Timothy McGrew (mcgrew-t)
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Bibliography
McGrew, Timothy. 1992.
“Unraveling Innate Ideas.” History of
Philosophy Quarterly 9(3): 307–317.
McGrew, Timothy. 1994. “Scientific Progress, Relativism and
Self-Refutation.” The Electronic Journal of Analytic
Philosophy 2.
McGrew, Timothy. 2001. “Direct Inference and the Problem of
Induction.” The Monist 84(2): 153–178.
McGrew, Timothy. 2002. “Review of Swinburne (2001).”
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9(10).
McGrew, Timothy. 2010.
“Miracles.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/miracles/.
McGrew, Timothy. 2011.
“Evidence.” in The
Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 58–67. Routledge
Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
McGrew, Timothy. 2014. “The Argument from Silence.” Acta
Analytica 29(2): 215–228.
McGrew, Timothy. 2017a. “The Spirit of Cromwell’s Rules.” in
Best Explanations. New Essays on Inference to
the Best Explanation, edited by Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, pp. 242–247. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746904.001.0001.
McGrew, Timothy. 2017b. “Thinking about Reported Miracles.” in
A Companion to Applied Philosophy,
edited by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen,
Kimberley Brownlee, and David Coady, pp. 555–566. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118869109.
McGrew, Timothy. 2019.
“Miracles.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/miracles/.
McGrew, Timothy and Larmer, Robert. 2024.
“Miracles.” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California:
The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language;
Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/miracles/.
McGrew, Timothy and McGrew, Lydia. 2000. “What’s Wrong with Epistemic Circularity.”
Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical
Review 39: 219–219.
McGrew, Timothy and McGrew, Lydia. 2007. Internalism and Epistemology. The Architecture of
Reason. Routledge Studies in
Contemporary Philosophy n. 3. London: Routledge.
McGrew, Timothy and McGrew, Lydia. 2009. “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the
Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology,
edited by William Lane Craig and James
Porter Moreland, pp. 593–662.
Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell,
doi:10.1002/9781444308334.
McGrew, Timothy, McGrew, Lydia and Vestrup, Eric. 2003. “Probability and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Skeptical
View.” in God and Design: The
Teleological Argument and Modern Science, edited by Neil A.
Manson, pp. 200–208. London: Routledge.
McGrew, Timothy, Shier, David and Silverstein, Harry S. 1997. “The
Two-Envelope Paradox Resolved.” Analysis 57(1):
28–33.
Further References
Swinburne, Richard. 2001.
Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/0199243794.001.0001.