John M. Preston (preston-jm)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Glock, Hans-Johann and Preston, John M. 1995. “Externalism and First-Person Authority.” The Monist 78(4): 515–533.
Preston, John M. 1989. “Folk Psychology as Theory or Practice? The Case for Eliminative Materialism.” Inquiry 32: 277–303.
Preston, John M. 1994. “Methodology, Epistemology and Conventions: Popper’s Bad Start.” in PSA 1994: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers, edited by David L. Hull, Micky Forbes, and Richard M. Burian, pp. 314–322. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Preston, John M., ed. 1997a. Thought and Language. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Preston, John M. 1997b. “Introduction: Thought as Language.” in Thought and Language, edited by John M. Preston, pp. 1–14. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Preston, John M. 1997c. “Paul Feyerabend.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1997/entries/feyerabend/.
Preston, John M. 2001. “Feyerabend.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, edited by William H. Newton-Smith, pp. 143–148. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164481.
Preston, John M. 2004. “Bird, Kuhn, and Positivism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35(2): 327–335.
Preston, John M. 2006. “Janik on Hertz and the Early Wittgenstein.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 73: 83–95.
Preston, John M. 2007. “Paul Feyerabend.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/feyerabend/.
Preston, John M. 2008a. “Hertz, Wittgenstein and Philosophical Method.” Philosophical Investigations 31(1): 48–67.
Preston, John M. 2008b. “Mach and Hertz’s Mechanics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39(1): 91–101.
Preston, John M., ed. 2009. Wittgenstein and Reason. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444307092.
Preston, John M. 2012. “Paul Feyerabend.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/feyerabend/.
Preston, John M. 2015. “Logical Space and Phase-Space.” in Mind, Language and Action. Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker A. Munz, and Annalisa Coliva, pp. 35–44. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 22. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Preston, John M. 2016. “The Rise of Western Rationalism: Paul Feyerabend’s Story.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57: 79–86.
Preston, John M. 2017a. “Review of Stump (2015).” Ratio 30(1): 100–106.
Preston, John M. 2017b. “Wittgenstein, Hertz, and Boltzmann.” in A Companion to Wittgenstein, edited by Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman, pp. 110–124. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118884607.
Preston, John M. 2019. “Mach, Wittgenstein, Science and Logic.” in Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence, edited by Friedrich Stadler, pp. 63–90. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook n. 22. Berlin: Springer.
Preston, John M. 2020. “Paul Feyerabend.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/feyerabend/.
Preston, John M., ed. 2021. Interpreting Mach: Critical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781108564311.
Preston, John M. and Bishop, Mark, eds. 2002. Views into the Chinese Room. New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Preston, John M. and Schroeder, Severin. 2013. “The Neuroscientific Case for a Representative Theory of Perception.” in A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology, edited by Timothy P. Racine and Kathleen L. Slaney, pp. 253–273. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Further References

Stump, David J. 2015. Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science. Alternative Interpretations of the A Priori. London: Routledge.