Douglas W. Portmore (portmore)
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Bibliography
Portmore, Douglas W. 2001. “Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory Be Agent
Relative?” American Philosophical Quarterly
38(4): 363–377.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2007a. “Consequentializing Moral theories.”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88: 39–73.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2007b. “Desire Fulfillment and Posthumous Harm.”
American Philosophical Quarterly 44(1): 27–38.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2008.
“Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism.”
Philosophical Studies 138(3): 409–427.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2009.
“Consequentializing.” Philosophy
Compass 4(2): 329–347.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2011a.
Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets
Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794539.001.0001.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2011b. “The Teleological Conception of Practical
Reasons.” Mind 120(477): 117–153.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2011c.
“Consequentialism.” in The Continuum Companion to Ethics, edited by
Christian B. Miller, pp. 143–167. London:
Continuum International Publishing Group. Republished as Miller
(2015).
Portmore, Douglas W. 2011d. “Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism.” in
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics,
volume I, edited by Mark Timmons, pp.
120–142. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2012. “Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options.”
Noûs 46(1): 24–60.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2013.
“Perform Your Best Option.” The Journal of
Philosophy 110(8): 436–459.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2017a. “Uncertainty, Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centred
Constraints.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
95(2): 284–298.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2017b.
“Maximalism Versus Omnism About
Permissibility.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
98: 427–452.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2017c. “Parfit on Reasons and Rule
Consequentialism.” in Reading
Parfit on What Matters, edited by Simon Kirchin, pp. 135–152. Reading Parfit on What Matters. London: Routledge.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2018.
“Telelogical Reasons.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and
Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 764–783. Oxford
Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2019a. Opting for the Best. Oughts and Options.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190945350.001.0001.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2019b. “Control, Attitudes, and Accountability.” in
Oxford Studies in Agency and
Responsibility, volume VI, edited by David W. Shoemaker, pp. 7–32. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198845539.001.0001.
Portmore, Douglas W., ed. 2020. The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism.
Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.001.0001.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2022.
“Consequentializing.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/consequentializing/.