Andrew Melnyk (melnyk)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Melnyk, Andrew. 1991. “Physicalism: From Supervenience to Elimination.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(3): 573–587.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1994a. “Being a Physicalist: How and (More Importantly) Why.” Philosophical Studies 74: 221–241.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1994b. “Inference to the Best Explanation and Other Minds.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71(4): 482–491.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1995. “Two Cheers for Reductionism, Or, the Dim Prospects for Nonreductive Materialism.” Philosophy of Science 62: 370–388.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1996a. “Formulating Physicalism: Two Suggestions.” Synthese 105: 381–407.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1996b. “Searle’s Abstract Argument against Strong AI.” Synthese 108(3): 391–419.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1996c. “Testament of a Recovering Eliminativist.” Philosophy of Science 63: S185–193.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1996d. “The Prospects for Dretske’s Account of the Explanatory Role of Belief.” Mind and Language 11: 203–215.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1997a. “How to Keep the ‘Physical’ in Physicalism.” The Journal of Philosophy 94: 622–637.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1997b. “On the Metaphysical Utility of Claims of Global Supervenience.” Philosophical Studies 87: 277–308.
Melnyk, Andrew. 1998. “The Prospects for Kirk’s Nonreductive Physicalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 323–332.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2001. “Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers’ Inconclusive Argument for Dualism.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 331–349. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2003a. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2003b. “Physicalism.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 65–84. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2003c. “Some Evidence for Physicalism.” in Physicalism and Mental Causation. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, edited by Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, pp. 155–172. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2006. “Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism.” Philosophical Studies 131(1): 127–155.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2007. “Functionalism and Psychological Reductionism: Friends, Not Foes.” in The Matter of Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction, edited by Maurice K. D. Schouten and Huib Looren de Jong, pp. 31–50. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2008. “Can Physicalism Be Non-Reductive?” Philosophy Compass 3(6): 1281–1296.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2009. “Realization Realized [on Shoemaker (2007)].” Philosophical Books 50(3): 185–195.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2010a. “Comments on Shoemaker (2007).” Philosophical Studies 148(1): 113–123.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2010b. “What do Philosophers Know?” Grazer Philosophische Studien 80: 297–307.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2013. “Can Metaphysics Be Naturalized? And If So, How?” in Scientific Metaphysics, edited by Don Ross, James Ladyman, and Harold Kincaid, pp. 79–95. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696499.001.0001.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2014. “Pereboom’s Robust Non-reductive Physicalism.” Erkenntnis 79(5): 1191–1207.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2016. “Grounding and the Formulation of Physicalism.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 249–270. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6.
Melnyk, Andrew. 2021. “Two-Dimensionalism and the Foundation of Linguistic Analysis.” in The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, edited by Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson, pp. 257–267. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Shoemaker, Sydney S. 2007. Physical Realization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214396.001.0001.