I work in philosophy of emotion, value, and mind, with a strong interest in Nietzsche and the Phenomenologists. 

As a member of the Dialectica Editorial Committee, I am reviewing papers mostly on philosophy of mind and emotion. I also have an interest in early Phenomenology and 19th century German philosophy.

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Bibliography

    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2017. The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.” Dialectica 71(1): 57–84, doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12171 .
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2019a. Emotional Experience and Propositional Content.” Dialectica 73(4): 535–561.
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2019b. Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.” The Philosophical Quarterly 69(277): 771–794, doi:10.1093/pq/pqz018.
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2020. Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(4): 505–523.
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2021a. Emotion as Feeling towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846013.001.0001.
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2021b. The Bodily-Attitudinal Theory of Emotion.” Philosophical Studies 178(8): 2635–2663, doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z.
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2022a. Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.” European Journal of Philosophy 30(1): 307–325, doi:10.1111/ejop.12648.
    Mitchell, Jonathan. 2022b. Affective Persistence and the Normative Phenomenology of Emotion.” in A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa, edited by Julien Amos Deonna, Christine Tappolet, and Fabrice Teroni. Genève: University of Geneva, https://www.unige.ch/cisa/related-sites/ronald-de-sousa/assets/pdf/Mitchell_Paper.pdf.