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Gregory Ray (ray-g)

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Bibliography

    Ludwig, Kirk A. and Ray, Gregory. 1998. Semantics for Opaque Contexts.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 141–166. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Ludwig, Kirk A. and Ray, Gregory. 2002. Vagueness and the Sorites Paradox.” in Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 419–461. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Ray, Gregory. 1995. Thinking in L.” Noûs 29: 378–396.
    Ray, Gregory. 1996a. Ontology-Free Modal Semantics.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(4): 333–361.
    Ray, Gregory. 1996b. Logical Consequence: A Defense of Tarski.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 25(6): 617–677.
    Ray, Gregory. 1996c. On the Possibility of a Privileged Class of Logical Terms.” Philosophical Studies 81: 303–313.
    Ray, Gregory. 1997. Fodor and the Inscrutability Problem.” Mind and Language 12: 475–489.
    Ray, Gregory. 2000. De Re Modality: Lessons from Quine.” in Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, edited by Alex Orenstein and Petr Kotátko, pp. 347–366. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 210. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Ray, Gregory. 2002. Truth, the Liar, and Tarskian Truth Definition.” in A Companion to Philosophical Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, pp. 164–176. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470996751.
    Ray, Gregory. 2003. Tarski and the Metalinguistic Liar.” Philosophical Studies 115(1): 55–80.
    Ray, Gregory. 2004. Williamson’s Master Argument on Vagueness.” Synthese 138(2): 175–206.
    Ray, Gregory. 2005. On the Matter of Essential Richness.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 34(4): 433–457.
    Ray, Gregory. 2014a. Meaning and Truth.” Mind 123(489): 79–100.
    Ray, Gregory. 2014b. The Problem of Negative Existentials Inadvertently Solved.” in Empty Representations. Reference & Non-Existence, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Genoveva Martı́, pp. 262–276. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199647057.001.0001.
    Ray, Gregory. 2018. Tarski on the Concept of Truth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 695–717. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.