Michael Morreau (morreau)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Asher, Nicholas and Morreau, Michael. 1991. “Commonsense Entailment: a Modal Theory of Nonmonotonic Reasoning.” in IJCAI-91. Proceedings of the 12th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, edited by John Mylopoulos and Raymond Reiter, pp. 387–392. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence n. 814. San Francisco, California: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
Asher, Nicholas and Morreau, Michael. 1995. “What Some Generic Sentences Mean.” in The Generic Book, edited by Gregory N. Carlson and Francis Jeffry Pelletier, pp. 300–338. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
Fuhrmann, André and Morreau, Michael, eds. 1991. The Logic of Theory Change. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence n. 465. Berlin: Springer.
Gärdenfors, Peter, Lindström, Sten, Morreau, Michael and Rabinowicz, Włodzimierz [Wlodek]. 1991. “The Negative Ramsey Test: Another Triviality Result.” in The Logic of Theory Change, edited by André Fuhrmann and Michael Morreau, pp. 129–134. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence n. 465. Berlin: Springer.
Kyburg, Alice and Morreau, Michael. 1998. “Vague Utterances and Context Change.” Unpublished manuscript.
Kyburg, Alice and Morreau, Michael. 2000. “Fitting Words: Vague Language in Context.” Linguistics and Philosophy 23(6): 577–597.
Morreau, Michael. 1990. “Epistemic Semantics for Counterfactuals.” in Conditionals, Defaults, and Belief Revision, edited by Hans Kamp, pp. 1–27. Stuttgart: Institut für maschinelle Sprachverarbeitung, Universität Stuttgart.
Morreau, Michael. 1992a. “Planning from First Principles.” in Belief Revision, edited by Peter Gärdenfors, pp. 204–219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morreau, Michael. 1992b. “Epistemic Semantics for Counterfactuals.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 21(1): 33–62.
Morreau, Michael. 1992c. “Conditionals in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence.” PhD dissertation, Amsterdam: Philosophy Department, Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam.
Morreau, Michael. 1995. “Allowed Arguments.” in IJCAI-95. Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, edited by Christopher S. Mellish and C. Raymond Perrault, pp. 1466–1472. San Francisco, California: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
Morreau, Michael. 1996. “Prima Facie and Seeming Duties.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 57(1): 47–71.
Morreau, Michael. 1997a. “Fainthearted Conditionals.” The Journal of Philosophy 94(4): 187–211.
Morreau, Michael. 1997b. “Reasons to Think and Act.” in Defeasible Deontic Logic, edited by Donald L. Nute, pp. 139–158. Synthese Library n. 263. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Morreau, Michael. 1998. “Review of Levi (1996).” The Journal of Philosophy 95(10): 540–546.
Morreau, Michael. 1999a. “Other Things Being Equal.” Philosophical Studies 96(2): 163–182.
Morreau, Michael. 1999b. “Supervaluations Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps after All.” The Journal of Philosophy 96(3): 148–156.
Morreau, Michael. 2002. “What Vague Objects Are Like.” The Journal of Philosophy 99(7): 333–361.
Morreau, Michael. 2014a. “Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: From Social Choice to Theory Choice.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 6): 1253–1268.
Morreau, Michael. 2014b. “Arrow’s Theorem.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/arrows-theorem/.
Morreau, Michael. 2015. “Theory Choice and Social Choice: Kuhn Vindicated.” Mind 124(493): 239–262.
Morreau, Michael. 2019. “Arrow’s Theorem.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/arrows-theorem/.
Morreau, Michael and Kraus, Sarit. 1998. “Syntactical Treatments of Propositional Attitudes.” Artificial Intelligence 106(1): 161–177.

Further References

Levi, Isaac. 1996. For the Sake of Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.