Martine Nida-Rümelin (nidaruemelin-m)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Horgan, Terence E. and Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2021. “On the Satisfaction Conditions of Agentive Phenomenology: A Dialogue.” in The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency, edited by Christopher Erhard and Tobias Keiling, pp. 264–299. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Mizrahi, Vivian and Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2006. “Introduction.” Dialectica 60(3): 209–222.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1990. “In Defense of Mentalism: A Critical Review of the Philosophy of Mind.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 37: 217–220.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1993a. Farben und phänomenales Wissen. Eine Materialismuskritik. Conceptus-Studien n. 9. Wien: Verlag der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1993b. “Colour Perception.” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati and Graham White, pp. 383–388. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Kirchberg am Wechsel: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1995. “What Mary Couldn’t Know: Belief about Phenomenal States.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 219–242. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. Reprinted in Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar (2004, 241–268).
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1996. “Pseudonormal Vision – An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?” Philosophical Studies 82: 145–157.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1997a. “Is the Naturalization of Qualitative Experience Possible or Sensible?” in Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, edited by Martin Carrier and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 117–144. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1997b. “The Character of Color Predicates: A Phenomenalist View.” in Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Proposition Attitudes, edited by Wolfgang Künne, Albert Newman, and Martin Anduschus, pp. 381–402. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1997c. “Chisholm on Personal Identity and the Attribution of Experiences.” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 565–585. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 25. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1997d. “Eine Supervienzienzthese für den Begriff personaler Identität.” in Analyomen 2. Volume II: Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, edited by Georg Meggle, pp. 396–404. Perspektiven der analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytic Philosophy n. 17. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1998a. “On Belief about Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 51–73.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1998b. “Zur Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von empirischen Beziehungen.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 52.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1999a. “Pseudonormal Vision and Color Qualia.” in Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, edited by Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and David J. Chalmers, pp. 75–84. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 1999b. “Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science: A Reply to Nida-Rümelin (1999a).” Consciousness and Cognition 8: 571–574.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2001. “Another two-dimensionalist Argument for Property Dualism.” Unpublished manuscript.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2002a. “Causal Reduction, Ontological Reduction, and First-Person Ontology. Notes on Searle’s View about Consciousness.” in Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality. Discussions with John Searle, edited by Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, pp. 205–222. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 79. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2002b. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2003. “My Future Body.” in Proceedings of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Persons. An Interdisciplinary Approach, edited by Christian Kanzian, Josef Quitterer, and Edmund Runggaldier, pp. 260–270. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 31. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2004. “Phenomenal Essentialism – A Problem for Identity Theorists.” in Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, edited by Ralph Schumacher, pp. 332–344. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2006a. Der Blick von innen. Zur transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2006b. “Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework.” in Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Josep Macià, pp. 205–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199271955.001.0001.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2006c. “A Puzzle About Colors.” Dialectica 60(3): 321–336.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2007a. “Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness.” in Philosophical Perspectives 21: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 429–455. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2007b. “Dualist Emergentism.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 269–286. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2007c. “Grasping Phenomenal Properties.” in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and Sven Walter, pp. 307–338. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.001.0001.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2008a. “Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience.” in The Case for Qualia, edited by Edmond Leo Wright, pp. 309–324. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2008b. “Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56(4): 513–534.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2009. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2010a. “What about the Emergence of Consciousness Deserves Puzzlement?” in Emergence in Science and Philosophy, edited by Antonella Corradini and Timothy O’Connor, pp. 149–162. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 6. London: Routledge.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2010b. “An Argument from Transtemporal Identity for Subject-Body Dualism.” in The Waning of Materialism, edited by Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, pp. 191–213. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.001.0001.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2010c. “Thinking without Language. A Phenomenological Argument for its Possibility and Existence.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 81: 55–75.  “New Perspectives on Concepts,” ed. by Julia Langkau and Christian Nimtz.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2011a. “Phenomenal Presence and Perceptual Awareness: A Subjectivist Account of Perceptual Openness to the World.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 352–383. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2011b. “Basic Intentionality, Primitive Awareness, and Awareness of Oneself.” in Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, edited by Anne Reboul. Genève: Département de philosophie, Université de Genève. Reprinted in Reboul (2014b, 2: 261–291), http://kevin.philosophie.ch.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2012a. “The Conceptual Origin of Subject-Body Dualism.” in The Self and Self-Knowledge, edited by Annalisa Coliva, pp. 39–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2012b. “The Non-Descriptive Individual Nature of Conscious Beings.” in Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?, edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan, pp. 157–175. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139028486.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2014a. “Qui est Roger Federer?” in Aristote chez les helvètes. Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique, edited by Olivier Massin and Anne Meylan, pp. 75–82. Paris: Les Éditions d’Ithaque.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2014b. “Basic Intentionality, Primitive Awareness and Awareness of Oneself.” in Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan, volume 2, edited by Anne Reboul, pp. 261–292. Cham: Springer. Book publication of Reboul (2011).
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2017. “Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings.” in Realism – Relativism – Constructivism. Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, edited by Christian Kanzian, Sebastian Kletzl, Josef Mitterer, and Katharina Neges, pp. 279–292. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 24. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2018a. “The Experience Property Frame Work: A Misleading Paradigm.” Synthese 195(8): 3361–3387.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine. 2018b. “Colours and Shapes.” in Phenomenal Presence, edited by Fabian Dorsch and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 77–103. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199666416.001.0001.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine and O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2019. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine and O’Conaill, Donnchadh. 2024. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2024/entries/qualia-knowledge/.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine and Suarez, Juan. 2009. “Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 346–391.

Further References

Ludlow, Peter J., Nagasawa, Yujin and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2004. There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Reboul, Anne, ed. 2011. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Genève: Département de philosophie, Université de Genève. Book publication: Reboul (2014a), http://kevin.philosophie.ch.
Reboul, Anne, ed. 2014a. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. vol. 1. Cham: Springer. Book publication of Reboul (2011).
Reboul, Anne, ed. 2014b. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan. vol. 2. Cham: Springer. Book publication of Reboul (2011).