Donnchadh O'Conaill (oconaill-d)
Email:
doconaill(at)yahoo.co.uk
UniFR
I am currently working as a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, on the Swiss National Science Foundation-funded project The Subject of Experiences: The Significance of its Metaphysical Nature in the Philosophy of Mind. My research interests are mainly in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics and phenomenology.
Mentioned on the following portal pages
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Association Dialectica, Circular Paths and Infinite Descent: a Guide, Susan Stebbing on Well-Foundedness, A Recipe for Non-Wellfounded but Complete Chains of Explanations (and other Determination Relations), Determination Relations and Metaphysical Explanations, Grounding Ground and the (In-)Escapable Ill-Foundedness of the Inclusive `Explains', Articles of Dialectica, Dialectica: Editors and Boards, Philosophie in / à Fribourg, Dialectica 74(1), 2020, The Personalized A-Theory of Time and Perspective, Editorial, Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral Obligation, Consciousness, Revelation, and Confusion, Why Strevens' Counterexample to Lewis's 'Causation as Influence' is Effective, A Note on Accuracy-Dominance Vindications of Consistency, Review of Soames (2018), Review of Oppy (2018), Review of Antonelli (2018)Contributions to Philosophie.ch
Bibliography
Nida-Rümelin, Martine and O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2019. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine and O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2024. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2012. “McDowell, Phenomenology and the Awareness of the World.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(4): 499–518.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2013. “Truthmaker Monism.” Draft of April 2013.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2014. “Ontic Structural Realism and Concrete Objects.” The Philosophical Quarterly 64(255): 284–300.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2017. “Phenomenology, Objectivity, and the Explanatory Gap.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55(1): 32–50.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2018. “Grounding, Physicalism and Necessity.” Inquiry 61(7): 713–730.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2020. “In Defence of Facts: Grounding, Essential Properties and the Unity Problem.” Dialectica 74(1), doi:10.48106/dial.v74.i1.05.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh and Pearson, Francis Oliver Charles [Olley]. 2013. “Ontological Dependence and the Fundamental Level.” Draft of March 2013.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh and Pearson, Francis Oliver Charles [Olley]. 2023. “Infinite Regresses, Ground Conditions, and Metaphysical Satisfaction.” Dialectica 77(4). Special issue “Non-Wellfoundedness,” guest editors Steph Rennick and Stephan Leuenberger, doi:10.48106/dial.v77.i4.03.
O’Conaill, Donnchadh and Tahko, Tuomas E. 2016. “Minimal Truthmakers.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97(2): 228–244.