Thomas J. McKay (mckay-tj)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

McKay, Thomas J. 1975. “Essentialism in Quantified Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 4(4): 423–438.
McKay, Thomas J. 1978. “The Principle of Predication.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 7(1): 19–26.
McKay, Thomas J. 1981. “On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions.” Philosophical Studies 39: 287–303.
McKay, Thomas J. 1986a. “Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 295–304. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
McKay, Thomas J. 1986b. “His Burning Pants.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27: 393–400.
McKay, Thomas J. 1986c. “Lowe and Baldwin on Modalities.” Mind 95: 499–505.
McKay, Thomas J. 1988. “De Re and De Se Belief.” in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example, edited by David F. Austin, pp. 207–218. Philosophical Studies Series n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
McKay, Thomas J. 1994a. “Names, Causal Chains, and De Re Beliefs.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 293–302. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McKay, Thomas J. 1994b. “Plural Reference and Unbound Pronouns.” in Logic, and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala, edited by Dag Prawitz and Dag Westerståhl, pp. 559–582. Synthese Library n. 236. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McKay, Thomas J. 2000. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2000/entries/prop-attitude-reports/.
McKay, Thomas J. 2006. Plural Predication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.001.0001.
McKay, Thomas J. 2008. “Critical Study of Laycock (2006).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38(2): 301–324.
McKay, Thomas J. 2015. “Stuff and Coincidence.” Philosophical Studies 172(10): 2799–2822, doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0458-5.
McKay, Thomas J. 2016. “Mass and Plural.” in Unity and Plurality. Logic, Philosophy and Linguistics, edited by Massimiliano Carrara, Alexandra Arapinis, and Friederike Moltmann, pp. 171–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716327.001.0001.
McKay, Thomas J. and van Inwagen, Peter. 1977. “Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents.” Philosophical Studies 31(5): 353–356.
McKay, Thomas J. and Johnson, David. 1996. “A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.” Philosophical Topics 24(2): 113–122, doi:10.5840/philtopics199624219.
McKay, Thomas J. and Nelson, Michael. 2005. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/prop-attitude-reports/.
McKay, Thomas J. and Nelson, Michael. 2010. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/prop-attitude-reports/.
McKay, Thomas J. and Stern, Charles. 1979. “Natural Kind Terms and Standards of Membership.” Linguistics and Philosophy 3(1): 27–34.

Further References

Laycock, Henry. 2006. Words Without Objects. Semantics, Ontology and Logic for Non-Singularity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199281718.001.0001.