Ingmar Persson (persson-i)

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

LaFollette, Hugh and Persson, Ingmar, eds. 2013. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. 2nd ed. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: LaFollette (2000), doi:10.1111/b.9780631201199.1999.x.
Persson, Ingmar. 1981. Reasons and Reason-Governed Actions. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
Persson, Ingmar. 1985. The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism. Library of Theoria n. 16. Lund: CWK Gleerup Bokforlag.
Persson, Ingmar. 1993. “Critical Study of van Inwagen (1990).” Noûs 27: 512–518.
Persson, Ingmar. 1997. “Hume – Not a ‘Humean’ about Motivation.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 14(2): 189–206.
Persson, Ingmar. 2000. “Mill’s Derivation of the Intrinsic Desirability of Pleasure.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 17(3): 297–310.
Persson, Ingmar. 2004a. “Self-Doubt: Why We are Not Identical to Things of Any Kind.” Ratio 17(4).
Persson, Ingmar. 2004b. “Two Act-Omission Paradoxes.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 149–164.
Persson, Ingmar. 2005. The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199276900.001.0001.
Persson, Ingmar. 2007. “Primary and Secondary Reasons.” in Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, edited by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson, and Dan Egonsson. Lund: Lunds Universitet, Filosofiska Institutionen, http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek.
Persson, Ingmar. 2013a. From Morality to the End of Reason. An Essay on Rights, Reasons, and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676552.001.0001.
Persson, Ingmar. 2013b. “The Relevance of Responsibility to Morality.” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, edited by Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson, 2nd ed., pp. 197–219. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: LaFollette (2000), doi:10.1111/b.9780631201199.1999.x.
Persson, Ingmar. 2017. Inclusive Ethics. Extending Beneficence and Egalitarian Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198792178.001.0001.
Persson, Ingmar. 2019a. Reasons in Action. A Reductionist Account of Intentional Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845034.001.0001.
Persson, Ingmar. 2019b. “Why the Intrinsic Value of Hedonic Sensations Is Not Quantifiable.” in The Illusions of Time. Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception, edited by Valtteri Arstila, Adrian Bardon, Sean Enda Power, and Argiro Vatakis, pp. 91–102. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-22048-8.
Persson, Ingmar. 2021. Morality from Compassion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192845535.001.0001.
Persson, Ingmar, Hermerén, Göran and Sjöstrand, E., eds. 2015. Against Boredom. 17 Essays presented to Nils-Eric Sahlin. Lund: Fri tanke förlag.
Persson, Ingmar and Savulescu, Julian. 2005. “McMahan on the Withdrawal of Life-Prolonging Aid [on McMahan (2002)].” Philosophical Books 46(1): 11–22.
Persson, Ingmar and Savulescu, Julian. 2012. Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199653645.001.0001.
Savulescu, Julian and Persson, Ingmar. 2012. “Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine.” The Monist 95(3): 399–421.

Further References

van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, doi:10.7591/9781501713033.
LaFollette, Hugh, ed. 2000. The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. 1st ed. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: LaFollette and Persson (2013).
McMahan, Jefferson. 2002. The Ethics of Killing. Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195079981.001.0001.