Michelle Montague (montague-m)

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bayne, Tim[othy John] and Montague, Michelle, eds. 2011. Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579938.001.0001.
Grzankowski, Alex and Montague, Michelle, eds. 2018a. Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.
Grzankowski, Alex and Montague, Michelle. 2018b. “Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction.” in Non-Propositional Intentionality, edited by Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague, pp. 1–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.
Montague, Michelle. 2005. “Counterfactuals.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Montague, Michelle. 2007. “Against Propositionalism.” Noûs 41(3): 503–518.
Montague, Michelle. 2009a. “The Content of Perceptual Experience.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 494–511. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Montague, Michelle. 2009b. “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.” Philosophical Studies 145(2): 171–192.
Montague, Michelle. 2010. “Recent Work on Intentionality.” Analysis 70(4): 765–782.
Montague, Michelle. 2012a. “The Metaphysics & Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience: A Reply to Conduct (2012).” Consciousness and Cognition 21: 737–739.
Montague, Michelle. 2012b. “The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Experience.” in Consciousness and Subjectivity, edited by Sofia Miguens and Gerhard Preyer, pp. 73–88. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 47. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Montague, Michelle. 2013. “The Access Problem.” in Phenomenal Intentionality, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 27–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001.
Montague, Michelle. 2014. “Evaluative Phenomenology.” in Emotion & Value, edited by Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd, pp. 32–51. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686094.001.0001.
Montague, Michelle. 2015. “The Life of the Mind.” in Phenomenal Qualities. Sense, Perception, and Consciousness, edited by Paul Coates and Sam Coleman, pp. 322–346. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001.
Montague, Michelle. 2016. The Given. Experience and its Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198748908.001.0001.
Montague, Michelle. 2017a. “A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion.” The Monist 100(1): 64–87.
Montague, Michelle. 2017b. “Brentano on Emotion and the Will.” in The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, edited by Uriah Kriegel, pp. 110–123. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Montague, Michelle. 2017c. “What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?” Grazer Philosophische Studien 94(3): 359–380.

Further References

Conduct, Matthew D. 2012. “Naı̈ve Realism without Disjunctivism about Experience.” Consciousness and Cognition 21: 727–736.