Jonathan Mitchell (mitchell-jo)

I work in philosophy of emotion, value, and mind, with a strong interest in Nietzsche and the Phenomenologists.

As a member of the Dialectica Editorial Committee, I am reviewing papers mostly on philosophy of mind and emotion. I also have an interest in early Phenomenology and 19th century German philosophy.

Cited in the following articles

Review of Lepine (2023), The Attitudinalist Challenge to Perceptualism about Emotion, In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

No contributions yet

Bibliography

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2017. “The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.” Dialectica 71(1): 57–84, doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12171 .

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2019a. “Emotional Experience and Propositional Content.” Dialectica 73(4): 535–561.

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2019b. “Pre-Emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.” The Philosophical Quarterly 69(277): 771–794, doi:10.1093/pq/pqz018.

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2020. “Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(4): 505–523.

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2021a. Emotion as Feeling towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846013.001.0001.

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2021b. “The Bodily-Attitudinal Theory of Emotion.” Philosophical Studies 178(8): 2635–2663, doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z.

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2022a. “Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.” European Journal of Philosophy 30(1): 307–325, doi:10.1111/ejop.12648.

Mitchell, Jonathan. 2022b. “Affective Persistence and the Normative Phenomenology of Emotion.” in A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa, edited by Julien Amos Deonna, Christine Tappolet, and Fabrice Teroni. Genève: University of Geneva, https://www.unige.ch/cisa/related-sites/ronald-de-sousa/assets/pdf/Mitchell_Paper.pdf.