dans les articles suivants

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Kelly, Thomas and McGrath, Sarah. 2010. “Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 325–359. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00195.x.
Kelly, Thomas and McGrath, Sarah. 2017. “Are there Any Successful Philosophical Arguments?” in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John Adorno Keller, pp. 324–341. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah. 2003. “Causation and the Making/Allowing Distinction.” Philosophical Studies 114(1–2): 81–106.
McGrath, Sarah. 2004. “Moral Knowledge by Perception.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 209–228. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McGrath, Sarah. 2005a. “Autonomy and Choice.” Unpublished manuscript of a talk at the MITing of Minds 2005, January 20-21, 2005, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
McGrath, Sarah. 2005b. “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma.” Philosophical Studies 123(1–2): 125–148.
McGrath, Sarah. 2008. “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume III, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 87–108. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199542062.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah. 2009. “The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 321–344. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
McGrath, Sarah. 2010. “Moral Realism without Convergence.” Philosophical Topics 38(2): 59–90.
McGrath, Sarah. 2011a. “Normative Ethics, Conversion, and Pictures as Tools of Moral Persuasion.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume I, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 268–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah. 2011b. “Moral Knowledge and Experience.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 107–127. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah. 2014. “Relax! Don’t Do It! Why Moral Realism Won’t Come Cheap.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IX, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 186–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah. 2018. “What is Weird about Moral Deference?” in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, edited by Gideon Rosen, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 2nd ed., pp. 914–919. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
McGrath, Sarah. 2019a. Moral Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805410.001.0001.
McGrath, Sarah. 2019b. “Philosophical Methodology and Levels of Generality.” in Philosophical Perspectives 33: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne and Jason Turner, pp. 105–125. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12127.
McGrath, Sarah and Kelly, Thomas. 2015. “Soames and Moore on Method in Ethics and Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 172(6): 1661–1670.