Dilip Ninan (ninan)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Ninan, Dilip. 2009. “Persistence and the First-Person Perspective.” The Philosophical Review 118(4): 425–464.
Ninan, Dilip. 2010a. “Semantics and the Objects of Assertion.” Linguistics and Philosophy 33(5): 355–380.
Ninan, Dilip. 2010b. “De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication.” Philosophy Compass 5(7): 551–567.
Ninan, Dilip. 2012. “Propositions, Semantic Values, and Rigidity.” Philosophical Studies 158(3): 401–413.
Ninan, Dilip. 2015. “On Recanati’s Mental Files.” Inquiry 58(4): 368–377.
Ninan, Dilip. 2016a. “What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?” in About Oneself. De Se Thought and Communication, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Stephan Torre, pp. 86–120. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001.
Ninan, Dilip. 2016b. “Imagination and the Self.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, edited by Amy Kind, pp. 274–285. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Ninan, Dilip. 2016c. “Review of MacFarlane (2014).” The Philosophical Review 125(3): 439–447.
Ninan, Dilip. 2021. “De Se Attitudes and Action.” in The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, edited by Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson, pp. 482–498. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

MacFarlane, John. 2014. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682751.001.0001.