Manuel Pérez-Otero (perezotero)
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Bibliography
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 1998. “Davidson, Correspondence Truth and the Frege-Gödel-Church Argument.” History and Philosophy of Logic 19: 63–81.
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2009. “The Conventional and the Analytic.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 239–274.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 1996. “Verdad necesaria versus teorema de lógica modal.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 11: 185–201.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 1998a. “Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposición.” Teorema 17(1): 61–74.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 1998b. “On the Utility of Global Supervenience.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 30(90): 3–21.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 1999. Conceptos modales e identidad. Filosofia n. 5. Barcelona: Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2001. “A Fallacy about the Modal Status of Logic.” Dialectica 55(1): 9–27.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2002a. “Aplicaciones Filosóficas del Bi-Dimensionalismo: Modalidad y Contenido Epistémico.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 17(3): 457–477.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2002b. “Reasoning about Non-Actual Possibilities. Problems with the Douven-Putnam Model-Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 34(102): 29–45.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2006a. Esbozo de la Filosofı́a de Kripke. Barcelona: Montesinos.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2006b. “Aspectos particularistas en el discurso modal.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 21(2): 213–232.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2007. “An Evaluation of Kripke’s Account of the Appearances of Contingency.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 39(117): 19–44.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2008. “The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll’s Paradox.” Philosophical Studies 141(3): 357–376.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2009. “El estatus ontológico de los mundos posibles.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 41(122): 69–96.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2010a. “Invariantism versus Relativism about Truth.” Teorema 29(3): 145–162.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2010b. “Possible Worlds: Structure and Stuff.” Philosophical Papers 39(2): 209–237.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2011. “Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 83: 9–32.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2012. “La prueba de Putnam contra el escepticismo radical: Dos reinterpretaciones basadas en el autoconocimiento.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 44(132): 35–63.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2013a. “Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism.” Theoria (San Sebastian), Secunda época 28(3): 393–406.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2013b. “Purposes of Reasoning and (a new vindication of) Moore’s Proof of an External World.” Synthese 190(18): 4181–4200.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2016a. “How Indeterminism Could Help Incompatibilism on Free Action.” Dialectica 70(2): 169–184.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2016b. “Respuestas disposicionalistas al problema Wittgensteiniano-Kripkeano sobre el significado y el seguimiento de reglas.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 48(143): 21–45.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel. 2018. “Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and Non-Ideal Thinkers.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99: 23–43.
Pérez-Otero, Manuel and Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel. 1999. “The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories.” in The Nature of Logic, edited by Achille C. Varzi. European Review of Philosophy n. 4. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.