Daniel Morgan (morgan-d)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Morgan, Daniel. 2007. “Review of De Gaynesford (2006).” Dialectica 61(4): 583–587.
Morgan, Daniel. 2009. “Can you think my ‘I’-Thoughts?” The Philosophical Quarterly 59(234): 68–95.
Morgan, Daniel. 2012. “Immunity to Error through Misidentification: What Does It Tell Us about the de se?” in Immunity to Error through Misidentification, edited by Simon Prosser and François Récanati, pp. 104–123. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morgan, Daniel. 2015. “The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought.” Philosophical Studies 172(7): 1795–1811.
Morgan, Daniel. 2019a. “Thinking about the Body as Subject.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49(4): 435–457.
Morgan, Daniel. 2019b. “Temporal Indexicals are Essential.” Analysis 79(3): 452–461.
Morgan, Daniel. 2024. “Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study.” Ergo 10(44): 1272–1294, doi:10.3998/ergo.5181.
Morgan, Daniel and Salje, Léa. 2020. “First-Person Thought.” Analysis 80(1): 148–163.

Further References

De Gaynesford, Maximilian. 2006. I: The Meaning of the First Person Term. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199287821.001.0001.